# Problems of Communism

Book Reviews
Frederick W. Crook
Jacob M. Landau
Elizabeth Clayton
Anna M. Cienciala
A. Ross Johnson

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1983



LATIN AMERICA IN SOVIET EYES
Morris Rothenberg

Peru's Maoist Guerrillas
Cynthia McClintock

Are Nations Merging in the USSR?
Zvi Gitelman

Party and Military in China
Ellis Joffe

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# Problems of Communism

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**SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1983 VOL XXXII**

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Cover: Cuban workers supervise construction of the new airport runway on the Caribbean island of Grenada, in May 1982. Photo by Owen Franken/SYGMA.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

# Problems of Communism

## Articles


**Latin America in Soviet Eyes**
Morris Rothenberg

Soviet ideologists and policymakers view the "progressive" Sandinista regime in Nicaragua as a promising addition to Moscow's Cuban connection in Latin America, and there has been a marked rise in declared Soviet support for further revolutionary "armed struggle" in Central America, particularly in El Salvador. Nevertheless, a keen awareness of the geopolitical advantages that determined US resistance could bring to bear is likely to impose caution on Moscow's dealings with insurgencies in the hemisphere. Meanwhile, the Soviets hope to expand their already fairly substantial diplomatic, economic, and other links with the larger countries of Latin America as a means of accelerating the erosion of US influence they claim is under way.

**Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas**
Cynthia McClintock

After five years of stability unchallenged by a substantial parliamentary Left, the centrist government of Peruvian President Belaúnde Terry has faced an upsurge in extreme leftist violence by the Sendero Luminoso organization. The movement's Maoist rhetoric, Indian nativist pretensions, and isolated but sensational terrorism appeal mainly to a small intellectual group and some of the impoverished peasants in Peru's southern highlands, around Ayacucho. Sendero has few political allies, either at home or abroad, and so it is likely to remain weak; the greater threat is that its terrorism may further drain the country's hard-pressed economy and political cohesion.

**Are Nations Merging in the USSR?**
Zvi Gitelman

Interviews with Soviet émigrés confirm that nationality does matter, not only to the Soviet state but also to Soviet society. Contrary to self-congratulatory official pronouncements, the Soviet Union has not created a "fundamentally new social and international community" or, for that matter, a "Soviet people." Inter-ethnic differences and tensions persist, and, like religion, appear to be hardy perennials.

**Party and Military in China: Professionalism in Command?**
Ellis Joffe

Civil-military relations in China under Deng Xiaoping are diverse and complex. His policies have aroused varying degrees of opposition among two broad but amorphous military groupings. One group consists of professional officers, whose main concern is the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and whose differences with Deng revolve around the issue of resource allocation for weapons renewal. The other group consists of "political" military leaders, whose concerns extend beyond military issues and include criticism of the party's national policies. Thus far, Deng has been able to fend off dissent in the PLA by promising gradual technological modernization, by making personnel changes, and by conducting indoctrination campaigns.


Essay-reviews (over)

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## Essay-reviews

**Motivating China's Farmers**
Frederick W. Crook

In 1978 the post-Mao leadership of China launched a major reform of agricultural management aimed at restoring certain prerogatives to peasant households and unleashing entrepreneurial and innovative behavior. A review of Chinese agricultural management during the Communist era reveals the problems which the reform seeks to address and reminds one of the possibility of a swing of the pendulum back to stultifying centralization of agricultural management.

**Images of the Turkish Left**
Jacob M. Landau

Over the past decade, Turkey's intellectually significant Left has produced a diversity of political tracts, differing greatly in tone and tactical prescription but generally agreeing that capitalism and economic dependency have kept the country backward. Military government has impeded the expression of such rhetoric somewhat since September 1980. But the approaching November 1983 elections and restoration of civil rule could well mean the gradual return of strong leftist influences on Turkey's political life.

**USSR Regional Issues: Growth vs. Equality**
Elizabeth Clayton

Despite the stated Soviet objective of equalizing economic development throughout the vast territory that comprises the USSR, strong regional economic differences continue to exist. The implication is that the Kremlin leadership still favors economic growth over regional equalization.

**Resistance: A Polish Tradition**
Anna M. Cienciala

Poland's resistance to foreign occupation during World War II was the greatest and most united in Polish history. Accounts of this struggle were disseminated by the underground press in Communist Poland in the late 1970's and helped to fuel the national revival embodied in the Solidarity movement. Thus Solidarity is also a part of Polish traditional resistance to oppression.

**Eastern Europe: The Challenge From Within**
A. Ross Johnson

In the early 1980's, Eastern Europe's status as a stable and viable element of the Soviet imperial system has been increasingly challenged, not from without but from within. East European governments appear to be simply running out of steam. What is needed is significant adaptation of the economic management system, which inevitably entails reform of the political system. But East European leaderships reject political reform because it would undermine their own institutional and personal power and because Moscow would forbid it. Many Western analysts therefore predict that stagnation and instability are likely to characterize East European societies over the next decade.

**Please Note:**

The editorial office of *Problems of Communism* is now located at 400 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, telephone (202) 485-2230. The staff regrets any inconvenience the recent move may have caused, including delays in mail and telephone communications directed to the old Pennsylvania Avenue address.

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# Latin America in Soviet Eyes

**by Morris Rothenberg**

Once an area of remote and limited concern, Latin America has become one of great interest and considerable involvement for the USSR. Through its ties to Cuba and increasingly to Nicaragua, the Soviet Union has already become an important presence in Latin America, with important consequences for Moscow's international role and ideological convictions about the "inevitable march of history." Socioeconomic factors not of its own making have created opportunities for the Soviet Union to project its power into the Western Hemisphere. It seeks to do so, however, against the background of an activist US administration, and one that tends to define foreign policy issues in East-West terms. Moscow's propaganda therefore seeks to mute the East-West image of its activities in Latin America and to focus attention instead on traditional Latin concerns about US intervention, while taking advantage of new openings below the US border.

Until the 1960's, Soviet attention to the Third World centered almost exclusively on Asia and Africa. Khrushchev's "zone of peace" did not include Latin America. Moscow's primary front organization for the Third World—the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization—by definition excluded other continents, where the USSR lacked the resources to support an active strategy. Moreover, the Soviets believed Latin America to be under firm US control, and assumed that Washington would not tolerate leftist regimes or significant Soviet influence there. But the Cuban revolution and, above all, the unexpected survival of Fidel Castro's regime critically altered Soviet perceptions of all three relevant factors: the opportunities available in Latin America, Moscow's own ability to capitalize on those opportunities, and US domination of the hemisphere.

The main thrust of Moscow's Latin American policy since then has been to strengthen the Soviet hold on Cuba, while striving to expand Soviet and undermine US influence wherever other openings arise. The factors that made possible the development of Soviet-Cuban ties still shape Soviet policy elsewhere in the region. In particular, since 1980 the Soviet Union has welcomed the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua as a historic watershed reversing the downturn in Communist fortunes that resulted from the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile.[1] Continuing ferment on the continent holds out the promise of further Soviet penetration. Moscow's ability to influence Latin American developments has been enhanced both by the growth of Soviet strategic and naval power and by the acquisition of Cuba as a regional ally.

## The Cuban Connection

The cornerstone of the Soviet position in Latin America is, of course, the close relationship with Castro's Cuba. The Soviets have always handled Castro with utmost care, applying pressure in the early years but providing psychic and practical payoffs once he "saw the light." Since the turbulent quarrels of the late 1960's over Castro's ill-fated revolutionary "adventurism," no major ideological controversy has surfaced between Moscow and Havana; their current views on Latin American revolution may not be absolutely identical, but there is no evidence at all of sub-

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[1]See, for example, B. I. Koval', "Revolution—A Long Historic Process," *Latinskaya Amerika* (Moscow), March 1980, p. 12.



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stantial disagreement. Economically, Cuba is tied as closely as ever to the Soviet bloc, whether by choice or lack of it. The significance of Soviet oil shipments to Cuba, for example, is described by one Soviet magazine as "hard to overestimate, since practically the entire functioning of Cuba's national economy is based on energy supplies from the Soviet Union."[2] The favorable price Cuba pays compared to world market prices for oil, and the subsidy paid to Cuba for the bulk of its sugar exports going to the Soviet bloc, bind the island tightly to the Soviet sphere. Over the years, a network of relationships has also developed in military and other fields, creating a powerful pro-Soviet lobby in Havana that is likely to outlast Castro.

This Soviet investment, though extremely costly, has paid some considerable dividends. The 1962 missile crisis set back the boldest effort to reap strategic benefits from Cuba, but Moscow has made up for this in other ways. Castro's regime is now an important adjunct of Soviet political, diplomatic, propaganda, and intelligence activities in Latin America. Cuba's value as a proxy in other areas of the world was demonstrated in Angola and Ethiopia. Moscow has also benefited from Castro's attempts to steer the Nonaligned Movement into "anti-imperialist," pro-Soviet channels. Most important of all, the USSR has incrementally developed a military position on the island, thus strengthening the image of Soviet power in an overall East-West context, reinforcing the impression of a Soviet counterweight to the United States in Latin America, and potentially providing a physical capability for Soviet access to other areas of the continent as well as to the United States.

Moscow has pursued a dual policy of steadily building up its military presence in Cuba while exercising care that this process not generate US counteraction. From the Soviet perspective, one of the most portentous developments of the past two decades has been the increasing US acceptance not only of the existence of Castro's regime, but also of that regime's military relationship with the USSR. As the Soviet sense of assurance about US acceptance has grown, Moscow's commitment to the defense of Cuba has become more definite and more overt.

After the missile crisis setback, the USSR continued to explore the limits of Soviet military activities in Cuba. In 1970 the USSR began building a permanent base for nuclear-armed submarines at Cienfuegos.[3] After low-key exchanges between Moscow and Washington, the USSR formally denied that it was building such a base and reaffirmed its adherence to a 1962 agreement barring offensive weapons from the island.

[2]V. Burmistrov, "The First Soviet-Cuban Long-Term Trade Agreement (1976–1980): Its Results," *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), January 1982, p. 9.

[3]For details of the 1962 and subsequent Cuban "crises," see Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown & Company, 1979, pp. 632–52; and the articles by Raymond L. Garthoff, Gloria Duffy, Mark N. Katz, and Jorge I. Domínguez in the section "Cuba Between the Superpowers," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Summer 1983.



*A Soviet tanker unloading oil at a Havana refinery formerly owned by the US firm Exxon.*

—Camera Press.



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*General Viktor Kulikov, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, at the 1978 dedication of the new Maximo Gomez Military Academy located near Havana. Seated in the left foreground are Raúl Castro and Fidel Castro. Under wraps is a bust of Lenin which was later unveiled as a gift from the USSR on the occasion.*

—Fred Ward/BLACK STAR.

In return, Moscow obtained official assurance from the US that it would not invade Cuba, an assurance Washington had hitherto linked to agreement by Castro—never given—to permit on-site inspection regarding offensive weapons in his country.

While Moscow has always avoided giving Castro the formal treaty he evidently wanted, the Soviet commitment to Cuba was increased several notches in the early 1970's. In June 1972, Brezhnev declared that "Socialist Cuba is not alone. It is a strong constituent part of the world system of socialism."[4] Within a month of this declaration, Cuba was admitted to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the closest legal tie between Cuba and the Soviet multilateral treaty structure. In January 1974, Brezhnev paid his first and only visit to Cuba, another important step in Cuban integration with the Soviet world.

As this process unfolded, Moscow noted with satisfaction the increasing diplomatic recognition of Cuba by various Latin American countries. Even more significant, the United States itself, first under Nixon and later under Carter, moved to establish some form of diplomatic ties with Cuba, thereby dropping an earlier condition linking relations to abrogation of Soviet-Cuban military ties. The short-lived, inconclusive uproar in 1979 over the presence of a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba further strengthened Moscow's overt self-confidence about its role on the island, and about US acquiescence in that role. After facing down the Carter Administration on the brigade issue, the Soviet government published an authoritative editorial in *Pravda* of September 11, 1979, asserting the "inalienable right" of the Soviet Union and Cuba to establish any military relationship they pleased.

Nevertheless, in 1980–81, Moscow and Havana once more confronted the problem of a possible US "threat" to Cuba. The major catalyst was Washington's charge that Cuba was aiding a rising tide of leftist insurgencies in Central America. While it is doubtful that either Moscow or Havana was genuinely apprehensive about US action, the contretemps about that threat may have helped generate an important addition to Cuba's relations with the Soviet world: the signature on May 31, 1980, of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Cuba and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the only political-military

[4] *Pravda* (Moscow), June 28, 1972.



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


*A MiG–23, said to be of the sort furnished by the Soviet Union to Cuba in 1978.*

**—J. P. Quittard/Gamma-Liaison.**

treaty between Cuba and a member of the Warsaw Pact. The terms of this treaty are relatively weak, but its symbolic importance is considerable. A similar treaty was signed between Cuba and Vietnam on October 19, 1982.[5]

With the advent of the Reagan Administration and its professed determination to make a test case of El Salvador, the Cubans began voicing greater apprehension about US intentions. A note of alarm is evident in Castro's statement to the Soviet party congress in February 1981 that "90 miles from our fatherland are those who proclaim the need to destroy us."[6] In this context, Brezhnev raised the Soviet commitment to Cuba yet one more degree by including that country explicitly, for the first time, in a listing of members of the "socialist community."[7] Previously this community had seemed to encompass only the East European states (sometimes with Mongolia added), with all other Communist states identified either as "fraternal states" or else as members of the "world socialist system," as Brezhnev had labeled Cuba back in 1972.

The special significance attached to inclusion in the community became clearer in a March 1981 Soviet-Polish joint declaration:

*The socialist community is indissoluble; defense of it is the cause not only of each state but of the entire socialist coalition.*[8]

A few weeks later, to make the connection still clearer, Brezhnev himself declared:

*The glorious Republic of Cuba, an inseparable part of the community of socialist states, is fulfilling the task of its development under difficult conditions. The Soviet Union firmly and invariably supports and will continue to support the fraternal Cuban people.*[9]

In the fall of 1981, at the height of this "hands off Cuba" campaign, Moscow responded to US charges of Cuban military involvement (via Nicaragua) in El Salvador with a series of warnings to the US about the "serious consequences" of any punitive action against Havana.[10] Presumably to back up these warnings, the USSR significantly stepped up military shipments to

[5]For text of the Cuba-GDR treaty, see GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (Berlin), Vol. 20, No. 18, June 18, 1980, pp. 137–38. For text of the Cuba-Vietnam treaty, see broadcast by Vietnam News Agency (Hanoi), Oct. 21, 1982, in US Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-LAM*), Oct. 22, 1982, pp. Q/1–3.

[6]*Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1981.

[7]Ibid., Feb. 24, 1981.

[8]Ibid., Mar. 5, 1981.

[9]Ibid., Apr. 8, 1981.

[10]These included a statement by bloc Communist party secretaries on November 4, and by USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov on Nov. 6, 1981, in *Pravda*, Nov. 5 and 7, 1981; see also *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Nov. 17, 1981, and *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1981.



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Cuba. This influx of weapons was noted in a statement by US President Reagan on February 24, 1982:

*Last year, Cuba received 66,000 tons of war supplies from the Soviet Union, more than in any year since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Last month the arrival of additional high-performance MiG–23 Floggers gave Cuba an arsenal of more than 200 Soviet war planes, far more than the military aircraft inventories of all other Caribbean Basin countries combined.*[11]

Moreover, Brezhnev made a striking addition to Moscow's warnings when he evoked the possibility of new Soviet missile emplacements in Cuba. In his March 16, 1982, speech to the Soviet Trade Union Congress, Brezhnev warned that if the US deployed medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, "this would compel us to take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States, its own territory, in an analogous position."[12] While Soviet spokesmen have carefully avoided explicit confirmation that Brezhnev had in mind new missile deployments in Cuba, they have also hinted occasionally that this remains a Soviet option. In late 1981, for example, *New Times* pointedly recalled that the 1962 missile deployment was a "response" to US Thor and Jupiter missiles in Western Europe, invoking a precedent for linking the presence of missiles in both hemispheres.[13] Similarly, in March 1983, former Soviet ambassador to Bonn Valentin Falin observed that Washington "arrogates to itself the right to do what it thinks necessary wherever it likes," whereas "if the Soviet Union were to begin acting in similar fashion and were to deploy its missiles in the Western Hemisphere," then the US "would regard this as an unacceptable threat."[14] The reference to this option contrasts with statements Falin made back in 1979 and 1981, in which he noted merely that "there are technical ways to bring medium-range missiles close to the United States without involving the territory of a bordering or nearby country."[15]

In general, since Yuriy Andropov's accession to power in the Kremlin, a conscious effort has been underway to reaffirm Cuban ties with the USSR and membership in the "socialist community." In an unusual gesture, Andropov and Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov jointly received Fidel Castro when he journeyed to Moscow for Brezhnev's funeral in November 1982; the symbolic welcome was repeated for Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro at the USSR's

[11] *The New York Times*, Feb. 25, 1982.
[12] *Pravda*, Mar. 17, 1982.
[13] Yuriy Gudkov, "What is Behind the Rhetoric," *New Times* (Moscow), December 1981, p. 8.
[14] *Izvestiya*, Mar. 30, 1983.
[15] Interviews in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Nov. 5, 1979, and in *Stern* (Hamburg), July 9, 1981.

*Raúl Castro, Cuban Minister of Armed Forces, in Moscow on December 29, 1982, at a meeting with Soviet leaders (from left to right): Minister of Defense Dmitriy Ustinov, General Secretary Yuriy Andropov, and CPSU Secretary Konstantin Rusakov.*

—TASS from Sovfoto.



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60th anniversary celebration the following month. In both cases, Ustinov's presence may have been intended to underline the military component of Soviet-Cuban relations. Indeed, also in December 1982, another in a series of Soviet naval visits was made to Cuba. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets issued a new volume celebrating that relationship. The book, according to a review in the military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), reminds the reader that the "Soviet Union sees its international duty to render political and military assistance to socialist Cuba," which represents "the advance post of socialism in the Western hemisphere, 90 miles from the citadel of imperialism." The Cubans, in turn, are said to view their ties with the USSR and other socialist states as "the guarantee of their security."[16]

Nevertheless, for the past several months Moscow has seemed deliberately to mute the Cuban dimension of its charges about threatening US actions in Latin America, and has not repeated warnings of possible Soviet counteractions. Both Moscow and Havana may thereby seek to avert the accusation of a Soviet-Cuban axis in the region. For example, one long Soviet article about hostile US plans touched only very lightly on military issues, stressing instead the internal opposition to those plans both in the US and in Latin America. As far as Cuban security was concerned, the author asserted that "extensively using the experience of the Soviet armed forces, the Cuban armed forces have been transformed into a well-prepared and technically well-equipped army"—implying that it could do well enough on its own. Washington's "aggressive strivings," the article continued, would meet the twin obstacles of Cuban determination and the "combat solidarity"—but not necessarily the direct military response—of the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole.[17]

Similarly, while Ustinov's 1982 message to Raúl Castro commemorating Fidel's abortive assault on the Moncada barracks pledged further "close collaboration between our fraternal peoples and armies," the 1983 message omitted any reference at all to Soviet-Cuban military ties.[18] Fidel Castro, in a July 1983 interview with US journalists, likewise focused exclusively on the steps the Cubans themselves would take in case of a US invasion, and seemed intent on playing down the possibility that a Central American crisis might escalate into global conflict. The main danger, he said, was an expanded regional conflict, not intervention by "large powers."[19] The Soviet media version of this interview was still more cautious, greatly compressing the section about a hypothetical invasion of Cuba and referring to possible intervention by unspecified "governments" rather than by "large powers."[20]

How the USSR would in fact react to US military action against Cuba remains conjectural. At a minimum, Soviet threats have been designed to deter the US from such action, to reassure the Cubans, and to remind the rest of Latin America about Moscow's current and potential role. At the same time, the Soviet Union may wish to avoid more explicit and perhaps dangerously provocative declarations of its commitment to Cuba, just when both countries are concentrating on the consolidation of a new revolutionary regime in Central America.

## Moscow and Managua

For the past four years, Soviet spokesmen have placed the Nicaraguan revolution in the context of world developments deemed to be among the major Soviet triumphs of recent years. On November 6, 1979, shortly after the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza, Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko remarked that the "Soviet people rejoice that in recent years the people of Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Grenada have broken the chains of imperialist domination and have embarked on a road of independent development."[21] From Moscow's perspective, the Sandinista victory constituted the third great revolutionary development in recent Latin American history, after Castro's victory in Cuba and Allende's in Chile. In language reminiscent of their early encomiums to Castro, Soviet commentators suggest that Nicaraguan events demonstrate anew the possibility of revolutionary transformations in the "strategic rear" of the United States.[22]

The USSR moved even more rapidly than it had in Castro's case to establish diplomatic, economic, and other relations with the new revolutionary regime. Moscow responded immediately to the proclamation of a Provisional Democratic Government of National Reconstruction with a message from Brezhnev ex-

[16] *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Dec. 29, 1982.

[17] B. I. Gvozdarev, "Washington's Anti-Cuban Policy—A Threat to the Peace and Security of the Peoples," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* (Moscow), May 1983, pp. 7–15.

[18] Cf. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 25, 1982, and July 26, 1983.

[19] Broadcast on Havana Domestic Television Service, Aug. 3, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-LAM*, Aug. 4, 1983, pp. Q/1–11.

[20] *New Times*, Aug. 19, 1983, pp. 18–20.

[21] *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1979.

[22] See, for example, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), July 20, 1979; *Izvestiya*, July 29, 1979; *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), June 1981, p. 47.



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

*A 1977 military parade in Havana showing Soviet BRDM–2 amphibious vehicles mounted with "Sagger" anti-tank missiles.*

—Camera Press.

pressing Soviet willingness "to develop multifaceted ties with Nicaragua."[23] Since that time, Sandinista ties with the Soviet Union and its allies have increased dramatically. This has taken place against a backdrop both of US economic restrictions and "covert" support for anti-Sandinista "Contra" forces, and of sporadic periods of negotiations between US and Sandinista representatives.

On March 17, 1980, the first major Sandinista delegation arrived in Moscow, on a journey that also included stops in Bulgaria, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia. The delegation included four top members of the Sandinista leadership: Minister of Interior Tomas Borge, Minister of Economic Planning Henry Ruíz, Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega, and Junta member Moises Hassan. From the Soviet point of view, perhaps the most important result of this visit was the affirmation of a clear-cut ideological affinity between the USSR and the Sandinistas, in the signature of a party-to-party agreement between the CPSU and the Sandinist National Liberation Front. Although the Front is not a Communist party, the agreement reflected Soviet expectations that it would become one and, under Soviet guidance, take on the characteristics of a Soviet-style organization, much as Castro's organization had evolved in Cuba.

Moscow's handling of Nicaragua's ideological status shows the impact of both the Cuban experience and the "lessons of Chile." At issue is the pace of Nicaragua's identification with the "socialist community," and of its transformation into a socialist state. Whereas Castro managed to "force the pace" of his recognition as a Marxist-Leninist leader, Soviet commentaries conspicuously ignore numerous statements by Sandinista leaders proclaiming their adherence to Marxism-Leninism. Nor do Soviet writers suggest that Nicaragua is aspiring to build a socialist society. The leading Soviet ideologist, Boris Ponomarëv, did come close to this formulation in two separate articles published in November 1980 and January 1981, where he wrote that states of "socialist orientation" were emerging in Asia, Africa, "and Central America."[24] But he did not explicitly refer to Nicaragua then, nor did other Soviet authors.

[23] *Pravda*, July 20, 1979.

[24] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 16, November 1980, p. 41; and *World Marxist Review*, January 1981, p. 13.



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For at least several months beginning in March 1982, however, Soviet authors unobtrusively raised Nicaragua's ideological status. Soviet journals began to refer to Nicaragua as a "people's democracy," a label originally used to designate the postwar regimes in Eastern Europe.[25] The Soviet May Day slogans for 1982, as reported in *Pravda* on April 11 of that year, made this change official:

*Warm greetings to the heroic Nicaraguan people, who are waging a courageous struggle to consolidate the gains of the people's democratic revolution and against imperialism and reaction.*

Significantly, Soviet analysts take the position that the Sandinistas have corrected various major mistakes that led to the downfall of Allende: first, in taking care to avoid antagonizing the middle classes, including a sector of the business community; second, in securing control of the armed forces; and third, in establishing control over the main levers of power and creating instruments for mass mobilization.[26] The key issue, the Soviets emphasize, is not socialist economic reform but political power. Sergo Mikoyan, editor of the specialized Soviet monthly *Latinskaya Amerika*, set forth this thesis with particular clarity:

*The issue comes down, above all, not to tempos of reforms, as some revolutionaries think at times, but to the effectiveness of the measures adopted, not to the broadness of the economic reforms but to the reliable securing of all (or the maximum possible) fullness of power. It is precisely this, in the last analysis, that is the key to the realization of reforms not on paper, but in fact, the guarantee of the reliability and irreversibility of revolutionary gains.*[27]

Moscow gave the Sandinistas high marks on this count. According to *Latinskaya Amerika* in July 1982:

*The Sandinist Front of National Liberation, in alliance with other parties, comes out in the role of the political vanguard of the Nicaraguan revolution and*

[25]This designation appeared in *New Times*, Mar. 19, 1982, and in N. Yu. Smirnova, "Nicaragua: The Revolution Is Developing," *Latinskaya Amerika*, March 1982, pp. 36–42.

[26]See, for example, the comments by several participants in a *Latinskaya Amerika* roundtable in the January, February, and March 1980 issues of the journal.

[27]Sergo Mikoyan, "On the Peculiarities of the Revolution in Nicaragua," *Latinskaya Amerika*, July 1982, p. 41.

*Cuban leader Fidel Castro with Sandinista leaders at their first anniversary victory celebration in Managua, July 19, 1980.*

—Owen Franken/SYGMA.



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fulfills the role of a ruling party, *consistently realizing a program of profound socioeconomic reforms.*[28]

To a considerable extent, this ideological upgrading was rewarded in kind by Managua. A comparison of the March 1980 and May 1982 Soviet-Nicaraguan joint communiqués, for example, underscores how far the Sandinistas have come in aligning themselves rhetorically with the USSR. The 1980 document barely mentioned the US, while the 1982 communiqué deplores "the growth of the aggressiveness of the forces of imperialism and reaction led by the United States of America."[29]

In addition to this Soviet connection, an impressive array of political ties has developed between Nicaragua and other Communist states. The Sandinistas also have party-to-party agreements with the GDR, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. Other Sandinista bodies have established ties with their counterparts in the GDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary—and, most notably, with the Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Nicaragua is now affiliated with all major international Communist front organizations, and Managua is increasingly the site of meetings sponsored by these groups. In May 1982, Nicaragua joined the Soviet-led Intersputnik telecommunications consortium, the first Nicaraguan accession to a multilateral Communist governmental body.[30]

In the economic arena, the very first official Sandinista visit to Moscow brought a variety of agreements on trade relations, technical cooperation, and airline and consular ties. Of special significance, Henry Ruíz and N. K. Baybakov, head of the Soviet State Planning Commission, signed an agreement that could give Moscow considerable influence over Nicaragua's future economic course. And, though both Moscow and Havana initially encouraged the Sandinistas to get economic aid wherever they could,[31] in the past two years a growing share of Nicaragua's international transactions has gradually been redirected toward the Soviet sphere. In September 1981, the USSR concluded economic aid, technical cooperation, radio-television, and fishery agreements with Managua. An economic protocol provided for a US$50 million Soviet credit—supplementing US$100 million in credits from Libya, US$64 million from Cuba, and over US$50 million more from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria extended during 1981 and 1982.[32] The next milestone in Soviet-Nicaraguan economic relations came in May 1982, with a visit to Moscow by Sandinista "Coordinator" Daniel Ortega that featured the personal involvement of Brezhnev and the signature of new commercial agreements. Ortega told a press conference in Managua upon his return that the USSR had granted Nicaragua an additional US$100 million credit and had contracted to expand facilities for ship repair at the Pacific port of San Juan del Sur.[33]

In the military realm, the presence on the 1980 Sandinista delegation to Moscow of Defense Minister

*A Soviet-Nicaraguan economic planning agreement is signed in Moscow on March 22, 1980, by Nicaraguan Planning Minister Henry Ruíz (left) and N. K. Baybakov (right), Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee.*

**—TASS from Sovfoto**

[28]M. F. Gornov, "Latin America: Strengthening of the Struggle Against Imperialism and Oligarchy, for Democracy and Social Progress," ibid., July 1982, pp. 13–14. Emphasis added.

[29]Cf. *Pravda*, Mar. 23, 1980, and May 10, 1982.

[30]Radio Managua, May 20, 1982, in *FBIS-LAM*, May 21, 1982, p. P/22.

[31]Sergo Mikoyan, "On The Peculiarities of the Revolution of Nicaragua and Its Lessons from the Point of View of the Theory and Practice of the Liberation Movement," *Latinskaya Amerika*, March 1980, p. 43; K. I. Maydanik, "The Key Question—Unity," ibid., February 1980, p. 50; speech by Fidel Castro in Managua on July 19, 1980, in *FBIS-LAM*, July 21, 1980, pp. P/8–10.

[32]On the Soviet credit, see TASS, Sept. 4, 1981, in US Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Sept. 8, 1981, p. K/2. On the Libyan and Cuban credits, see Radio Managua, Apr. 25, 1981, in *FBIS-LAM*, Apr. 27, 1981, p. P/18. On the GDR credit, see Radio Managua, June 6, 1981, in ibid., June 10, 1981, p. P/17. On the Czechoslovak credit, see *El Nuevo Diario* (Managua), Dec. 19, 1981, in ibid., Dec. 28, 1981, p. P/6; also Managua Television, July 7, 1983, in ibid., July 12, 1983, p. P/25. On the Bulgarian credit, see Radio Managua, Apr. 8, 1982, in ibid., Apr. 14, 1982, p. P/22.

[33]Radio Managua Domestic Service, May 10, 1982, in *FBIS-LAM*, May 11, 1982, pp. P/8–10.



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Humberto Ortega suggests that military aid may well have been explored even at that early date, though no announcement to that effect was made. In November 1981, Nicaragua's Defense Minister visited the Soviet Union again, this time for more than a week, and it may be presumed that military aid was at the top of his agenda. TASS announced that Ortega had had "a friendly conversation on matters of mutual interest" with Moscow's three top military officials: Defense Minister Ustinov, Chief of Staff Nikolay Ogarkov, and the head of the armed forces Main Political Administration, Gen. Aleksey Yepishev.[34] This visit most likely set the stage for steadily rising Soviet military shipments to Nicaragua, reported in *The New York Times* on March 9 and again on August 2, 1982.

In this connection, though the Soviets professed support for Mexican President Lopez Portillo's February 1982 proposals for a negotiated settlement in Central America, they carefully avoided endorsing his call for steps to allay the apprehensions of neighboring countries about Nicaragua's military buildup. Soviet media coverage of that buildup has generally been quite meager, concentrating on charges that the US was planning to destabilize or invade Nicaragua. Yet, as in the Cuban case, Moscow refrained from making any formal security commitments to the Sandinista regime.

Most recently, since the advent of Andropov to power in Moscow, the general trend of Soviet-Nicaraguan relations has continued: on the one hand, more moves toward stronger ties; on the other hand, the same Soviet caution about counteraction in case of drastic US military pressure. Top Sandinista leaders made a remarkable number of trips to the Soviet capital from late 1982 through mid-1983. In September 1982, in a visit publicized by Managua but not by his Soviet hosts, Tomas Borge went to Moscow at the express invitation of then party secretary Andropov and various security officials. Daniel Ortega made the journey for Brezhnev's funeral in November 1982, and then again in March 1983 en route home from the Nonaligned Conference in New Delhi. Jaime Wheelock, Minister of Agriculture, Cattle Development and Agrarian Reform, took part in the USSR's 60th anniversary celebrations in December 1982, and returned in July 1983 to negotiate an agricultural agreement. Henry Ruíz held talks with Soviet planners in February 1983, and Bayardo Arce, head of the Sandinista political commission, visited in June for talks on implementing the CPSU-Sandinista party-to-party agreement.

Throughout this period, a steady Soviet media campaign of solidarity with Nicaragua was carried out, first, in the face of reports that Washington planned to intensify the pressure on Nicaragua, and then when anti-Sandinista forces stepped up their operations in the country. The constant warnings about US intentions appeared intended to discredit these intentions in the United States, in Nicaragua, and in Latin America as a whole.

Nevertheless, cautious notes were also evident in Moscow's treatment of possible Soviet commitments to or involvement in Nicaragua. With only one conspicuous exception, Moscow reverted to its earlier, lesser ideological identification of Nicaragua as "democratic" or "progressive," rather than "people's democratic" or "socialist oriented."[35] While the Soviet media have raised alarms about Reagan's speeches attacking Nicaragua and about the large-scale US maneuvers in Central America that began in June 1983, they have expressed little apprehension that the survival of the Sandinista regime may actually be in jeopardy.

In fact, the latest Soviet statements have consistently stressed the ability of that regime to defend itself. For example, on the occasion of Andropov's meeting with Daniel Ortega on March 25, 1983, the latter was quoted as having "emphasized that the revolutionary government of Nicaragua has all the necessary resources to defend the motherland." Andropov, in turn, "expressed the conviction that Nicaragua will be able to uphold its freedom and independence,"[36] presumably without the need for anything more than the Cuban and Soviet arms already in the pipeline. In a similar vein, an article by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko published in *Kommunist* the following month declared that "the Soviet peoples are in total sympathy with the peoples of Nicaragua, who are repulsing the ruthless imperialist pressure."[37] In June, after condemning the "terrorist policy and terrorist activity of the United States against Nicaragua," Gromyko told the USSR Supreme Soviet that "it can be said with confidence that such a policy cannot extinguish the unsuppressible striving of the peoples of Latin America for independence and freedom."[38] Most telling of all was the response of Yuriy Fokin, Secretary General of the Soviet foreign ministry, when asked

[34] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 21, 1981.

[35] The exception was an article on "The USSR and the Developing Countries," in *Pravda*, June 13, 1983, which referred to "countries with a socialist orientation, in particular, Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and also certain Arab states."

[36] *Pravda*, Mar. 26, 1983.

[37] A. Gromyko, "V. I. Lenin and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State," *Kommunist*, No. 6, April 1983, p. 24.

[38] *Pravda*, June 17, 1983.



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*Soviet leader Yuriy Andropov meets with Daniel Ortega, Coordinator of Nicaragua's government Steering Council, in Moscow on March 25, 1983.*

—TASS from Sovfoto.

at a press conference in Managua on August 3, 1983, "what attitude the Soviet Union would assume in the event of a direct aggression against Nicaragua." Fokin's reply: "We will support Nicaragua *politically* in every way."[39]

Indeed, from the Soviet perspective, a manageable threat to Nicaragua is probably considered a useful tool for rallying the population of that country around the Sandinista leadership. The Soviet press is replete with reports from its correspondents in Nicaragua along just those lines. Moreover, the familiar bogey of US intervention can help mobilize anti-Yanqui sentiment elsewhere in Latin America, while perhaps distracting attention from efforts to export revolution from Managua.

## From Nicaragua to El Salvador

Ever since the Sandinista victory, the Soviet media have voiced the hope that the Nicaraguan example would spread. One of the first major indicators that Moscow and its followers now intended to adopt a more militant policy in Central America came in a roundtable discussion in the first three 1980 issues of *Latinskaya Amerika*. Especially significant were the expressions of approval for the hitherto rejected views of Ché Guevara on the primacy of armed struggle. One Soviet scholar saw Nicaragua as the "beginning of a new stage in the struggle on the scale of the entire continent."[40] Two years later, the journal *New Times* still predicted a "domino" effect in Central America:

*The strengthening of the Cuban socialist system and the growth of Cuba's international influence, the victory of the popular-democratic and anti-imperialist revolution in Nicaragua ... have given a powerful push to the revolutionary movement in Central America, directed against tyrannical military dictatorships set up and supported by the United States. ... In Guatemala, four military-political organizations ... have united, and having established the Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity, they are inflicting increasingly powerful blows against the government troops. The intensity of antigovernment acts is growing in Honduras, where the Francisco Morascan Liberation Front was born. Socio-political conflicts have become exacerbated in Costa Rica and Panama.*[41]

As might be expected, Soviet statements have concentrated on El Salvador, where "the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front has unleashed a broad partisan war throughout the entire territory of the repub-

[39] As reported by Radio Havana, Aug. 3, 1983, in *FBIS-LAM*, Aug. 4, 1983, p. P/10. Emphasis added.

[40] B.I. Koval', loc. cit., p. 12.

[41] *New Times*, Mar. 19, 1982.



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lic."[42] In early 1980 the pro-Soviet El Salvador Communist Party definitively adopted an armed-struggle line and began negotiating under Cuban aegis with other insurgent groups. According to a subsequent Soviet analysis, the key factor leading to these developments was "the victory of the revolution in Nicaragua."[43] A unified opposition front was established in October 1980. Shortly thereafter, El Salvador Communist party chief Shafik Handal departed for a visit to the USSR, Eastern Europe, Vietnam, and Ethiopia.[44]

Public Soviet attitudes toward the El Salvador conflict have since gone through several phases, apparently reflecting perceived shifts both in US policy and in guerrilla fortunes "on the ground." During 1980, the Soviet media depicted a growing polarization in El Salvador, pitting the Left against both the extreme rightists and the US-supported junta. By the end of the year, Soviet commentaries implied that victory for the leftist guerrillas was near. In January 1981, *Izvestiya* cited a statement by the Communist parties of Mexico and Central America that the revolution in that area "feels stronger than in any other year in history." In addition to El Salvador, *Izvestiya* reported a burgeoning struggle in Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica.[45]

Soon afterward, however, apprehension about what the Reagan Administration might do appears to have led the Kremlin to pull in its horns on El Salvador for several months. The failure of the guerrilla "final offensive" in January 1981 probably also played a cautionary role. A later article in *Latinskaya Amerika* revealed that fear of more active US opposition had "possibly influenced the speeding up of the timetable for the beginning of the great offensive."[46] Significantly, after this disappointing performance, the Salvadoran Communist party was the only one of note not reported in attendance at the 26th Soviet Party Congress in February of that year.

In mid-1981, Soviet hopes seemed to mount again. The June 1981 issue of the *World Marxist Review* reported the work of a study commission on "Motive Forces of the Liberation Process in Latin America," which presented the following assessment as one of its main conclusions:

*The Nicaraguan revolution has confirmed that far from impeding armed struggle, as some petty bourgeois theorists contend with reference to the experience of the 1960's, the present international situation largely predetermines its favorable outcome.*[47]

Meanwhile, as in the case of Cuba and Nicaragua, Moscow sought to forestall US action in El Salvador by raising alarms that the US planned to intervene militarily on a large scale. The Soviet media backed calls for negotiations, but derided the March 28, 1982, Salvadoran elections. The defeat of the Christian Democrats and the right-wing victory, one Soviet author conceded, had not "entered into US plans," but he foresaw no basic change in US policy and praised a statement by Salvadoran leftists "that they will continue the armed struggle."[48]

However, strong hints appeared by July 1982 about difficulties within the leftist coalition. One Soviet article noted that "from the very beginning, it was clear that the attainment of unity of the revolutionary organizations of Salvador will be quite painful," and that special "difficulties" persisted in connection with efforts to establish a unified leadership. The author praised "the role of the Communist Party in overcoming difficulties of the unification process"; but a reminder about the "sad experience" of the Nicaraguan Socialist (i.e., Communist) Party, which preferred ideological purity to unity with the Sandinistas, suggested that some elements in the Salvadoran party were balking at the unity process.[49]

By the following spring, an authoritative Soviet source once again claimed to see signs of improved prospects for the guerrillas, and of disarray in US Central American policy. Responding to President Reagan's speech to a joint session of Congress on April 27, 1983, *Pravda* declared that

*it is evident from Reagan's remarks that Washington is in a panic in the face of the anti-imperialist movement which is gaining strength in that region, and of the peoples' growing struggle for national independence and sovereignty and against foreign, first and foremost American, domination.*[50]

Nevertheless, subsequent articles in the Soviet media have been divided in their assessments. A June 1983 article, for example, warned that "despite the results

[42] Ibid.

[43] T. Ye. Vorozheykina, "The Revolutionary Organizations of El Salvador and the Popular Movement," *Latinskaya Amerika*, July 1982, p. 33.

[44] *The New York Times*, Feb. 20, 1981.

[45] *Izvestiya*, Jan. 6, 1981.

[46] N. S. Leonov, "Salvadoran Drama," *Latinskaya Amerika*, August 1981, p. 14.

[47] "Latin America: A Continent in Struggle," *World Marxist Review*, June 1981, p. 47.

[48] M. F. Gornov, "Latin America: Intensifying the Struggle," *Latinskaya Amerika*, July 1982, p. 21.

[49] T. Ye. Vorozheykina, loc. cit., pp. 24, 35.

[50] *Pravda*, Apr. 28, 1983.



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*A January 1981 photo from San Lorenzo, a Salvadoran village 50 kilometers from El Salvador's capital, occupied by guerrilla forces. A slogan of the Revolutionary Democratic Front is partially visible on the wall in the foreground.*

—Alain Keler/SYGMA.

achieved, the FMNLF [Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front] leadership understands that a complete victory of the patriots demands a long and difficult struggle."[51] A Salvadoran rebel interviewed by *Krasnaya Zvezda* the following month was more sanguine, declaring that "the concrete situation in the country convincingly indicates that signs of the revolution's victory are present right now."[52] Subsequently, in response to Salvadoran government sweeps of rebel-held territory, the Soviet media remained silent.

Most recently, Soviet attention has increasingly been directed to the ongoing talks between Salvadoran leftists and the US government or the Salvadoran government's Peace Commission. In August 1983, for example, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* seized on US Ambassador Richard Stone's meeting with a Salvadoran rebel representative "as US recognition of the Salvadoran revolutionary organization's real strength." In the same breath, however, the paper expressed "fears that this move is purely propagandist in character."[53] Instead, Moscow has voiced frequent support for the negotiating efforts of the "Contadora group" composed of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela. The Soviets also endorsed the proposals for a regional settlement made by Nicaraguan Defense Minister Ortega on July 19, and by Fidel Castro on July 28, 1983—including a direct statement of support by Andropov to a visiting US Senate delegation.[54] All along, a steady stream of Soviet statements has denied any involvement in El Salvador on the part of the USSR, Cuba, or Nicaragua, while emphasizing the divergence between Latin American and US policies toward Managua and toward Central America as a whole. Whether or not Moscow's support for Central American negotiations is the same kind of ploy of which it accuses Washington will depend, to a great extent, on the Salvadoran situation on the ground, as well as on estimates by the USSR and its allies about the course of US policy.

As regards that policy, Soviet coverage in the spring and summer of 1983 balanced expressions of alarm with frequent references to factors that might limit Washington's actions. Continual allusions have been made to fears in the United States of "another

[51] V. Krest'yanikov, "'Quiet' Aggression Against El Salvador," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 6, June 1983, p. 72.

[52] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 9, 1983.

[53] *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Aug. 11, 1983.

[54] *Pravda*, Aug. 19, 1983.



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Vietnam." Soviet media have also paid attention to the growing impact of the 1984 US elections, and to opposition in Congress to current US Central American policy. Significantly, at his audience with a US Senate delegation on August 18, 1983, Andropov urged that "everything be done to prevent the situation in that region from getting out of control."[55] Meanwhile, looking beyond the revolutionary upheavals in Central America, recent Soviet statements also suggest guarded optimism regarding the long-term potential for favorable developments in some of the larger countries further south.

## Beyond Central America

In a speech to the 26th Party Congress, Brezhnev gave official recognition to the doctrine enunciated by his experts that "the states of Latin America, including Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, are playing a more important role" in world affairs. Accordingly, he concluded, "we are happy to note the USSR's expansion of mutually beneficial relations with the Latin American countries, and we are willing to continue developing them."[56] Looking ahead, one major Soviet foreign policy journal has even suggested that the main arena of struggle in the hemisphere will not be in Central America or the Caribbean, but on the Latin American mainland:

*The US ruling elite calculates that however important in strategic or political relations the individual small countries of the region are, the outcome of the opposition between the forces of progress and reaction on the soil of Latin America is being decided in key countries—Brazil, Mexico, Argentina.*[57]

Next in importance, in this same Soviet scenario, are "the countries of the so-called 'second echelon': Colombia, Venezuela, Peru."

Moscow has particularly welcomed the refusal of Argentina and Brazil to go along with US grain embargoes against the USSR, seeing in these actions a prime example of Latin American independence directly beneficial to Soviet interests. The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas dispute took Argentina out of the picture, at least temporarily, as an ally of US policy in Central America, and brought Cuba and Nicaragua

*Signing of an agreement for the sale of Soviet heavy water to Argentina's nuclear power ministry in April 1982.*

—ILA/Gamma-Liaison.

into closer concert with other Latin nations. The USSR's condemnation of British military action against Argentina and Soviet support for Argentine legal claims clearly scored some points for Moscow in Argentine opinion.

At the same time, the Falklands dispute also uncovered limits in Soviet ability to take advantage of seeming opportunities. It remains something of a mystery why the USSR did not (as Buenos Aires expected) veto the initial UN Security Council resolution in April calling for Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands and peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Soviets in fact never specifically approved of the initial Argentine seizure that triggered the crisis. The USSR has not rushed in with offers of military aid, though this may reflect Argentine rather than Soviet reticence. It may also be that Moscow is waiting to see the domestic impact in Argentina of the Falklands crisis. As *Izvestiya* noted on July 1, 1982, "Argentina's troubled days are not over." Meanwhile, modest moves toward improved economic and cultural relations have taken place.

While maintaining its long-term interest in the larger states of the mainland, Moscow's activity outside Cuba and Central America has centered for the time being on the Caribbean. After three years of receiving praise but little more, the tiny island nation of Grenada has now become the beneficiary of top-level Soviet attention. As the capstone of the first visit to the Soviet Union by Grenada's leader, Maurice Bishop, a series of official agreements was signed with the USSR on July 27, 1982. As in the case of the Sandinistas' first visit to Moscow, a party-to-party

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., Feb. 24, 1981.

[57] A. Glinkin and P. Yakovlev, "Latin America in the Global Strategy of Imperialism," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunardonyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), October 1982, p. 79.



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agreement was signed as well, along with a joint communiqué underscoring the ideological affinity between the two countries. The construction on Grenada, with Cuban and East European aid, of a major airfield capable of handling MiG aircraft and long-range bombers could conceivably contribute one more practical asset for Soviet and Cuban operations or political-military pressures in Latin America.

## The Broader Soviet "Presence"

Recent Soviet policy in Latin America has unfolded against the background of an expanding network of "routine" contacts with the region. Their still relatively limited scope suggests that they do not yet give the USSR decisive leverage over any country apart from Cuba. Notably absent in South America (except for a very limited case in Peru) is a Soviet military aid program of the kind that has been a principal—though not necessarily lasting—source of Soviet influence elsewhere in the Third World. Nevertheless, over the past two decades, the Soviets have slowly but surely built up an "infrastructure" of linkages to Latin America that receptive local governments might one day be disposed to cultivate for mutual advantage.

The very physical presence in Latin America of the Soviet Union and its allies has shown a notable increase over the past 15–20 years. By the end of the 1950's, the Soviet Union had formal diplomatic relations only with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay. At present it has diplomatic relations with 19 Latin countries.[58] The most recent additions, Suriname and Grenada, were added to this list only in July 1982. Moscow has an ambassador on the scene in all but three of these countries; it has no resident ambassador in Trinidad and Tobago and no mission at all in Guatemala or the Dominican Republic.

There has also been a notable increase in Latin American diplomatic relations with Cuba, and with Moscow's East European allies. Add to this an impressive array of trade, cultural, and consular establishments and it all amounts to a greatly expanded Soviet capability to make contacts at all levels of Latin American governments and societies. These activities are facilitated by the growing sophistication and language proficiency of Soviet diplomatic personnel, buttressed for the past 20 years by Cubans and probably in the years ahead by Nicaraguans as well.

Soviet–Latin American trade has grown quite rapidly, too, though it remains an extremely small percentage of the foreign trade of both sides. According to Soviet trade figures, turnover (excluding Cuba) in 1969 amounted to 116.5 million rubles; by 1979 this had grown to 595 million rubles, and by 1981 it reached 3,124.4 million rubles (about US$4.6 billion).[59] The bulk of this trade over the years has been with Argentina and Brazil. In 1960, the Soviet Union engaged in trade with only four countries in Latin America; now it deals with more than 20.

In the general area of culture and information, the expansion of Soviet activity has likewise been substantial. One striking statistic is the growth in Moscow's Spanish-language publications. In the decade 1949–59, according to the official annual handbooks *Pechat' v SSSR* (The Press in the USSR), Soviet presses turned out an average of about 53 such titles totaling half a million copies per year. By contrast, in 1975, Moscow issued 353 Spanish titles and 13 million copies; and in 1980, 370 titles and 10.6 million copies. In a similar vein, Moscow published only 7 Spanish-language serial titles in 1958; by 1980, that number had increased nearly fivefold. In 1972, Communist countries broadcast 708.5 hours per week to the region; by 1979, the figure had risen to 793 hours, of which Cuba accounted for 241.5 hours, or almost one-third of the total.[60]

The growth of Soviet interest in Latin America can also be gauged by the expanding scope of Soviet research about the continent. In 1961, Moscow established the Latin America Institute. In 1969, the journal *Latinskaya Amerika* was inaugurated, with a circulation of about 3,000. As Soviet interest in the region increased, the magazine's circulation also rose steadily, reaching a plateau of about 7,000 by the late 1970's. Six months after the Sandinista victory, *Latinskaya Amerika* (issued in Russian and Spanish) was transformed from a bimonthly to a monthly journal, and its circulation raised to 9,000. This dropped back down to about 7,500 copies in 1982 and 1983—though the decrease was probably due more to paper shortages in the Soviet Union than to political reasons.

The development of all these contacts has led one Soviet scholar to suggest the emergence of a new international "subsystem." As he explained:

*For the two decades which have passed since the vic-*

[58] Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

[59] *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR* (USSR Foreign Trade) for 1969 and 1979, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya," 1970 and 1980; and *Foreign Trade*, March 1982, Supplement.

[60] From US Information Agency research material on world-wide Communist broadcasting; author's conversation with Agency officials.



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*tory of the Cuban revolution, when for the first time world socialism became a direct actor in the international relations in the Western Hemisphere, there has unfolded a stable and constantly increasing subsystem of "socialist states–Latin America" ties. It already has a very well developed treaty-legal base (the number of agreements concluded between the two groups of countries has reached 80) and includes economic, political, scientific-technical, and cultural ties.*[61]

One element of this subsystem not mentioned by the Soviet scholar is the large number of Latin American Communist parties. A Soviet book published in 1982 lists 23 of them.[62] There is a constant interchange between the Soviet and Latin American Communist parties. Delegations from the latter arrive en masse at Soviet party congresses and at major ceremonial occasions like Brezhnev's funeral or the USSR's 60th anniversary celebration. On international Communist issues, the Latin American parties generally constitute a large bloc Moscow can count on for ideological support. Latin American Communists also appear to be an important source of information for the Soviet Union, not only about their own countries but also about the continent as a whole. Few issues of *Latinskaya Amerika* fail to carry an article by (or interview with) a Latin American Communist; several of the latter have also contributed articles to *Kommunist* and other leading Soviet journals over the years.

These diplomatic, economic, cultural, and ideological connections do not yet make the Soviet Union a full-fledged "superpower" in the Western Hemisphere, but they do enable Moscow to exert some influence on selected target groups and to hold out the possibility of alternatives to the United States. Especially in situations such as the present one of strained US-Soviet relations, Latin American links with the USSR can be interpreted as demonstrations of independence from Washington. It is in this context that one should look at the growing complex of Soviet activity in the region—and at evolving Soviet assessments of the erosion of US dominance there.

## Is US "Control" Eroding?

Given the expanding list of Soviet contacts in Latin America described above, it is not surprising that Soviet specialists have begun to reassess the overall US position in the hemisphere. While they continue to regard the triumph of leftist regimes as the ultimate in weakening that position, they have also derived satisfaction lately from a perceived Latin American tendency toward greater self-assertiveness that complicates matters for Washington. Impressed by this tendency, the journal *Latinskaya Amerika* has in the past few years sponsored several symposia of Soviet Latin American experts to assess its implications.[63] The first such discussion took place in 1979 and centered on the theme of "dependent capitalism," that is, the degree and significance of Latin American economic ties with the West and, by implication, the amount of leeway those ties allowed for Latin American Communist parties and for the USSR. Since "substantial disagreements" on this issue emerged, the journal organized a second meeting on the same general theme in February 1981. Once again, the reportage conceded that "there is still a great deal of disagreement over the topic of Latin American dependence."

The differences acknowledged in these discussions do not carry the polemical tone of exchanges in other fields, suggesting that this may be a rare instance in which the Soviet regime permits its experts to air alternative explanations. This dispensation may be due to the relatively abstruse nature of the issues, which are far enough removed from the forefront of Soviet policymaking that the admission of differences need not have any significant immediate consequences. Be that as it may, the 1981 symposium did report a general consensus that Latin American countries had a "more important role in world affairs," and that their foreign policies often had an "anti-imperialist element" that could "restrict the sphere of imperialism's 'freedom of movement' in the international arena and . . . complicate the attainment of its strategic and tactical goals on the global scale, in Latin America and in other parts of the world."

In particular, Soviet analysts see a steady breakdown of the inter-American system under US aegis. On the eve of Reagan's inauguration, one of Moscow's leading Americanologists speculated that Washington might seek to reverse this trend by adopting a "new continentalism" that would give priority to Latin America even over Europe.[64] By late 1981, however, another analyst concluded, in discussing the Organi-

[61] A. N. Glinkin, "A Systems Approach—The Basis for a Deep Analysis of the Foreign Political Activities of Latin American States," *Latinskaya Amerika*, August 1981, p. 50.

[62] V. Burmistrov, loc. cit., p. 9.

[63] "How to Evaluate the Peculiarities and Levels of Development of Capitalism in Latin America," *Latinskaya Amerika*, Nos. 1–2, January–February and March–April 1979; "Latin America: Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence," ibid., Nos. 8–10, August, September, and October 1981.

[64] A. A. Kokoshin, "The New Continentalism as an Alternative US Foreign Policy Doctrine for the 1980's," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, October 1980.



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zation of American States, that "the possibilities for the use of this organization by the United States have become greatly narrowed."[65]

Moscow believed that US hemispheric policy was dealt a new blow, a few months later, by the Anglo-Argentine war over the Falkland islands in mid-1982. Brezhnev told a Nicaraguan delegation on May 4 that the "imperialist essence of Washington's policy vis-à-vis the Latin American countries has again been graphically borne out."[66] Several Soviet commentaries sought to use the crisis to discredit the 1947 Rio Treaty, contrasting US efforts to invoke that treaty in the case of El Salvador with unwillingness to apply it against Britain. For example, *Trud* carried an article on May 28 suggestively entitled "The End of the Monroe Doctrine." Anti-Communist Latin American military doctrines were deemed to have been severely undermined by the Falklands dispute; specifically, as *Izvestiya* reported on July 1, 1982, "anti-American feelings now predominate in Argentina." Several other Soviet post-mortems on the Falklands crisis predicted that the issue would remain a sore point between Argentina and both Britain and the US for some time to come.

Altogether, Moscow now claims to see history actively working against the United States in its own hemisphere, especially in Central America. Elsewhere in Latin America, according to one Soviet analyst, "the White House has been forced to pay special attention" to all of the major countries, "because today, it is too much for Washington any longer to dictate its will to them."[67] As explained by *Latinskaya Amerika* in July 1982:

*Revolutionary events on the continent, the development and strengthening of the struggle against imperialism and oligarchy, for democratic and social progress is clear confirmation of the proposition that the aggressive plans of the Reagan administration will suffer defeat. The struggle will bear an ever broader, more popular character and will rely on tremendous international solidarity. It is developing in conditions when the influence and authority of the Soviet Union, all countries of the socialist community, the forces of peace and progress are growing ever greater in the international arena.*[68]

While the last sentence implies the possibility of direct Soviet involvement, it carefully avoids any explicit commitment. Still, given Moscow's bipolar definition of world events, any loss for the US is presumably seen as a gain for the Soviet Union. To what extent the Soviet Union gains directly is another matter.

For the time being, indeed, a close reading of Soviet statements reveals considerable confusion about specific tactics for the region and uncertainty about revolutionary prospects there. The same enthusiastic article just quoted, for example, foresaw "ebbs and flows, successes and temporary defeats" in the years ahead. An explanation for this "revolutionary pessimism" was provided in another journal by Kiva Maydanik, a Soviet scholar who is normally optimistic about such matters. An article he co-authored with a Soviet authority on general Third World affairs warns of Latin America's "unfavorable" geographic location, "the greater strength of the local states" as compared with Asian or African countries, "the practical knowledge of domination of the exploiter classes," and "much else."[69] Brezhnev's rather bland recommendations about Latin America at the most recent party congress were in line with this wary assessment, and there is little in Andropov's record so far to suggest a major departure in Soviet policy toward the region.

The immediate challenge, as one Soviet analyst put it in July 1983, is that

*most recently in the Latin American strategy of the US, the geopolitical factor is being moved more persistently to center stage, the "vital significance" is being frankly emphasized for the security of the United States.*[70]

In the face of such resistance, Moscow's policy to date suggests great reluctance to extend unequivocal guarantees in support of Latin American revolutions, while probing Washington's tolerance to the limit.

## Soviet Prospects in Latin America

As in the past, the main thrust of Soviet policy in Latin America will be directed toward strengthening the Soviet position in Cuba and bolstering Castro's domestic strength. That is where the bulk of Soviet personnel and resources in the area is concentrated, and it is the natural regional starting point for advancing Soviet global goals.

[65] B. F. Martynov, "The Problems and Prospects of the Inter-American System," *Latinskaya Amerika*, November 1981, p. 17.
[66] *Pravda*, May 5, 1982.
[67] A. Glinkin and P. Yakovlev, loc. cit.
[68] M. F. Gornov, loc. cit., p. 22.
[69] K. Maydanik and G. Mirskiy, "The National Liberation Struggle: the Current Stage," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunardonyye Otnosheniya*, June 1981, p. 29.
[70] V. Antiasov and M. Vasiliyev, "Latin America: Washington's Wager on Reaction," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, July 1983, p. 46.



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Nicaragua now seems to Moscow to offer a second breakthrough, this time on the mainland of the continent. The flurry of Soviet-bloc activity since 1981 suggests growing Soviet confidence in the permanence of the Sandinista regime, its gradual emergence as a variant of Cuba or of the Soviet Union itself, and its ability to withstand outside threats. Accordingly, Moscow has signaled an intention to devote some additional resources to Nicaragua, though still with the hope that others will help out. An increasing Soviet presence in Nicaragua seems to point to eventual candidacy for membership in the "socialist community."

Outside these areas, Moscow's major hopes in the period ahead continue to lie in Central America. Though generated largely by indigenous factors, the turmoil there is too much for Moscow to ignore—especially given current Soviet assessments of the course history is taking in the region, and of the bleak outlook for quick overall improvement in US-Soviet relations. The Soviets may see in that turmoil a chance to "correct" global strategic asymmetry by keeping the US preoccupied with problems near its borders. In the larger countries of South America, the main thrust of Soviet and local Communist policy is simply to encourage anti-US tendencies. Moscow clearly believes that the long-term trend in Latin America is moving in that direction. Given Soviet views of that region as the "strategic rear" of the United States, this perceived trend adds special impetus to Moscow's efforts in the hemisphere.

Yet, despite its satisfaction at the blows to "geographic fatalism" in Cuba and Nicaragua, Moscow can be expected to retain a healthy respect for US power and local advantage—not to mention the intractability of many situations in Latin America itself. Strategic calculations, growing Soviet power-projection capabilities, a self-proclaimed mantle of world revolutionary leadership, and the emergence of regional targets of opportunity all impel Moscow to take some action. Even so, its responses to assorted Latin American temptations have so far been cautious, and it seems likely that the USSR will remain circumspect about how it manages outside aid to insurgencies in the region.



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# Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas

**by Cynthia McClintock**

Back in the early 1960's, urban revolutionary activists sought to build a guerrilla base in highlands Peru, near Cuzco. Persuaded by the ideas and example of the recent Cuban revolution, they believed that they could mobilize the Andean peasantry relatively quickly and easily. They were mistaken. Without either significant peasant support or a sophisticated military plan, the guerrillas were no match for the Peruvian armed forces.[1] Several thousand people were arrested, and about five hundred were killed.[2]

Now, in the early 1980's, a more serious guerrilla threat has emerged in Peru. This movement is called Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). It is of interest not just because of its sensational recent escapades in Peru, but also, more broadly, as an example of the tangled and often violent problems that can result from the combination of widespread poverty, ethnic and regional tensions, and radical leftist ideology in the Third World—even when that combination lacks the catalyst of significant foreign intervention. Like its 1960's predecessors, Sendero too is based in Peru's southern highlands, now centered in the city of Ayacucho rather than in Cuzco.

In most respects, however, the new movement is very different. Dogmatically Maoist, Sendero activists are committed to protracted struggle; most have lived and worked for many years in Ayacucho, where they gained considerable peasant support. Sendero is no longer a mere band of disillusioned provincial university students, but a movement of some 3,000 activists who span many parts of Peru and can carry terror right into the capital, Lima. The death toll connected to their activities has soared in recent months, to about 1,000 people in the first half of 1983;[3] property damage now probably exceeds US$1 billion.[4]

Sendero Luminoso is different not only from earlier guerrilla movements in Peru but also from other revolutionary movements in Latin America today. Specifically, in Central America and in Colombia, groups of urban-based Marxist intellectuals and rural guerrilla leaders have lately worked together, emphasizing unity in the course of their common struggle.[5] These revolutionaries have sought to publicize their promises and programs for the future, in an attempt to build a broad base of support. In contrast, Sendero Luminoso is avowedly exclusivist and secretive. It derides Peru's other Marxist groups as "cretins." Its leaders say nothing about what they would like for Peru. Even in their own peasant communities, Senderistas have been ruthless, killing suspected informants first and asking questions later, and dynamiting facilities that benefit the local population.

How and why did such a movement emerge in Peru? What do we know about the group's leadership,

[1] See especially Richard Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1971.

[2] There are no official figures on the number of arrests or deaths. My figures are estimates based on interviews with individuals who were familiar with the region at the time, including General Edgardo Marcado Jarrín, foreign minister under the military governments; Ing. Luís Deustua, an agronomist with vast experience in the Peruvian highlands; and Sr. Rodolfo Osores Ocampo, a student in Huancayo in the early 1960's who also has vast professional experience in the southern highlands.

[3] The exact toll is unknown. This figure is from *Peru Update* (New York, NY), No. 30, July 1983, p. 1.

[4] My calculation from various reports of damages.

[5] See especially Robert H. Dix, "The Varieties of Revolution," *Comparative Politics* (New York, NY), April 1983, pp. 281–94.

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ideology, and activities? Have any other leftist groups supported Sendero? This article seeks to answer these questions. It will also analyze the current Peruvian government's counteroffensive against Sendero, and suggest the probable outcome of this unusual battle.

## Who Are the Senderistas?

Sendero Luminoso was founded in 1970 at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho by Abimael Guzmán. The group had previously been part of another Maoist band, the Bandera Roja (Red Flag). The name Sendero Luminoso was taken from a statement by Peru's first prominent Marxist, José Carlos Mariateguí, that "Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to revolution."

Guzmán, a philosophy professor in the education program at the university since the early 1960's, was clearly the driving personal force behind Sendero. A scholar by temperament and training, he was in many respects an atypical leader for so violent a movement as Sendero.[6] Born in Arequipa, Peru's second largest city, Guzmán earned his degree at the local university with a thesis on "The Theory of Space in Kant." He steeped himself not only in Marx, Lenin, and Mao, but also in Heidegger and Jaspers. Some even say that, but for his forceful and dynamic wife, Augusta, Guzmán would have remained a bookish intellectual.

In the 1960's, however, Guzmán began to devote large amounts of his time to political meetings and discussions at his home in Ayacucho, drawing a large number of students around him. While photographs of Guzmán from this period portray a plump, smiling fellow, in fact he is remembered as intense. Reportedly, he was extremely persuasive and compelling in ideological debates; he would listen carefully to others' arguments, maintaining a respectful attitude, but ultimately he would prevail.

Guzmán's home base of Ayacucho was in many ways an ideal site for Peruvian revolutionaries. The area is located in Peru's southern highlands, the country's most destitute and remote area. At 11,000 feet and higher, the land is precipitous and windswept, and produces little more than potatoes. For decades, the region has received almost no attention from the government. In the basically "small-town," traditional life of Ayacucho, the university, inaugurated in 1959, played an influential role. By some estimates, it provided more than 15 percent of the city's jobs. The city itself is also of symbolic significance: it was the site of the last battle for Latin American independence, in 1824.




*A "Wanted" poster for Senderista leader Abimael Guzmán (alias Comrade Gonzalo).*

—Nicole Bonnet/Gamma-Liaison.

That milieu has had a lasting influence on Sendero; even today, its core leaders are former students at the Ayacucho university. Most were the sons and daughters, or grandsons and granddaughters, of peasants from highlands communities. Many were already familiar with the area and spoke the local Indian language, Quechua. While they embodied their parents' aspirations and fervently sought professional employment, opportunities were disappearing in the mid-1970's as Peru's economy deteriorated. As of 1980, the number of such Senderista militants was approximately 250 to 500.

In Ayacucho, under Guzmán's tutelage, this group developed its ideology. Apart from its militant Maoism, not a great deal is known about Sendero's beliefs,

[6]On Guzmán as a leader, see *Caretas* (Lima), Feb. 21, 1983, p. 13; Raúl González, "Ayacucho: On the Trails of Sendero," *QueHacer* (Lima), No. 19, October 1982, p. 52; and Mario Vargas Llosa, "Inquest in the Andes," *New York Times Magazine*, July 31, 1983, p. 22.



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since members rarely write or speak to the Peruvian public. No leader has given an interview for about three years. Guzmán himself went underground in 1978, and his current whereabouts are unknown. Analysts interpret Sendero's ideology primarily on the basis of just two slim texts, one written in July 1981 and the other in March 1982.[7]

It is clear, however, that Sendero professes strict adherence to the tenets espoused by China's "gang of four." World revolution is to be achieved through a prolonged popular war in the countryside, eventually encircling the cities. In this connection, the Senderistas claim to have made a unique contribution to Marxist theory in the elaboration of five distinct stages of "armed struggle."[8] Briefly, the first stage is the gathering of support in backward regions; the second, the assault on the symbols of the bourgeois state; the third, the start of guerrilla war; the fourth, the expansion of popular support; and the fifth, the collapse of the cities and victory.

Among the unusual aspects of Sendero's ideology are its blindness to nuance and its fanatical exclusivity. The Senderistas see no difference, for example, between the Peru of the 1930's and the Peru of the 1980's; the country remains, in their view, semifeudal and semicolonial. Peru thus supposedly continues to resemble prerevolutionary China. Nor does Sendero see any difference between the military governments of Juan Velasco Alvarado and of Morales Bermúdez that ruled Peru from 1968 to 1978, or even any difference between those military governments and the current civilian administration of Peruvian president Fernando Belaúnde Terry. All are simply labeled "fascist."

Sendero's scorn extends even to Marxists who, in its view, are not radical Maoists like "los cuatros de Shanghay" (the gang of four). As one Peruvian journalist put it, "To ... Guzmán, Fidel Castro would be a peon of imperialist social revisionism."[9] Sendero has not only criticized other Marxist parties verbally but has also taken action against them. In 1982, to take one of the more spectacular instances, Senderistas destroyed an experimental agricultural center at the Ayacucho university, burning the machinery and massacring more than 100 breeding cattle. Apparently, the aim was to undermine and intimidate the other Marxist groups that had pioneered the center.[10] The Senderistas have also tried to kill local elected officials belonging to rival Marxist parties in the Ayacucho area.[11] As one Senderista put it, "This is a revolution, and anyone who opposes it will be crushed like an insect."[12] Perhaps the most telling Senderista custom in this respect is that of hanging dead dogs from poles. This practice is variously interpreted as a repudiation of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (Mao's "betrayer"); as a rejection of the "running dogs" of imperialism; and as a traditional Indian warning of a coming attack. It is for these and other gruesome deeds that Sendero has invited comparisons to Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge.

[7]The first is *Nuevo Gobierno y la perspectiva económica, politica, y de la lucha de clases en general* (The New Government and Prospects for Economics, Politics, and Class Struggle in General), and the second is *Desarrollemos la guerra de guerrillas* (Let's Advance the Guerrilla War); see *QueHacer*, No. 19, October 1982, p. 63.

[8]See *Caretas*, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 65; and David Scott Palmer, "The State of Peru in 1982: Respresentative Democracy, Recession and Inflation, and Rural Rebellion," in the forthcoming (April 1984) annual edition of *Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record*, New York, NY, Holmes and Meier, Vol. 2, p. 12.

[9]Quoted by Jay Mallin, "Shining Path Guerrillas," *Soldier of Fortune* (Boulder, CO), March 1983, p. 52.

[10]*The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1982.

[11]*Caretas*, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 64.

[12]Ibid.

*A dead dog found hanging from a Lima lamppost in May 1983, a trademark of Sendero Luminoso.*

—Nicole Bonnet/Gamma-Liaison.



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Some additional insight into the Sendero ethos comes from the visit of a leading Peruvian journalist to the special prison where many of the movement's members are now held.[13] He reported that the prisoners constantly repeated bellicose chants. Soldier-like, they marched, made formations, and saluted. One of their songs was a kind of hymn: it described the seas of agitation, and land flooded, then amid the disorder the rising of the sun, and finally the affirmation, "except for power, everything is an illlusion." It is in the virtual worship of Guzmán, however, that the personality cult aspect and indeed almost messianic character of Sendero Luminoso is most apparent. Guzmán is almost certainly not Sendero's current military leader, and in fact may even be dead; the new leader appears to be one Julio César Mezzich.[14] Yet it is Guzmán who is still foremost in Senderista minds. He is always referred to by his nom de guerre, Comrade Gonzalo. Throughout the jail, shouts of "Long live Comrade Gonzalo!" and "Gonzalo is armed struggle" were heard. Senderistas called Guzmán the "Fourth Sword of Marxism," after Marx, Lenin, and Mao. "The vanguard of world revolution," they intoned, "is the thought of Comrade Gonzalo."

In another unusual twist on the Marxist line, various Sendero practices have raised speculation that the group is interested not only in archetypal class struggle but also in something like race war. The Ayacucho people are almost all Indian or mestizo (mixed blood), while most of Peru's white population lives in Lima. To a greater extent than elsewhere in Latin America, the Indians of Peru's southern highlands maintain their own traditions, including their own language. In addition, more so than elsewhere, they resent the white descendants of the Spanish conquerors who rule them from the coast. While Ayacucho is only about 200 miles from Lima as the crow flies, it is much further away in most other respects. Some of the highest peaks of the Andes divide the two cities. Living standards in Peru's highlands are much lower than in coastal cities.

Thus, when the Senderistas try to cut off Ayacucho communities from the coast, they may be trying to return to the days when the Incas alone ruled Peru's highlands. In a symbolic practice, Senderistas use the traditional Inca slingshot—to fling dynamite. One reason why the Senderistas do not want to collaborate with Peru's Lima-based Marxist parties may be that most leaders of those parties are white as well as middle-class.

Sendero's organization is as mysterious as its ideology. It is a disciplined, clandestine movement, one that would be difficult to infiltrate. All members use aliases. Few Senderistas know more than four others: each guerrilla cell has a maximum of five members, one of whom is the leader who joins the committee at the next higher level. During terrorist activities, Senderistas wear large woolen hoods to protect their anonymity.

*Captured Senderistas demonstrating at an island prison near Lima, where they are permitted to hang banners declaring: "For the Advancement of Guerrilla War. Long Live the Communist Party of Peru. Long Live Our Leadership. Long Live Our Guide—Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought."*

**—Oscar Medrano/*Caretas*.**

It is even possible that Sendero may now be not just one organization, but two or even more. The Ayacucho-based Sendero is admittedly totally ruthless, but it is also strongly committed to its doctrines. In contrast, some analysts believe, a second "Sendero" that has emerged around the slums of Lima is less doctrinaire and more criminal: the "thug left."[15] This interpretation derives some support from the fact that the recent terrorist actions around Lima, unaccompanied by efforts at popular mobilization, are not consistent with the Maoist tenet of prolonged popular war. Also, in contrast to many Latin American revolutionary groups, Sendero has not built up a war chest by kidnapping businessmen or political leaders

[13] Ibid., pp. 21–24 and 64–65.

[14] Ibid., June 13, 1983, cover story.

[15] Various confidential interviews in Lima, July 1983.



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and holding them for ransom. Instead, Sendero's only likely source of significant amounts of hard cash, either in the capital or in the highlands, is the drug traffic in Peru.

Sendero itself vehemently opposes drug use. Still, even though the Senderistas and the drug traffickers operate in close proximity, Sendero has apparently not tried to go into the prime coca growing land in the northeastern part of Ayacucho province. Some say that Sendero is simply fearful of the well-armed smugglers; others, including the respected Peruvian journalist Raúl González, believe that Sendero charges the latter for permission to come and go freely in the region. There is no conclusive evidence for either argument. But because of the geographical proximity of the two groups, and because they share (at a minimum) opposition to the government, they may well have agreed to trade money for access.

## Who Are Sendero's Allies?

Beyond this uncertain and limited *mariage de convenance* with Peru's drug dealers, the Senderistas appear to have no political allies to speak of, either at home or abroad. Indeed, it is Sendero's political isolation, more than any other single factor, that will probably doom the movement to eventual defeat.

To begin with, it is highly unlikely that Sendero receives aid from the Soviet bloc, for many reasons.[16] First, most obviously, the strategies of the Senderistas on the one hand and of the Cubans and Soviets on the other are in sharp contradiction. The Soviets have backed Peru's traditional Marxist parties—particularly the Moscow-line Communist Party.[17] Recent Soviet and Cuban foreign policy in most South American countries has emphasized the need for unity among Marxist leftist groups. Sendero disagrees, and its activities have exacerbated the traditional factionalism of Peru's leftist parties and generally discredited the leftist alternative among the better-off, mestizo Peruvians on the coast.[18] Moreover, Sendero proclaims its opposition to the Soviet model. As one anonymous guerrilla

*Julio César Mezzich, right, who is believed to be the new leader of Sendero Luminoso.*

*—Caretas.*

put it, in an interview reported by *The Christian Science Monitor* on September 15, 1983: "There is no difference between North American and Soviet corruption. Both are bad."

Second, the Soviets would have quite a lot to lose in Peru if they supported Sendero and this support were discovered.[19] During the 1970's, Peru's military governments developed amicable relations with Moscow. Peru's generals brought in Soviet military equipment and Soviet military advisers. Peru granted the Soviets extensive fishing rights in its waters. Furthermore, the Peruvians are traditional allies of the Argentines (in part because both are enemies of the Chileans), and the Argentines in turn have been relatively friendly to the Soviets. Although the Belaúnde government, in line with its military, would almost certainly prefer to distance itself from Moscow, to date it has not taken decisive steps in this direction. For example, the number of Soviet military advisers in Peru, according to various US sources, remains at just over 100.

Add to these considerations the problems of geography. Peru, of course, is far from Cuba. None of the

[16]No one has argued that the Soviet bloc is funding Sendero. Manual Ulloa, Peru's prime minister until late 1982, doubted that any foreign government supported Sendero; see *Washington Letter on Latin America* (Washington, DC), Sept. 15, 1982, p. 5. Daniel Hunt Clare III, Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Lima, voiced similar doubts in an interview, July 11, 1983.

[17]For a summary of the recent history of Peru's pro-Moscow Communist Party, see Alvaro Rojas Samanez, *Partidos Politicos en el Perú* (Political Parties in Peru), Lima, Centro de Documentación y Información Andina, 1982, pp. 49–55.

[18]Excellent articles on the current crisis in Peru's parliamentary Marxist Left appear in *QueHacer*. See especially Henry Pease García, "The United Left, Year One—Balance Sheet and Prospects," *QueHacer*, No. 13, November 1981, pp. 4–12; idem, "The United Left: A Major Crisis with Possible Ways Out," ibid., No. 20, Janaury 1983, pp. 24–35. For a view from the Moscow-line Communist Party on Peru's current politics, see Guillermo Herrera Montesinos, "The Party, the United Front, and the Revolution," ibid., No. 12, September 1981, pp. 56–63.

At least according to recent opinion polls, the problems of Marxist Left parties have diminished their popular support in the coastal cities. In Lima, the Marxist Left won 33 percent of the Constituent Assembly vote in 1978, 19 percent of the vote for legislative deputies in 1980, and was the preferred political alternative of only 14 percent in April 1983. For the 1978 and 1980 figures, see Henry Pease García, *A Un Año del Segundo Belaundismo: Un Perfil del Proceso Politico Peruano* (One Year into the Second Belaúnde Era: A Profile of the Peruvian Political Process), Lima, DESCO, 1981, p. 76; for the 1983 data, see *Caretas*, May 2, 1983, p. 15.

[19]This point was emphasized by Daniel Hunt Clare III, loc. cit.



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countries bordering Peru is pro-Soviet. The bare land of Ayacucho would provide scant cover to persons of distinctive appearance.[20] In other words, the risk of detection would be perilously high. Finally, there is no evidence that any of Sendero's weapons have come from foreign sources.[21] Sendero's primary weapon is dynamite. As there are many mines throughout highlands Peru, securing dynamite is not difficult. Sendero has also stolen large quantities of guns during its numerous raids on police posts. When Peruvian officials recover weapons from Senderistas killed in action or arrested, the great majority of those weapons turn out to have been originally the property of the armed forces or the police.[22]

Despite the lack of evidence that foreigners are aiding and abetting Sendero, President Belaúnde continues to charge that they are. Accordingly, security officials have regularly tried to identify foreign accomplices. Their primary suspects have been West Europeans who visit highlands peasant communities, and who resemble 1960's "hippies" in their appearance and lifestyle. Since the departure of the US Peace Corps from the country, these are the only foreigners to be found in any numbers in highlands Peru. To date, the government's quest for foreign accomplices has seemed a kind of tragicomedy, diverting the security forces from their real challenges. Unfortunately, several persons from West European countries have been detained for as long as 20 days, only to prove themselves ordinary tourists or anthropologists in the end.[23]

Internally, Peru does have a broad spectrum of Marxist parties of considerable significance. But Sendero, as noted above, opposes them all, and the feeling is generally mutual. In part, this is because Peru's "parliamentary" Left, as it is often called, fears

[20]For a discussion of the barriers posed to revolutionary groups by Peru's geography, see David Chaplin, "Peru's Postponed Revolution," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1968, pp. 397–99.

[21]All analysts make this point. See in particular Mallin, loc. cit., pp. 51–52.

[22]For a detailed analysis, see *Caretas*, Sept. 6, 1982, p. 65.

[23]The most notorious case is the arrest of three Danes in June 1983. See ibid. July 11, 1983, pp. 23 and 63.

*Members of Peru's Civil Guard in their Ayacucho sleeping quarters, which show the results of a bomb attack by the Senderistas on the night of May 20, 1983.*

—*Caretas* photo via Liaison.



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*Areas of major Sendero Luminoso activities are indicated by Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry at a January 28, 1983, press conference.*

—François Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.

that terrorism will jeopardize its chances of electoral success. The tension created by this situation is a critical component of Sendero's story, and justifies a brief digression to survey the recent history of the Marxist parties of Peru.

With the exception of the pro-Soviet Communist party, these parties did not emerge until the 1970's, when a left-wing military government ruled in Peru. In this period, the Marxist Left's emphasis was on popular mobilization, particularly political strikes. Widespread general strikes in 1977, for example, were a key factor in the decision of the military government to step down and return the country to civilian rule.[24] None of these parties, however, engaged in terrorist activities.

All of Peru's established Marxist parties decided to participate first in the 1978 elections for a constituent assembly, and then in the 1980 elections for a civilian government. The Left emerged as the country's third major political forcé, after Acción Popular, the party of current president Belaúnde, and Acción Para la Revolución Americana (APRA), a much older party whose political perspectives today are apparently social-democratic. Nationwide, the Marxist Left won 29 percent of the vote in 1978 and 18 percent of the vote in 1980.[25]

Most of Peru's Marxist parties remain committed to the electoral route to power. Encouraged by their previous electoral tallies, they believe that, if they are united, they can win at the polls in the not-too-distant future. The parties are currently working together in a loose coalition called Izquierda Unida, led by Alfonso Barrantes. The major participants in the coalition are the UDP (Unidad Democrático Popular, a unity-minded Maoist party); UNIR (Unión de Izquierda Revolucionario, a pro-Beijing party based on the school teachers' union); the PCP (Partido Comunista Peruano, the pro-Soviet Communist party); the PSR (Partido Socialista Revolucionario, led by radical members of the Velasco military regime); and FOCEP (Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular, the party of labor lawyer Genaro Ledesma, based primarily in a central highlands mining region). These parties individually won between 1 percent and 4.6 percent of the vote in the 1980 elections; UDP gained five parliamentary representatives, UNIR four, and the others even fewer. The PCP, in particular, won only 3 percent of the popular vote in 1980 in an alliance with other parties—even though it still dominates the country's largest labor union, the Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos (CGTP).[26]

All of these parliamentary leftist parties oppose Sendero for many reasons, as Barrantes and other Izquierda Unida leaders have explained on several occasions.[27] First, they believe that Sendero, acting in blind impatience, is strategically wrong. Second, the parliamentary Left fears that Sendero's activities could spark a military coup, ending the Left's chances for electoral success, at least in the short run. Third, the parliamentary leftists also fear that they, rather than the clandestine Senderistas, will bear the brunt of the security forces' repression, whether the national government is military or civilian.

A final concern of the parliamentary Left is that Sendero, as a Marxist movement, will tarnish the image of all Marxist groups in Peru. Though Sendero did gain considerable support in the southern highlands for a while, that region is the home of only about 17 percent of the country's population.[28] Its people are mostly destitute Indians who have never felt them-

[24] On the 1977 strikes, see, for example, Howard Handelman, "Peasants, Landlords, and Bureaucrats: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Peru," *American Universities Field Staff Reports* (Hanover, NH), No. 1, 1981.

[25] Henry Pease García, *A Un Año del Segundo Belaundismo* . . ., p. 76.

[26] On these parties and their electoral tallies, a fine analysis in English is Sandra L. Woy-Hazleton and Stephen M. Gorman, "The Peruvian Left since 1977: Ideology, Programs, and Behavior," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association meeting, Denver, CO, Sept. 2–5, 1982.

[27] See, for example, the interviews with Alfonso Barrantes in *Caretas*, Dec. 13, 1982, pp. 28 ff., and in *QueHacer*, No. 20, January 1983, pp. 62–64; with Rolando Breña of UNIR in *Caretas*, Sept. 20, 1982, pp. 30 ff.; with Manuel Dammert of the UDP, in ibid., Apr. 12, 1982, pp. 28 ff.; and with Horacio Zeballos of UNIR, in ibid., Apr. 18, 1983, pp. 28 ff.

[28] *Peru 1982*, Lima, Presidency of the Republic, front matter.



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selves part of the Peruvian nation as a whole. In contrast, the majority of Peruvians are mestizos residing on the coast and still, somehow, eking out a living. All the available indications are that those people continue to want democratic government, not violent revolution.[29] Naturally, Peru's parliamentary Left wants that majority on its side. Thus, for most of Peru's parliamentary leftists, the most important question about Sendero today is how to stop that movement without serious human rights violations. Their primary emphasis in this regard is on development aid for the impoverished Ayacucho region.

There is, however, one reasonably important Marxist group in Peru that is not currently collaborating with Izquierda Unida and has not firmly opposed Sendero. This is the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), a self-proclaimed Trotskyite party led by Hugo Blanco, which gained 3.9 percent of the vote in 1980.[30] A guerrilla organizer in the 1960's, Blanco is a flamboyant leader and a big vote-getter (with the third most votes of all candidates in the 1978 election), but one who is increasingly criticized by other leaders as pugnacious and irresponsible. While Blanco disagrees with Sendero's strategy, he does not want to see Sendero defeated, and contrasts its "direct actions" to Izquierda Unida, "an electoral front and nothing more."[31] Although Blanco's view is uncommon among Peru's Marxists, it is not unique.[32] By and large, however, even those leftist spokesmen sympathetic to Sendero are middle-class and middle-aged, and not even Blanco has proposed moving to the Ayacucho countryside.

Altogether, the tendency among Peru's established urban leftists has been to condemn Sendero. In spite of this consensus, the guerrilla movement initially garnered an impressive amount of localized peasant support. An understanding of this phenomenon requires a closer look at the background against which Sendero intensified its activities in the early 1980's.

## The Rise of Local Sendero Support

After 1978, Senderistas fanned out from the Ayacucho university to the surrounding villages. Some returned to their native communities and took up odd jobs, others became teachers, and perhaps a few were social workers or the like. In contrast to Peru's previous revolutionaries from middle-class backgrounds, the Senderistas were prepared to live austerely for many years in remote, bleak places. Many were ready to give up their lives to the movement. They learned the Indian language if they did not already know it, married into the communities, and preached politics. Gradually, many younger villagers began to listen.

The peasants were more open to the revolutionaries than in the past, for reasons both economic and political. Peru's southern highlands have always been a "Fourth World" enclave in a "Third World" country. As of the early 1970's, life expectancy was 44 years in the southern highlands, versus 54 on the coast; literacy, 47 percent, versus 84 percent on the coast; each highlands physician had to serve 21,650 people, versus 1,822 on the coast; farm family incomes were only about one-third those in coastal Peru.[33] During the decade of the 1970's, the gap between the highlands and the coast actually grew, and absolute poverty in the highlands became more extreme.

As of 1980, many southern highlands peasants could not maintain even subsistence living standards. Malnutrition, rare in Peru until recent years, became prevalent. Average caloric intakes in the highlands in 1980 were down to approximately 72 percent of UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) daily requirements.[34]

This devastating increase in hunger was the result of a constellation of factors. First, the population was steadily increasing, in a country that already suffered from the second-worst land/family ratio in Latin America, after El Salvador.[35] By 1980, population density in Ayacucho province was 50 percent greater than in 1940.[36] At the same time, the quality of the land was deteriorating; soil erosion had devastated many farms.[37] Neither public nor private agronomists were focusing attention on the problems of southern high-

[29]In Lima, as of February 1983, 63 percent of polled citizens preferred a democratic regime, another 20 percent opted for a socialist regime (not necessarily undemocratic), and 14 percent chose a military regime. See *Caretas*, Feb. 28, 1983, p. 13.

[30]Woy-Hazleton and Gorman, loc. cit., p. 39.

[31]Interview with Hugo Blanco, in *Caretas*, Apr. 26, 1982, pp. 28 ff.

[32]See, for example, the interview with Ricardo Letts, in *QueHacer*, No. 20, January 1983, pp. 67–69.

[33]The data and their sources are described in Cynthia McClintock, "Government Policy, Rural Poverty, and Peasant Protest in Peru: The Origins of the Sendero Luminoso Rebellion," paper presented at annual meeting of The American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, Sept. 1–4, 1983, Table 10.

[34]See World Bank, *Peru: Major Development Policy Issues and Recommendations*, Washington, DC, The World Bank, 1981, p. 35. This figure is for the northern highlands, but caloric intake in the south would almost certainly be lower. For example, *QueHacer*, No. 19, October 1982, p. 43, reports that in many southern highlands regions average consumption is only 420 calories daily—i.e., starvation rations.

[35]See Daniel Martínez and Armando Tealdo, *El Agro Peruano 1970–1980* (Peruvian Agriculture, 1970–1980), Lima, CEDEP, 1982, p. 39.

[36]McClintock, loc, cit., Table 11.

[37]For a full description, see José María Caballero, *Economía Agraria de la Sierra Peruana* (The Agrarian Economy of the Peruvian Highlands), Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1981, pp. 59–91.



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lands agriculture. Thus, not surprisingly, per capita production of food staples plummeted in the 1960's and 1970's.[38] During the latter decade, per capita income for highland farm families fell by almost 20 percent.[39] Peru's highland peasants had been gradually integrated into the cash economy,[40] and so their incomes were hurt by the country's post-1975 economic crisis. Most younger men migrated to the coast or to the upper jungle area for temporary work, and real wages declined. Official producer prices for the region's primary crop, the potato, were low throughout the 1970's; more recently, in 1981 and 1982, they dropped to even lower levels.[41]

Politics also changed dramatically in Peru's highlands during the 1970's.[42] In previous decades, most highland peasants were under the watchful eyes of large landowners (hacendados) or their representatives. Although the majority of peasants did not work full time in haciendas, they typically owed the hacendados certain goods or duties, and their activities were to some extent monitored by the hacendados, who always feared that the peasants would invade the hacienda's lands. The hacendados carefully screened their own staff and all visitors to the area for their political affiliations.

[38]José María Caballero, *Agricultura, Reforma Agraria, y Pobreza Campesina* (Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, and Campesino Poverty), Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980, p. 29.

[39]McClintock, loc. cit., Table 11.

[40]The peasants' integration into the market is described fully in Caballero, *Economía Agraria de la Sierra Peruana*, esp. pp. 228–29.

[41]McClintock, loc. cit., Table 3.

[42]On the agrarian reform and its political implications, see Cynthia McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981; and idem, "Post-Revolutionary Agrarian Politics in Peru," in Stephen M. Gorman, Ed., *Post-Revolutionary Peru*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982.




*May 1983 scenes from Vinchos, a village in the Peruvian highlands occupied by Sendero Luminoso: at left, slogans scrawled on church walls call for "Death to Informers," "Glory to Guerrillas Fallen in Combat and Long Live Guerrilla War"; at right, a poster in the main square shows the initials for the Peruvian Communist Party above an image of Mao and the slogans "Long Live the Shanghai Four" and "Long Live Maoism! Long Live Guerrilla War!"*

—Nicole Bonnet/Gamma-Liaison.



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After 1968, the military government of General Velasco carried out a sweeping agrarian reform and, by the mid-1970's, virtually no haciendas remained in Peru. In the southern highlands, the value of the land distributed was small, and few peasants gained a great deal materially from the reform. Politically, though, the agrarian reform did have a considerable impact on this region. The hacendados abandoned Peru's countryside, leaving it open to political activists. On Peru's coast, where the agrarian reform brought peasants impressive material gains, peasants now had something to lose, and few were sympathetic to revolutionary politics. In contrast, in most of the southern highlands, the military government had promised a "revolution" but had not delivered, and many peasants were angry.

Whereas agrarian reforms are often implemented simultaneously with peasant mobilization into pro-government political parties, so that the incumbent government can reap political support from its economic policy, this was not the case in Peru. The Peruvian military government did not build its own political party and restricted other parties. Grass-roots peasant organizations did grow considerably during the 1970's, however. One such organization, the Confederación Nacional Agrária (CNA), was initially sponsored by the Velasco government, but gradually its politics moved leftward and it was disowned. Marxist groups organized a second peasant group, the Confederación de Campesinos Peruanos (CCP), whose leaders also carried leftist messages into remote areas of the country. Both peasant confederations played a role in the 1977 strikes that convinced the Morales Bermúdez government to step down.

By 1978, a substantial percentage of the highland peasantry was sympathetic to radical political views. In the 1978 Constituent Assembly election, a total of 37 percent of the vote in the Ayacucho Department, and slightly more in other southern highlands areas, was cast for one or another party of the Marxist

*A citizen of Ayacucho proceeds on her way past a wall bearing the Senderista slogan: "PCP: Start the Armed Struggle!"*

—T. La Penna/Gamma-Liaison.



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Left—versus only 29 percent nationwide.[43] During the next two years, however, the Marxist parties lost their ascendance in the region. Their electoral tally did remain higher in Ayacucho than in any other department, save the two tiny southern mining departments of Moquegua and Tacna. Even so, in the 1980 elections, the Left's vote fell to 27 percent in Ayacucho and yet lower elsewhere in the highlands region.[44]

Peasants had become disillusioned with the Marxist parties for various reasons, of which party factionalism was probably the most important. Divided among nine different organizations by 1980, leftist leaders were viewed as too quarrelsome and too personally ambitious to compromise their differences for the common good. Also, some Marxist leaders elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1978 were perceived as having lost interest in the problems of the highlands once they started to enjoy the good life in Lima. A third reason for popular disillusionment was the clearly limited impact of the Marxist Left on Peruvian politics in the late 1970's. After the 1980 election, the Marxist parties became even more obviously ineffectual, since the governing coalition enjoyed a majority in the congress and its policies could not be blocked by the Left. Indeed, one major factor behind Sendero's early success was the political vacuum created by the decline in image and effectiveness of other, less extreme leftist movements.

By 1980, to summarize, many peasants in the southern highlands were in despair. They had hoped for significant material benefits from the agrarian reform, and had not received them. Some had also hoped that, with the rising electoral strength of the leftist parties, Peru's government would show more concern for the poorest peasants, but it had not. Meanwhile, more and more peasants could no longer feed their families.

Against this background, Sendero Luminoso began to take concrete—if violent—steps that did help some peasants. In the expanding area that they controlled, the Senderistas targeted well-to-do individuals and threatened them. Most left, and those who did not were murdered. Their property—land, animals, and store goods—was distributed, and debts owed to them were declared null and void.

In 1980, Sendero also initiated its terrorist attacks on "symbols of the bourgeois state." The guerrillas dynamited police posts, public buildings, power lines, tourist hotels, and facilities of special interest like the Ayacucho university's experimental agricultural center

[43]Results calculated by Pease García, op. cit., p. 76.
[44]Ibid.

*A member of the "Sinchis," an elite Peruvian anti-guerrilla police force, removes a Sendero Luminoso banner raised during the night.*

—Nicole Bonnet/Gamma-Liaison.

mentioned above. Officials throughout the area were threatened; most resigned, others were assassinated.

Presumably, what most peasants wanted was construction, not destruction. But one of Sendero's apparent intentions was to draw security forces into the area and then, as these forces abused the Ayacucho people, gain more recruits. At least until early 1983, this was exactly what happened.[45] The Belaúnde government sent about 1,500 paramilitary police and "Sinchis"—a special counterinsurgency corps—to the area in 1982. (The word Sinchis means "warrior" in Quechua.) The security forces were poorly trained, they did not know the area, and in any case their mission was extremely difficult. They could not easily identify the Senderistas, who were part of the local population and thus able to camouflage themselves. In those few cases when informants did denounce a "Senderista," the individual was apparently often innocent, the victim of a mere personal grudge. The police passed much of their time lounging in Ayacucho's central square, drinking and firing occasional volleys

[45]Edward Schumacher, "Rebellion Brings New Fear to the Land of the Incas," *The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1982; Barry Came, "Terror on the 'Shining Path'," *Newsweek* (New York, NY), Feb. 7, 1982, p. 12; Jonathan Cavanagh, "Peru's Army Arrives in Guerrilla Area, but Communist Rebels Well Entrenched," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Jan. 4, 1983; and Jackson Diehl, "Mysterious Rebel Band Threatens Political Stability of Peru," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 1, 1982.



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into the air. But from time to time they also invaded villages, and their brutality terrified the peasants. As one US journalist described such an encounter:

*They roared into Pomacocha, a tiny hamlet wedged into a narrow valley 10,000 feet up in the Andes, at 4 in the morning. Firing automatic rifles into the air, the mixed unit of Peruvian anti-terrorist police, infantrymen and paratroopers quickly fanned out among the startled residents. Within minutes the raiders jerked 39 men from their beds and ordered them to lie face down in the local square. "Where are the terrorists?" the soldiers demanded, pushing a booted foot on each suspect's neck. Three of the younger men replied with taunts. They were dragged to a nearby mud wall, bound with wire, and summarily shot.*[46]

The reporter concluded that peasants feared the Sinchis more than they did Sendero, as the former killed much more randomly.

Sendero, for its part, was by no means averse to violence. While most of its assaults were rather simple dynamitings, some were more complex and required considerable military planning and daring. The best example is the jailbreak of March 1982. Fifty to sixty guerrillas attacked the Ayacucho prison, blasting their way inside and freeing 257 prisoners, including a number of Senderistas. Most of Sendero's recent recruits are adolescents, not yet even in their twenties, and conceivably they were impressed by operations of this kind.

By late 1982, for all these reasons, Sendero was in a very strong position in the Ayacucho area. As a result of some 3,000 terrorist actions,[47] including the murders of some 50 policemen and government officials,[48] Sendero had driven virtually all government representatives out of approximately 25,000 square miles of Peruvian territory.[49] Official estimates of the number of Senderistas were constantly rising, from a few hundred in 1981 to as many as 3,000 by 1983.[50] It was rumored that the Senderistas were organizing bands throughout the Peruvian highlands.

Popular support for Sendero at that time cannot be measured definitively, but virtually all available evidence suggests it was considerable. In a careful analysis of this question in late 1982, one Peruvian social scientist reported that when he asked citizens in Ayacucho if they thought "Sendero was backed by the local population," almost everyone answered that "it's a movement supported by the youngest peasants. The older ones are resigned to their lot, but they do support their kids."[51] Another suggestive point is that through 1982 the Senderistas enjoyed unusual success in escaping the police. Peru's geography, as previously noted, renders the capture of fugitives relatively easy, so if the Senderistas were not caught it was probably because other peasants were protecting them.

Further evidence of popular support was the mass turnout for the funeral of Edith Lagos, a 19-year-old guerrilla commander who died while in police custody in mid-1982. Estimated at somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 people in a city of only about 70,000, the turnout was the largest for an Ayacucho event in recent history. Sendero also called, covertly, for a department-wide strike in Ayacucho in early 1983, and this protest too was successful.[52] Yet this impressive show of local backing has not lasted; in the past year, a new government offensive in response to fresh episodes of political terror, along with a decline in popular support for the guerrillas, have dealt Sendero a series of blows from which it may not recover.

## 1983: Government Counteroffensive

In mid-December 1982 the Senderistas assassinated four more government officials; among the victims was the local deputy mayor, shot down in front of his wife and four children. President Belaúnde had not wanted to send the regular armed forces to Ayacucho, but these murders were apparently the last straw. A state of emergency was declared in eight districts of Ayacucho and Huancavellica, and General Clemente Noel took command of the area. About 2,000 soldiers and paratroopers arrived. Helicopter gunships and a reconnaissance plane were deployed. Argentine support may also have been enlisted.

The death toll in the resulting campaign rose precipitously. Whereas between 1980 and 1982 the death toll was under 200, official figures showed over 700 casualties between January and May 1983.[53] In

[46]Came, loc. cit. The same event is reported and similar conclusions drawn by Kenneth Freed, "Pocket of Terrorism Stirs Fear Among Peruvian Peasants," *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 20, 1983.

[47]This is the number claimed by Sendero. See "Peru: 'Dirty War' in Ayacucho," *NACLA Report on the Americas* (New York, NY), May/June 1983, p. 38.

[48]See Freed, loc. cit.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Estimates, of course, vary. See Mallin, loc. cit., p. 52.

[51]González, loc. cit., p. 47. Most of the US newspaper articles cited above also indicate considerable support.

[52]Raul González, "An Inconclusive Chronicle: The Battles of Ayacucho," *QueHacer*, No. 21, February 1983, p. 19.

[53]Palmer, loc. cit., p. 13.



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*A massive public turnout for the September 1982 funeral in Ayacucho of Senderist leader Edith Lagos; at right, a photo of Edith Lagos.*

—Photos from *QueHacer* and *Caretas*.

May alone, the number of dead exceeded 400 in Ayacucho.[54] It was uncertain, however, exactly who were the killers and who the victims. No account of these events other than the official one is readily available; reporters have not been allowed access to the troubled areas. In one instance, General Noel forcibly prevented reporters from Peru's *Caretas* and stringers from *The Wall Street Journal* from visiting one region.[55]

According to the government, most of the killers are peasants who oppose Sendero and most of the victims are Senderistas. Ayacucho military authorities say that, thanks to traditional local rivalries or to disillusionment with Sendero, peasants suddenly decided to take matters into their own hands. Other analysts, however, are skeptical of the official interpretation.[56] They believe that the security forces have launched a large-scale and sometimes indiscriminate search-and-destroy operation in the area. According to this view, antiguerrilla squads have descended upon villages considered sympathetic to Sendero to carry out mass searches, arrests, and allegedly brutal interrogations. Small bombs were also reportedly dropped on some villages. Most of these communities are now said to be almost deserted. Critics of the government line also claim that the counterinsurgency squads have bribed some peasant communities to attack others sympathetic to Sendero.

These opposing views of recent events in the southern highlands are clearly evident in the debate over the tragic murder of eight Peruvian journalists in the Indian village Uchuraccay in late January 1983. The journalists were on their way to another nearby community. According to officials and also to the well-known Peruvian novelist, Mario Vargas Llosa, who is sympathetic to the current administration, the Uchuraccay villagers simply made a mistake. They believed that the eight strangers were Senderistas and slew them for this reason.[57]

But most Peruvians, according to one poll taken at the time, doubted the official account.[58] Some observers noted that the journalists were traveling to Huaychao, a community that a few days previously had reportedly killed some Senderistas, in order to investigate those deaths. Perhaps, these observers reasoned, military authorities did not want the journalists

[54] *Latin America Weekly Report* (London), WR-83-21, June 3, 1983, p. 7.

[55] *Latin America Regional Report: Andean Group* (London), RA-83-04, May 20, 1983, p. 8.

[56] See, for example, *Latin America Weekly Report*, WR-83-14, Apr. 15, 1983, p. 5; *Peru Update*, No. 30, July 1983; James Brooke, "Peru's Patience, Bullets, and Bribes Put Leftist Guerrillas on the Run," *Miami Herald*, Feb. 27, 1983; Jackson Diehl "Peruvian Guerrillas Test Government Sway," *The Washington Post*, May 19, 1983; Freed, loc. cit.; and Philip Bennett, "Ayacucho's Quiet War," *The Lima Times*, Feb. 4, 1983.

[57] Vargas Llosa, loc. cit.

[58] In a public opinion poll in Lima, only 13 percent of respondents said that they were satisfied with the findings of the official commission investigating the massacre, which absolved the security forces. See *Peru Update*, No. 29, April 1983, p. 1. For criticisms of the official story, see *Latin America Weekly Report*, WR-83-06, Feb. 11, 1983, pp. 6–7; and *Peru Update*, Nos. 28 and 29, March and April 1983.



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*General Clemente Noel, center, military and civil chief of Ayacucho, with the mayor of Ayacucho on June 26, 1983.*

—J. C. Criton/SYGMA.

to reach Huaychao. As for the villagers, the skeptics ask, would Peruvian peasants—even impoverished ones in remote areas—mistake reporters for Senderistas, even after conversation with them at close range? Why did the Uchuraccay peasants appear to the next journalists on the scene to be awaiting a reward?

Several observations may shed some light on this debate, and on the broader question of the recent activities of both Sendero guerrillas and government troops around Ayacucho. On the one hand, it is virtually certain that many peasants did become disillusioned with Sendero.[59] Apparently, once the guerrillas gained control of large areas in 1982, they began to show their fanatical colors. They imposed planting quotas on the local communities so that there would be nothing to sell to the cities. They closed down weekly markets as forms of capitalist exchange. They became more random and more ruthless in their assassinations of "traitors" and "informants." Finally, when soldiers arrived in large numbers in early 1983, many Senderistas fled the area, instead of trying to protect the communities that had backed them at first. Even one Sendero guerrilla, in the anonymous September 1983 interview cited earlier, has confirmed that many Ayacucho peasants no longer support his movement:

*These peasants stand in the way of our success. Many are government informers. Others oppose us actively, do not cooperate with us, and even refuse us food and sustenance.*[60]

On the other hand, it is also virtually certain that human rights violations by government forces have increased markedly in Peru of late. While journalists have not been able to go beyond the city of Ayacucho, they have been free to talk to peasants and to anyone else in the city. Almost all report widespread and intense fear of the counterinsurgency squads. In this connection, Amnesty International believes that "scores of extrajudicial executions" have been carried out by these squads since mid-January 1983.[61] That organization has also reported that, while some of those arrested in recent months are indeed Senderistas, many are not, and that torture has been used in numerous cases. Along with many guerrillas, some respected individuals affiliated with the parliamentary parties of the Marxist Left are also said to be in jail. Altogether, according to one report, as many as 5,000–7,000 people were arrested in June 1983 alone.[62] This campaign has, however, apparently checked the rise in terrorist activity.

## Sendero and Peru's Political Future

After the counterinsurgency offensive in Ayacucho, Senderista leaders apparently dispersed. Some went to the central highlands, others into the upper jungle, and still others down to Lima. In the course of this dispersion, Sendero's overall composition may have shifted in an urban direction. Some established Ayacucho revolutionary leaders, as noted earlier, may already have merged with Lima's "thug left." In August 1982, this group showed its hand for the first time, dynamiting key power stations and blacking out the city. The tactic has been repeated several times over the past year. The "new" Sendero has carried out scores of other terrorist actions in Lima. In recent months, the governing party's headquarters, foreign-owned factories, airport installations, police posts, and the like have been assaulted, businessmen kidnapped, and political leaders targeted. While the

[59] See especially González, "An Inconclusive Chronicle . . ."; Barton, loc. cit., p. 38; and Brooke, loc. cit.

[60] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Sept. 15, 1983.

[61] Amnesty International, Circular No. 18 on Peru, Aug. 15, 1983.

[62] *Peru Update*, No. 30, July 1983, p. 1.



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number of deaths remains low in the capital (less than ten innocent victims), the damage to property and infrastructure has been great.

Because Sendero is repudiated by the great majority of Lima's citizens, the guerrillas have not been able to protect themselves as well in the capital as they did in the highlands. Some Senderista leaders and many rank-and-file members have been captured after the group's recent attacks. Sendero will probably still be able to recruit new members from among the thousands of unemployed and destitute teen-agers in Lima's slums. However, as Sendero loses leaders and its doctrine becomes diluted, the movement will probably take on more and more of a criminal character.

Unfortunately, in Peru as in the neighboring Andean countries, both revolutionary and criminal violence seem likely to increase in the near future, despite democratic elections and civilian leadership. Socially and economically, the last two years have been devastating ones for all these countries, and the poor have been hurt especially hard. University students and teachers, groups that are most often inclined to revolutionary alternatives, have also been seriously affected. It seems possible too that guerrilla groups from one Andean country will ally with those in another, perhaps as leaders flee their nation's security forces, or perhaps as a result of the drug traffic connection. For example, it is rumored that Colombia's guerrillas, the M-19, now have an outpost in a remote region of Ecuador.

The prospect of continual violence is a grim one. Nevertheless, as the Colombian experience shows, terrorism does not necessarily spell an end to civilian government. Peru, in particular, is looking forward to municipal elections in November 1983, and to presidential elections in May 1985. The best guess now is that both elections will be fair and open, and that victory will go to the social-democratic APRA party at the

*A synthetic fiber plant in Callao—owned jointly by the Bayer firm of West Germany and the Peruvian government—in flames on May 27, 1983, after being bombed by Senderistas.*

**—*Caretas* photo via Liaison.**



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expense of the current governing party, Acción Popular. The parliamentary Left is likewise expected to do well, provided that it remains united—very possibly running ahead of Acción Popular.[63] Whichever party wins, however, terrorism may well continue to pose difficult challenges for the government of Peru, and could tend to undermine the integrity and effectiveness—if not the electoral procedures—of the country's embattled democratic regime.

As for Sendero, the combination of the military offensive, declining popular support, and continued political isolation is likely to spell defeat, notwithstanding the bravado of some individual guerrilla spokesmen. To be sure, peasant bitterness will offer renewed opportunities for the radical Left; but Sendero's center of gravity, in apparent disregard of the movement's original Maoist prescriptions, seems to have shifted toward Lima. And neither rural guerrilla warfare nor sheer terror in the capital is likely to be a successful revolutionary strategy in the relatively modernized and urbanized contemporary Latin American context. All previous successful revolutions in that region—from Mexico in 1910 through Bolivia and Cuba in the 1950's to Nicaragua in 1979—were the result of combined action by urban intellectuals, university students, and peasants.[64] Fidel Castro did once try to reinterpret the story of the Cuban revolution, arguing that it was purely the product of the rural "*foco*";[65] but this version had to be modified again after the lonely death of Ché Guevara in the Bolivian countryside. Viewed in this harsh light, Sendero and any similar groups can certainly trouble but probably not topple the civilian democratic governments they target, in Peru or elsewhere in the Andes.

[63] *Caretas*, May 2, 1983, p. 15.

[64] See Dix, loc. cit., and Cole Blasier, "Social Revolution: Origins in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba," in Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes, Eds., *Cuba In Revolution*, New York, NY, Doubleday Anchor, 1972, pp. 18–51.

[65] The best-known advancement of a "*foco*" strategy is Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?* New York, NY, Grove Press, 1967.



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# Are Nations Merging in the USSR?

**by Zvi Gitelman**

It is often assumed that multiethnic states are more difficult to rule or simply to hold together than ethnically homogeneous ones; therefore, "from the perspective of central government elites ... multiethnicity is always a problem and a liability and never an opportunity and an asset."[1] There are, according to Joseph Rothschild, "some situations and circumstances in which ... a multiethnic population may serve as a resource and a policy lever to rulers and central elites."[2] Yet, on the Soviet multiethnic state, Western literature is nearly unanimous in its view that the non-Russian nationalities—now about half the Soviet population—are a "problem" and even a "threat" to the central elites and to the stability of the system over which they preside.

Soviet leaders from Lenin on, however, have viewed the non-Russian nationalities not only as potential threats but also as vehicles for spreading socialism to many peoples, including those outside the Soviet borders, and as economic, military, demographic, and cultural assets. These leaders therefore have designed policies to minimize the threats and maximize the opportunities.[3] Compared to leaders of many other multiethnic societies, Soviet leaders seem to have been successful. Seweryn Bialer argues that the Soviet Union "is almost the only state which after World War II has been able to thwart the successful global trend of national and ethnic self-assertiveness against central authority."[4] Yet, in the same breath, he says that "the multinational character of the Soviet Union poses potentially the most serious threat to the legitimacy of the Soviet state and to the stability of the Soviet regime."[5] Bialer explains this apparent contradiction as follows: the leadership has achieved a "proper balance" between repression and tolerance, along with the development of indigenous elites who have a stake in the system. This has kept the nationalities in line, but the potential for destabilization by the nationalities is very much there. In fact, without citing any empirical evidence, he asserts that "the polarization of the Soviet peoples along ethnic lines is increasing faster than their identification with, and consciousness of, a new Soviet statehood...."[6]

This ambivalence and uncertainty about the role of non-Russian nationalities in preserving or upsetting the stability of the system reflects much of Western scholarly opinion. Some see the non-Russian peoples as the political "soft underbelly" of the Soviet system and interpret the unmistakable signs of ethnic self-consciousness and, sometimes, self-assertiveness, as harbingers of the coming breakup of the "Soviet empire."[7] Others believe that while a full-fledged "nationalist movement" is the only force that could threaten the regime directly, this is unlikely to emerge, except perhaps in the Baltic states.[8] Rothschild takes an intermediate position, concluding that "the ethno-

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[1] Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1981, p. 213.

[2] Ibid.

[3] On the varieties of policies that dominant ethnic elites adopt toward ethnic subordinates, see ibid., pp. 155ff.

[4] Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 211.

[5] Ibid., p. 212.

[6] Ibid., p. 208.

[7] See, for example, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire*, New York, NY, Newsweek Books, 1979.

[8] Mary McAuley, "In Search of Nationalism in the USSR," unpublished paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the National Association for Soviet and East European Studies, Cambridge University, March 1982.



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*The multiethnic nature of the Soviet Union is evident from this street scene in Alma-Ata, capital of Kazakhstan.*

—EUPRA.

national problem is currently being managed and contained in the Soviet Union at a level below that of a crisis," although it could become "incendiary in the coming decade and/or insoluble within the prevailing political system."[9]

Thus, in speculating on the circumstances in which ethnic discontents can have directly destabilizing effects on the Soviet political system, Western analysts basically envision two possibilities. An alienated nationality that sees no hope for the amelioration of its grievances within the existing system attempts to topple it either to gain independent statehood or to create a wholly new multiethnic system that will satisfy its particularistic demands. Or, externally generated instability (a less than total East-West military confrontation; upheaval in Eastern Europe) gives disaffected nationalities an opportunity to upset the system further, either toppling it entirely or extracting such major concessions that its nature is fundamentally altered. However, there is a third pattern rarely considered in Western literature on the Soviet Union: Nationalities which do not intend to overthrow the system fight each other, the state authorities are unable to control the dispute, and an unintended consequence of ethnic rivalry is the disruption of the state. Without trying to assess which of these patterns is most likely to occur in the future, this essay aims, in a very limited way, to discover something about Soviet peoples' ethnocentrism and perceptions of ethnic relations. It does not claim to answer the question of how wide and deep ethnic tensions in the USSR are, nor, certainly, if and how they will lead to political destabilization.

## Gauging Ethnic Relations in the USSR

Neither as description nor prescription have Marxist and Western social scientists' visions of ethnic assimilation worked out. To the delight of some, the chagrin of others, and the surprise of many, ethnic consciousness—and ethnic tensions—have survived both conscious social engineering, as in the USSR and other multiethnic socialist countries, and the massive social changes wrought by economic development, whether socialist or capitalist. In fact, it is currently fashionable

[9]Rothschild, op. cit., pp. 226–27.



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in the West to view ethnicity not simply as an individual attribute, but as a potent resource that can be mobilized to attain important political, economic, and social desiderata.[10]

Soviet social scientists, by contrast, debate with vigor the pace at which their society is moving toward the amalgamation of the nationalities. The dominant opinion among them is that it is moving in that direction, but very slowly.[11] Moreover, as Leonid Brezhnev himself pointed out at the most recent party congress:

*The unity of Soviet nations is now closer than ever. This does not mean, of course, that all questions of nationality relations have been solved already. The degree of development of such a large multinational state as ours gives rise to many problems which demand the Party's close attention.*[12]

In recent years Soviet scholars and Western students of the USSR have increased their efforts to learn about both the "unity of Soviet nations" and the nature of ethnicity in the USSR. Western studies have focused largely on four areas: Soviet policies toward the nationalities; particular nationalities and/or republics and smaller regions; demographic trends and their implications for the future of the nationalities, the industrial labor force, the military, and the spread of Soviet values and Russian culture; general implications of demographic and political-cultural trends for the future strength and stability of the country and, by extension, its behavior in the international arena.[13]

Almost all the Wesern studies use aggregate data, such as census results, or case studies of groups or territories. General trends—for example, toward or away from adoption of Russian culture—can be discerned from these data and conclusions drawn from them regarding the effectiveness of Soviet policies and the dispositions of nationality groups. Proceeding from the assumption (shared by Soviet analysts) that one should expect a diminution of nationality distinctiveness over time, the studies find it noteworthy when such expectations are not fulfilled. On the question of the effects of modernization, Western and Soviet assumptions diverge. Here the Westerners, departing from conventional assumptions, believe that economic and cultural modernization will bring Soviet nationalities into conflictual contact with one another and will raise expectations among hitherto less developed groups. This will bring these groups into conflict with traditionally advantaged groups, and there will be tensions over resource allocation, personnel policies, and cultural issues. The Soviet assumption, on the other hand, is that modernization ("socialist in content") will temporarily preserve ethnic identity ("national in form"), but that value differences among peoples will diminish. In a study using Soviet data on the social and economic position of women, attitudes toward the role of women, the size of families and the division of labor within them, two American researchers concur that Soviet expectations *are* being fulfilled. They find that modernization in Soviet Central Asia is bringing about value change in the direction desired by the central leadership and that ethnic protest is "spontaneous, unfocused, and at a manageable level. Over the past decade, the predominant response of Soviet minorities to the requirements and opportunities of the system has been to adapt in both lifestyles and values, not to rebel."[14]

The limitation of all these studies is that in relying on aggregate, non-attitudinal data, individual attitudes and choices can only be inferred, at best. Also, because Western researchers have no access to the raw data that would permit independent analysis and full

[10]See, for example, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1975; D. Handelman, "The Organization of Ethnicity," *Ethnic Groups* (London), No 1, 1977; Jeffrey Ross, et al., Eds., *The Mobilization of Collective Identity*, Washington, DC, University Press of America, Inc., 1980; Rothschild, op. cit., pp. 3–4.

[11]The head of the section on the Theory of Nations and Nationality Relations at the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Mikhail I. Kulichenko, firmly rejects the proposition put forth by other Soviet writers that "already under socialism there is a fusion [*sliyaniye*] and unification of nations in the areas of economics, politics, and ideology." Kulichenko argues that fusion has taken place only on the ideological plane, and even then "not absolutely." Obviously, cultural, linguistic, and psychological differences are even further from being removed. See M. I. Kulichenko, *Natsional'nyye otnosheniya v SSSR i tendentsii ikh razvitiya* (National Relations in the USSR and Tendencies in Their Development), Moscow, Mysl', 1972, pp. 524–25.

[12]L. I. Brezhnev's report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU, *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

[13]A few recent examples of each genre may be cited. The first genre includes Jeremy Azrael, Ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1978; and Carl Linden and Dimitri Simes, Eds., *Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR*, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1977. Studies of individual nationalities are numerous, often focusing on Baltic and Central Asian peoples, Jews, and Ukrainians. Examples include Edward Allworth, Ed., *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States: Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1977; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970; Zvi Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972; and Michael Browne, Ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine*, Woodhaven, NY, Crisis Press, 1973. On demographic trends, see, inter alia, Murray Feshbach, "The Soviet Union: Population Trends and Dilemmas," *Population Bulletin* (Washington, DC), August 1982; and Robert Lewis, Richard Rowland, and Ralph Clem, *Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the U.S.S.R.*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1976. The last category would include works such as Jeremy Azrael's *Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR: A Project AIR FORCE Report*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1977; Eilen Jones and Fred Grupp, "Socio-Cultural Development and Political Stability in the Soviet Multinational State," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, NY, September 1981; and Bialer, op. cit.

[14]Jones and Grupp, loc. cit., p. 35.



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reporting, they must rely on Soviet findings and, to some degree, Soviet conclusions.

What are the subjective feelings underlying the aggregate statistics? If we know that certain groups have adopted the Russian language, does that mean they no longer identify with their own ethnic group but see themselves as Russians, or even have warm feelings toward Russians? Some Soviet scholars reject this simplistic confusion of acculturation with assimilation. As one puts it: "Even while losing the mother tongue and even cultural characteristics, national consciousness is often preserved (Russianized Germans and Jews, Tatarified Bashkirs)."[15] Certainly, the activities of Soviet Germans and Jews in the decade following 1967, when this statement was made, confirm that linguistic assimilation is not necessarily an indicator of diminished ethnic consciousness.[16] Yet, another Soviet scholar, writing in 1979, concluded on the basis of "native language" data in the 1959 and 1970 censuses: "The Jewish population should be considered a national group which finds itself in a process of intensive assimilation with other socialist nations."[17] This is but one example of how aggregate data can mislead the observer who tries to extrapolate values, feelings, or behavior from them. Aggregate data reflect large glacial movements without revealing the turbulence that may be beneath them. As several studies have shown, members of ethnic minorities learn to adapt their language and mores to specific social situations,[18] appearing "assimilated" in one kind of situation, but "going native" in a different situation. The general point is that the aggregate trends we can discern from the data used in studying Soviet nationalities are not a reliable indicator of subjective feelings. A non-Russian who uses the Russian language may be hostile to Russians, and may insist on maintaining a non-Russian identity. For those who are concerned with the implications of ethnic feelings for political stability, direct knowledge of inter-ethnic feelings and attitudes would be more useful than inferences made from aggregate data.

Unfortunately, such knowledge is hard to come by. Soviet official pronouncements on the state of inter-ethnic relations are generally self-congratulatory or hortatory. Soviet empirical studies of the issue are quite limited in number and scope. It is not possible for outsiders to conduct such studies in the USSR, as this is deemed too sensitive a subject. Official statements point with pride to the tremendous cultural and economic advances made under Soviet socialism by many nationalities, particularly Asian ones, and to what they describe as ethnic harmony and cooperation. When the non-Soviet observer compares the situation in the USSR with that in other multiethnic states in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas, the Soviet picture does seem quite bright. But, given the closed and controlled nature of the system, one cannot be sure how closely the superficial picture reflects underlying realities. Moreover, there is considerable, if sporadic, evidence of nationality discontent. One is reluctant to accept prima facie the claim that "the Soviet people is a fundamentally new *social* and *international* community of people," that the USSR consists of a "single and friendly family of over 100 nationalities jointly building communism," and that social relations are based on "friendship, complete equality, multifacted fraternal cooperation and mutual . . . assistance."[19]

Even if we take this claim with a grain of salt, it is clear that Soviet authorities rank their achievements in nationality relations among the greatest accomplishments of the system. Leonid Brezhnev proudly claimed that the achievements of "Leninist nationality policy ... can truly be put on the same level with achievements in the construction of a new society in the USSR such as industrialization, collectivization, the cultural revolution."[20] On the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Central Committee declared:

*Factual equality of all nations and nationalities in all spheres of . . . society has been assured . . . and genuine brotherhood of the people of labor, independent of nationality, has become established, a brotherhood welded by a community of fundamental interests, goals, and Marxist-Leninist ideology.*[21]

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[15] I. S. Gurvich, "Some Problems of Ethnic Development of Peoples in the USSR," *Sovetskaya etnografiya* (Moscow), No. 5, p. 63.

[16] Acculturation takes place when a group or individual adopts the culture of others; assimilation takes place when acculturation has gone so far that no characteristics identified with the former culture are retained, nor any loyalties to the former group. See Arnold Rose, *Sociology: The Study of Human Relations*, New York, NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1961, pp. 557–58.

[17] I. P. Tsameryan, *Natsii i natsional'nyye otnosheniya v razvitom sotsialisticheskom obshchestve* (Nations and National Relations in Developed Socialist Society), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, p. 105.

[18] See, for example, Fredrik Barth, Ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1969; and Jonathan Y. Okamura, "Situational Ethnicity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (London), October 1981.

[19] P. N. Fedoseyev, et al., *Leninism and the National Question*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, pp. 327, 334.

[20] L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskom kursom* (On the Leninist Path), Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, Vol. 4, p. 50.

[21] Quoted in M. I. Kulichenko, "Socioeconomic Foundations of Mutual Influence and Enrichment of National Culture in Conditions of Developed Socialism," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 5, 1977, trans. in *Soviet Law and Government* (White Plains, NY), Summer 1978, pp. 53–54.



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A Soviet Asian commentator claims that "such features of bourgeois relations as a sense of national superiority, national mistrust, national isolation, and exclusiveness are alien to Soviet people."[22]

The claim to friendly relations among all ethnic groups and to the absence of ethnic tensions and prejudices is made not only by official spokesmen, but even by scholars. For example, E. A. Bagramov writes, "Friendship, fraternity of nations, the creation of socialist internationalism—this is an achievement whose significance remains unprecedented in world history."[23] However, there is considerable debate over whether this has been fully achieved. Mikhail Kulichenko, for one, warns that "change in the relationship between the international and the national ... occurs slowly" and that it "proceeds at a different pace among different peoples." Moreover, "in considerable measure it is subject to the influence of subjective factors, although fundamentally it is unquestionably an objective factor."[24] Like other scholars, he cautions that nationality integration is not as rapid a process as economic development and levelling. "It would be entirely false to assert that convergence of nations in the area of the life of the spirit is proceeding at the same pace as in economic and political life."[25] Nevertheless, it is widely claimed in the USSR that ethnic relations there are not only profoundly different from those in any "bourgeois" society, but that they constitute a qualitatively different form of social organization. Academician P.N. Fedoseyev explains:

*The Soviet people—this is not a nation or an ethnic category, but a new historical form of social and international unity of people of different nations.... This unity arose on the basis of the elimination of antagonistic relations among classes and nations, on the basis of an alliance between workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, on the basis of the flowering and drawing together of Soviet nations.*[26]

Again, such claims are indirectly challenged by more skeptical Soviet voices. A major empirical study of the "lifestyles" of ethnic groups states that the greatest homogeneity of outlook has been achieved on political values, then on work, but least of all on culture and, especially, family life. In the latter two, ethnic differences are quite large.[27] Others acknowledge that the "objective conditions" for a qualitatively different form of social organization exist, but this does not automatically assure its emergence. As Bagramov points out, "the special character of national relations is such that their harmonious development depends not only on objective conditions, but also, *in increasing measure*, on subjective factors."[28]

The logical corollary of acknowledging the importance of subjective factors in inter-ethnic relations would be to study those factors empirically. Soviet scholars admit that it became necessary to shift from studying the "results of national processes and relations" to "discovering the internal mechanisms of such phenomena." This required "mass quantitative data" beyond those in the censuses, and so it became necessary to conduct "empirical sociological investigations" and to study nationality questions "on their own empirical basis, so to speak."[29] Beginning in 1967, empirical studies were carried out in the Baltic republics, Tataria, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and the lower Amur region. Most of these have been small-scale studies, and, as Yulian Bromley admits, "the bibliography of ethno-sociological studies is still not very long."[30] It is obvious that empirical research is fraught with the danger of unpleasant findings that might undermine the assertions of Soviet ideologists, who, as we have seen, have gone quite far in their claims of an unprecedented ethnically harmonious society. Therefore it is likely that empirical research on nationality questions is deliberately limited, that the results of studies are carefully screened before publication, and that even certain methods cannot be used by the researchers.[31]

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[22] N. Khalmukhamedov, "New Soviet Constitution: Socialism and National Relations," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 9, 1977, p. 32.

[23] "National Relations and Internationalist Upbringing," in M. I. Kulichenko, et al., *Osnovnyye napravleniya izucheniya natsional'nykh otnosheniy v. SSSR* (The Basic Trends in the Study of National Relations in the USSR), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, p. 87. See also Tsamerian, op. cit., pp. 75, 78.

[24] Kulichenko, "Socio-Economic Foundations," p. 82.

[25] Ibid., p. 86.

[26] *Izvestiya AN Kirghiz SSR* (Frunze), No. 6, 1975, p. 22, quoted in Kulichenko, et al., op. cit., pp. 65–66. Ironically, an article in *Kommunist* (Moscow), titled "We—the Soviet People," repeats the claim of having formed a "new community of people," but goes on to single out the Russians as "first among equal fraternal nations" and as having played the leading role in the Revolution, civil war, industrialization, collectivization, the victory over Fascist Germany, and the postwar development of the USSR. See No. 12, 1982, p. 6.

[27] Yu. V. Arutyunyan, et al., *Opyt etnosotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya obraza zhizni* (Experiment in Ethno-sociological Research of the Way of Life), Moscow, Nauka, 1980, p. 4.

[28] In Kulichenko, et al., op. cit., p. 96. Emphasis added.

[29] Ibid., p. 26.

[30] Ibid., p. 27. Arutyunyan's study, cited above, is an exception in that it reports a republic-wide study in considerable detail.

[31] Juozas Kazlas cites a Soviet sociologist who argues that the social distance scale was irrelevant to Soviet society since racial prejudice hardly exists there and almost all respondents would appear on the unprejudiced side of the scale. Kazlas, "Social Distance Among Ethnic Groups," in Allworth, op. cit., p. 233. For similar arguments regarding opinion research, see Walter Connor and Zvi Gitelman, *Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems* New York, NY, Praeger, 1977, chs. 1 and 4.



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Moreover, the party and similar institutions are often involved in organizing, if not conducting, the research. One of the researchers in the Tatar region, where the first major empirical study was done, thanks "comrades who helped organize the research, and especially the obkom of the Party and the obkom of the Komsomol of the Tatar ASSR."[32] This must at least raise the possibility of less than candid responses by interviewees who may be aware of official involvement in the research. We must therefore be cautious in accepting at face value the claim that in Tataria "a very small part of the population sticks to preferences for their own nationality and has negative attitudes toward ties among [Soviet] nations."[33] Older Tatar women are reported to be the most ethnocentric, and those who have experienced downward mobility are also inclined to national prejudices. Contrary to the assumptions of both Western and Marxist social theorists, the Soviet researchers found that increasing use of Russian and greater communication among nationalities as a result of the "scientific-technical revolution" do *not* necessarily lessen the national consciousness and pride of Tatars, especially among the intelligentsia.[34]

Bromley, one of the most authoritative spokesmen on nationality questions, notes that the "national" and "international" dimensions of ethnic relations may sometimes conflict ("internal contradictions"), and that the disappearance of some elements of a national culture is balanced by the revival of others.[35] Thus, the road to "fusion" seems to be a long one and Soviet scholars, if not politicians, recognize that platitudes about "friendship of peoples" are no substitute for research into the realities of inter-ethnic relations.

## Emigré Assessments of Ethnic Relations

The importance of the subjective aspects of Soviet nationality questions, on one hand, and the severe limitations on studying them, on the other, make the possibility of studying them through interviews with émigrés all the more attractive. Some will immediately object that interviews with émigrés are a poor substitute for surveys in the field with properly drawn samples. This may be true, but as Joseph Berliner remarked in his study based on interviews with post-World War II Soviet émigrés, "the hungry man does not refuse to eat because the food is not what he would have ordered."[36] The question remains, however, whether this "food" has any "nutritional value." For one thing, it is often assumed that the emigration is likely to be more biased against the Soviet system than is the population it left behind. However, it is clear that, at least in the "third wave" which left the USSR after 1971, many people left for personal, economic, and family reasons, rather than because of political, cultural, or ethnic disaffection. A considerable proportion are "secondary migrants" who left as spouses, children, parents, or even friends of others who had decided to emigrate. The assumption of bias is thus not necessarily correct, though it is impossible to compare the émigrés' outlooks with those of the home population. In the case of ethnic attitudes it is reasonable to assume that these are quite widespread in society—though, as we shall see, they may vary significantly by social group—and that émigré opinions about ethnic relations might be representative, in *direction* if not in intensity.[37] True, the emigration's ethnic composition is drastically different from that of the home population, but it is now diverse enough, with Jews, Germans, Russians, Armenians, and Ukrainians represented in sufficient numbers to allow meaningful interviews among these groups. Moreover, even people from the same ethnic group came from widely scattered parts of the USSR (Georgia, Central Asia, Moldavia, the Baltic states, the Slavic republics) and had contact with many peoples in all kinds of contexts. Some of these groups may be more sensitive to nationality problems than other Soviet citizens, but when we think of reports about the relationships between Georgians and Armenians, Baltic peoples and Russians, Ukrainians and Russians, and among Moldavians, Russians, and Ukrainians, we realize that many groups not represented in the emigration may be just as sensitive to nationality problems.

In our interviews, perceptions of ethnic relations were reduced to essentially three questions: (1) does one's ethnic identification matter to people in the USSR, or has rapprochement of nationalities rendered it insignificant? (2) do the émigrés' views coincide with the official characterization of harmonious inter-ethnic

[32] L. M. Drobizheva, "Socio-Cultural Features of Personality and National Conditions," *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 3, 1971, p. 4, n. 7.

[33] Yu. Arutyunyan, "Empirical Sociological Research on National Relations," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 12, 1969, p. 131.

[34] Ibid., p. 135, and Yu. Arutyunyan, "Social-Cultural Aspects of the Development of a Drawing Together of Nations in the USSR," *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 3, 1972, p. 7. The latter article provides information on the methods used in conducting the study in the Tatar region, and later in Moldavia, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia, and Uzbekistan.

[35] Yu. Bromley, "The International and The National Building of Socialism," *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 5, 1977, pp. 14 and 18.

[36] Joseph Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 4.

[37] This point is made in Kazlas, loc. cit., p. 235.



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**Sample and Method**

A group of 1,161 ex-Soviet citizens who had left the USSR in 1977–80 were interviewed during 1980–81 in Israel (n=590), the Federal Republic of Germany (n=100) and the United States (n=471). Six hundred women and 561 men were interviewed, the youngest being 22, and half the sample having been born in the 1930's and 1940's. Nearly half the respondents have had higher education. Seventy-seven percent, or 889 people, had been registered as Jews on their internal Soviet passports; 129 were registered as Russians; 98 as Germans; 18 as Ukrainians; and 27 are of other nationalities. The areas in which the respondents had lived most of their lives are as follows: 330 in the RSFSR; 247 in Ukraine; 120 in Moldavia; 174 in the Baltic republics; 120 in Georgia; 165 in Central Asia.

Men and women are quite evenly distributed in the age and regional categories, but men dominate the blue-collar professions and females the white-collar ones, despite very similar educational levels (48 percent of the men and 46 percent of the women have higher education). Educational levels are highest among émigrés from the RSFSR (69 percent have post-secondary education). Of the ethnic groups, 72 percent of the Russians have higher education. The lowest educational levels are found among people from Central Asia (18 percent with higher education) and from Moldavia (23 percent). Those from Moldavia also had the lowest income of the European groups, and the Central Asians had the lowest income of any group.

These people were interviewed in Russian or Georgian by native speakers. Despite the fact that the interview lasted between two and three hours, remarkably few declined to be interviewed. Though the bulk of the questionnaire was devoted to questions about various Soviet bureaucracies, several questions about ethnic relations in the USSR were asked.

relations in the USSR? (3) to what extent are the ex-Soviet citizens ethnocentric and what are their ethnic preferences and prejudices?

Ethnic identification matters so much to the Soviet *state* that every citizen is obliged to carry an identification card that lists, among other things, his or her nationality. This identification is not freely chosen, for it depends solely on the nationality of one's parents; nor is it freely changed. Sensitivity to ethnic identification seems to be shared by the population. People know one another's nationality, inquire about it, and, in many cases, feel it is significant. An Ashkenazic Jew who spent most of his life in Georgia says that it is hard to tell Georgian Jews apart from Georgians for they resemble each other physically. "But you can tell them apart, of course, after you've lived there a little while. Then you can tell Georgians apart from Jews, Georgians from Kurds, Georgians from Armenians. At first, ... *when you've just arrived* ... then everybody looks like a Georgian. Whoever has a mustache, that's a Georgian. But then the eye and the ear become accustomed somehow, and it is possible to differentiate."

This sensitivity to ethnic identity makes sense on practical grounds, for according to roughly two-thirds of our respondents—irrespective of their nationality or the region in which they had lived—ethnicity is an important consideration in determining one's chances of getting an apartment, admission to higher education, or a good assignment upon graduating from an institution of higher education, though it has no significance in the distribution of pensions.[38] A former member of the admissions committee at a Moscow institute tells how the party raykom would send a representative to the final meeting of the committee and would "suggest" adjusting admissions decisions to decrease the number of students of certain nationalities and increase the representation of other groups. Certain institutes, faculties, departments and even subdepartments are widely known to be closed to Jews, Germans, and others considered "unreliable." On the other hand, several informants independently mentioned that the Oriental Faculty at Leningrad State University was the place where one could find many Central Asian students, mostly the children of ranking party and state officials, and generally destined for important posts at home and abroad. A Jew from Kulashi in Georgia admitted paying "the uncles" 100 rubles to change his nationality from Jew to Georgian to enhance his chances for admission to a pediatric institute in Leningrad. After graduating and returning to Kulashi, he went to have his registration changed back to Jew, as everyone in town knew him as such. This time "the uncles" demanded 200 rubles. Upon questioning the rise in price, he was told: "Now Jews are getting out of the Soviet Union, and to be a member of a privileged group you have to pay more."

The general impression is that ethnic identity is a factor in one's chances of getting a job, though more so in some areas than in others. One respondent said it made all the difference in Transcarpathia, his native region, but seemed irrelevant in labor-hungry Siberia where he had worked for several years. This was confirmed by three others who had moved from Moscow to Siberia. An engineer from Kharkov claimed to have seen in the institute where he worked a file of all the personnel in which everyone's nationality was not only listed but also color coded for instant recognition. Our respondents from Central Asia confirmed the findings of two studies of Soviet German émigrés that the nominal nationality of each Central Asian republic was favored for desirable jobs and admissions to higher edu-

[38]See my "Working the Soviet System," in Henry Morton and Robert Stuart, Eds., *The Contemporary Soviet City*, New York, NY, M. E. Sharpe, forthcoming.



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cation.[39] One woman claimed that in order to fill ethnic quotas for a school of music, the authorities would scour the countryside for Uzbek women, whether they had musical inclinations or not. A Soviet source admits that the principle of promotion and job assignment of native cadres is sometimes applied "mechanically," so that "in the selection of cadres nationality is not infrequently given dominant importance, with insufficient attention to professional and political quality."[40]

Opinions are somewhat divided over the desirability of dealing with a government employee of one's own nationality. Most people would rather deal with "one of our own," but some say that such an employee may be more strict than usual in order to show that he does not favor people of his ethnic group. Whatever the case, the point is that ethnicity clearly matters in the relationship between officials and citizens. Thus, one must agree with those Soviet commentators who maintain that the fusion of nationalities is far off in the future. Whether as much rapprochement between nationalities has been achieved as the Soviets claim is also open to question, as we shall see.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the émigrés do not have as sanguine a view of inter-ethnic relations as is presented in official pronouncements. When asked, "In your opinion, to what degree does friendship of peoples exist in the USSR?" a majority answered, "Hardly at all." Only 16 percent thought it existed to some extent, and 4 percent, to a great degree. They were then asked, "If there are tense relations among some Soviet nationalities, which would these be?" The question was left open-ended, and each respondent could give as many as four answers. The following list gives the frequency with which poor relationships were mentioned: between Balts and Russians—495; Armenians and Georgians—389; Jews and Ukrainians—362; and Jews and Russians—318.

Since only 174 of the respondents are from the Baltic states, and 120 from Georgia, one is struck by how wide-ranging the bad reputation of Baltic-Russian and Armenian-Georgian relations is, extending beyond the boundaries of these republics and outside those ethnic groups. After all, most of our respondents are Jews, and yet relations between Jews and other nationalities are not seen to be as problematic as the other two. Not only was the Baltic-Russian pairing mentioned most frequently, it was also mentioned *first* more times than any relationship other than that between Jews and Russians. Finally, in 220 instances it was stated spontaneously that "relationships among *all* the nationalities" are tense or bad.

On the other hand, while one person made the simple assertion that "everybody dislikes the Russians," another made a distinction between the more and less educated sectors of the population, perhaps equally simplistically: "If we talk about the intelligentsia, then all relationships are good. If we talk about everybody, then no one likes the other one." A Russian related the following anecdote as his answer to the question about friendship of the peoples: Radio Yerevan asks: "What is the meaning of 'friendship of the peoples'?" Radio Yerevan replies: "'Friendship of the peoples' is when Armenians, Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians and Latvians go together to beat up a Georgian."

Finally, respondents were asked to characterize the relations of ten pairs of nationalities, only two of which we assumed to be harmonious relationships. We were testing whether the respondents were taking the questions seriously and whether they were not overgeneralizing or expressing an undifferentiated hostility toward the USSR. Respondents did, indeed, make distinctions, showing that they were not blindly casting all ethnic relations in a dark light. Nearly a majority characterized Latvian-Lithuanian and Russian-Byelorussian relations as "very good" or "good," and only 10–15 percent called them "poor." (The others called them "not bad.") The relations described as worst were those between Estonians and Russians: 92 percent called them "poor," confirming our earlier finding about the perception of Baltic-Russian relations. Again, 83 percent called Georgian-Armenian relations "poor."

In addition, Jewish and German respondents were asked whether they had personally experienced discrimination in the form of anti-Semitism or "anti-German expressions" in the USSR. A majority had felt discrimination often or sometimes in all republics with the exception of Georgia. Feelings of discrimination experienced in central Asia resembled those experienced in the European republics. This is due more to the Germans' feeling discrimination in the Asian regions, to which they were exiled by Stalin during World War II, than to a Jewish perception of anti-Semitism there. Thus, it is only in Georgia (where Jews and Georgians get along) that a majority of respondents felt discrimination not at all or only rarely.

The 250 émigrés who had served in the Soviet mili-

[39] See Kazlas, *loc. cit.*, p. 240; and Rasma Karklins, "Ethnic Relations in the USSR: Interviews with Soviet German Emigrants," unpublished final report to the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, Washington, DC, 1980; and Karklins, "Nationality Power in Soviet Republics: Attitudes and Perceptions," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Spring 1981, pp. 75–79.

[40] A. M. Liesetskiy, *Voprosy natsional'noy politiki KPSS v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma (na materialakh Moldavskoy SSR)* (Questions of Nationality Policy of the CPSU in Conditions of Developed Socialism (based on materia s of the Moldavian SSR)) Kishinëv, Shtintsa, 1977, pp. 137–38.



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tary, most of them in the post-World War II era, were asked about ethnic relations in the armed forces. Nearly 60 percent thought that everyone was treated equally in the service. However, those who served more recently perceived more ethnic discrimination. The same trend appears when these respondents were asked directly whether Jews or Germans received different treatment: 86 percent of those who served before 1941, 63 percent of those who served in the war, and 53 percent of those who served after the war thought that all nationalities were treated the same. Only 29 percent of the war veterans, 37 percent of the postwar soldiers, and none of the prewar soldiers thought Germans or Jews were treated differently. Whether this reflects an actual change in nationality relations in the Soviet military, now that military service no longer involves the active struggle to save the homeland, or whether it merely records the fresher impressions and more vivid memories of the younger soldiers, cannot be determined.

## Ethnocentrism and Ethnic Preferences

Not only are the émigrés sensitive to differences and problems in inter-ethnic relations, but they also, with the exception of the highly educated, are quite willing to express personal preferences and dislikes in regard to ethnic groups. When asked to comment on traits or attributes imputed to several nationalities, or to indicate preferences among them, about 40 percent of the highly educated respondents refused to do so (though when they did express preferences, the highly educated answered more questions than did the other groups). Typical comments were: "such questions should not be asked—in every nationality there are good and bad people"; or, "nationality is not important—what is important is whether the person is good or bad." The strong association of this posture with higher education raises interesting hypotheses. Does Soviet education have the same general effect as

*A view of Tallinn, capital of Estonia, a republic whose native population is perceived as having particularly bad relations with Russians.*

—Sven Simon via Katherine Young.



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higher education in the West, namely, a tendency toward more tolerant attitudes (or, at least, stated positions) on racial and ethnic questions? Is this due to the specific content of the education, or does more learning simply bring people to more tolerance of diversity? In other words, are we dealing with the outcome of successful socialization to a particular outlook, or the product of a general cast of mind? Surely, the émigrés had lived in Western countries for too short a period to have assimilated the prevalent posture of the well-educated on these matters. Moreover, even if the declared attitude does not reflect the true feelings of the respondent, at least it does reflect what he or she thinks *ought* to be said. Whether this norm is the product of Soviet socialization or of higher education in general, it does indicate that the conditioned response to questions about ethnic preferences is similar to that of the émigrés' counterparts in democratic societies.

People with less education are more willing to express preferences among nationalities and to attribute certain traits to them. Soviet writers say that "the Soviet working class, being internationalist in its world view and character ... strengthens its internationalist influence on all aspects of the life of nations and nationalities, including the shaping of an ethnic intelligentsia of the peoples of the USSR...."[41] But our evidence is that the intelligentsia is more "internationalist" than the working class, and who influences whom, if there is any influence flowing between them, is not clear.

Most of the émigrés associated largely with people of their own nationality when they lived in the USSR. Nearly 40 percent of Jews and a slightly higher proportion of the Germans reported that most of their friends were of their own nationality. Nearly half the Jews said that their friends were "both Jews and others," and less than 10 percent had mostly non-Jewish friends. The geographic pattern of Jewish ethnocentrism reflects historical and sociological differences. Jewish respondents from Moldavia displayed the most ethnocentric attitudes, followed by those from the Baltic states, Ukraine, Central Asia, and Georgia. Those from the Russian republic (RSFSR) are the least ethnocentric. If we remember that Moldavian, Baltic, and West Ukrainian Jews became part of the USSR more recently than the others, and

[41]Kulchenko, "Socioeconomic Foundations," loc. cit., p. 75. Another Soviet author, however, cites empirical studies of inter-ethnic relations in arguing that, as we have found among the émigrés, there is a positive correlation between education and acceptance of people of other ethnic groups. See L.M. Drobizheva, "A Drawing Together of Cultures and Inter-national Relations in the USSR," *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 6, 1977, p. 14.

*Members of the Soviet Union's German minority.*

**—Czechoslovak News Agency via EUPRA.**

that they had not acquired Russian culture or higher educational and vocational positions to the same extent as the Jews in the Russian republic, the differences in ethnocentrism can be understood. The Georgian and Central Asian Jews, more traditional in their ways and less educated than those in the RSFSR, are nevertheless culturally more similar to their non-Jewish neighbors than the Jews in the Western borderlands, and the Georgian and Central Asian Jews have had better relations with the populations among whom they have lived for many centuries. It should be remembered that both Jews and Germans are nonterritorial minorities who have had ample opportunity to associate with people of other nationalities.

German respondents are the most ethnocentric, and Russians the least. Between 60 and 70 percent of the Russians, three-quarters of whom are highly educated, refused to express preferences. Among Jews, the proportion was about one-fifth, and among Germans it was less than 10 percent. Responding to a question about having people of several nationalities as spouses, close friends, co-workers, neighbors, and officials, the Germans again displayed the clearest preference for other Germans. In regard to a spouse, 92 of the 98 German respondents said they would want a German spouse, and 30 percent said they would "never" want to have a Central Asian spouse. These results are very similar to those obtained by Juozas Kazlas, using the same technique, from another German sample.[42]

[42]Kazlas, loc. cit., p. 243. His German sample was more ethnocentric than a smaller Lithuanian sample he surveyed.



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A Soviet study of ethnic "lifestyles" in Moldavia produced quite different results. A survey taken in the early 1970's among Moldavians, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Gagauzy (a Turkic people originating in Bulgaria and living in Moldavia and Ukraine) revealed that over three-quarters did not think that nationality made a difference in the composition of working collectives, but that nationality was seen as a more important factor in marriage. Still, 70 percent of urban Moldavians, 65 percent of rural Moldavians, 63 percent of urban Ukrainians, 76 percent of Russians, 53 percent of Jews, and 66 percent of Gagauzy said that "nationality is of no significance in marriage," and only 2–6 percent of these people strongly preferred mono-ethnic marriages. Furthermore, 70 percent of Ukrainians and Jews who were also asked which nationality they preferred to marry said "it makes no difference." Yet, in another chapter, the same source states that in 1970 only 18 percent of families in Moldavia were "mixed." At that time, Moldavia ranked fourth highest (behind Latvia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) in the proportion of "mixed families" in the USSR. Even among the urban Moldavian population, only 34 percent of the families were ethnically mixed.[43]

There seems to be a wide gap between the "internationalist attitudes" reported to the interviewers and the actual marriage patterns. Thus, even if our Jewish and German respondents may, for historical and religious reasons, be more ethnocentric in marriage than other nationalities, most Soviet marriage patterns reflect more ethnocentrism than would be expected from reported attitudes. The reported attitudes of our respondents may be more sincere than those of the respondents in Moldavia, who undoubtedly knew which "progressive" attitude they should express.

In our sample, the Georgian Jews, generally much more religious than European Jews, strongly prefer Jewish spouses, and they have a slightly higher preference for *Georgian* Jewish spouses. One would have supposed that the preference would be even stronger, since the language of most Georgian Jews is Georgian and that of other Jews is usually Russian or Yiddish; moreover, Georgian Jewish traditions and customs are quite different from those of other Soviet Jews. But apparently Georgian Jews think of themselves as Jews first and Georgian Jews second. This feeling of kinship to other Jews is not reciprocated. Ashkenazic and Central Asian Jews do not prefer Georgian Jewish spouses to non-Jews. In fact, half of them say they would "never" marry a Georgian Jew. This asymmetry is also seen in Israel, where Georgian Jews immigrated to be reunited with their brethren from all over the world, only to meet with considerable contempt and derision.[44]

*A Jewish citizen of the city of Gori in the Soviet republic of Georgia.*

—MAGNUM.

Other than their own group, Germans prefer Latvians to the other nationalities mentioned (Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Georgian Jews, Lithuanians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks), and ranked the Kazakhs and Uzbeks lowest, with Georgians also ranked low.[45] Even in regard to officials with whom they might have to deal, nearly all the Germans said they would "always" prefer to deal with another German. Jews, too, prefer to deal with other Jews, but to a considerably lesser extent. Again, Georgian Jews have a stronger preference for other Jews than do Ashkenazic and Central Asian Jews. Not surprisingly, when we constructed an index of Jewish consciousness (based on the "Jewish atmosphere" in one's childhood home, one's native language, and one's religiosity), we found that those with the higher levels of consciousness were also the most ethnocentric.

A combined index of ethnic preferences is provided in Table 1 on p. 46. Without going into a detailed discussion of statistical significance and variance, several things are obvious even from this summary presentation. In addition to those findings already mentioned, we can see from this table that Georgian Jews are most favorably inclined toward Georgians,

[43] Arutyunyan, *Opyt*, pp. 202ff. and p 78.

[44] See my *Becoming Israelis: Political Resocialization of Soviet and American Immigrants*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1982.

[45] These findings, too, parallel those of Kazlas, loc. cit., pp. 242–56.



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**Table 1: Ethnic Preferences in the USSR**

| Nationality rated | Group expressing preference: Jews | Georgian Jews | Germans |
|---|---|---|---|
| Georgian Jews | 5.38 | 11.51 | — |
| Georgians | 4.94 | 7.98 | 4.90 |
| Germans | — | — | 14.46 |
| Jews | 13.02 | 12.51 | 10.79 |
| Kazakhs | — | — | 3.83 |
| Latvians | 5.45 | 4.88 | 11.56 |
| Lithuanians | 5.18 | 4.91 | — |
| Moldavians | 4.77 | 4.81 | — |
| Russians | 7.13 | 6.04 | 9.06 |
| Ukrainians | 4.31 | 3.85 | 8.43 |
| Uzbeks/Tajiks | 4.67 | 4.27 | 4.63 |

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY: By combining the preference expressed by each respondent regarding each nationality in the roles we tested for (spouse, friend, etc.), we arrived at a summary score given by the respondent, in effect, to each nationality. The mean scores for each nationality were then calculated. Higher numbers mean preferred ratings.

**Table 2: Perceived Traits of Ethnic Groups**

| Nationality rated | Group assessing traits: Jews | Georgian Jews | Germans |
|---|---|---|---|
| Georgian Jews | 4.03 | 2.73 | — |
| Georgians | 3.84 | 2.90 | — |
| Jews | 3.31 | 2.91 | 2.88 |
| Latvians | 3.97 | 4.30 | 2.79 |
| Lithuanians | 4.13 | 4.00 | 3.12 |
| Moldavians | 4.86 | 4.38 | 2.81 |
| Russians | 4.18 | 4.17 | 4.25 |
| Ukrainians | 5.11 | 5.05 | 4.17 |
| Uzbeks/Tajiks | 4.84 | 3.94 | 4.81 |

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY: Eight pairs of adjectives, each pairing a "good" and "bad" trait, were presented to the respondents, who were asked to locate several nationalities on a seven-point scale for each of the pairs. Thus, for example, respondents were to indicate along this scale how "trustworthy" or "untrustworthy" a given nationality is. Again, summary scores for each nationality were calculated from the marks given on each of the scales. It is important to note that in this table a *lower* score indicates a more *positive* evaluation.

which is in line with the generally accepted image of Georgian-Jewish relations. However, Jews who lived in Ukraine and Germans who lived in Central Asia have the most negative views of Ukrainians and Central Asians, respectively. Central Asians are also held in low esteem by Jews. Germans have a higher regard for Ukrainians and Latvians than Jews do, but next to Latvians they are most favorably disposed toward Jews. This perhaps surprising finding is similar to that of Kazlas.[46]

Respondents were also asked to rate nationalities with respect to certain character traits. Summary results are presented in Table 2. The general direction of the findings is the same as in Table 1 (note that in the second table, a lower score indicates a more positive evaluation). Germans rate Balts and Jews most favorably, aside from their own nationality, and Central Asians least favorably. Jews are least complimentary about Ukrainians and quite favorably disposed toward Georgians, especially Jews from Georgia. This consistency gives greater confidence in the findings. These are not random or hasty responses, but apparently reflections of attitudes and feelings that are the result of centuries of experience, myth, and tradition. The "drawing together" of the nationalities has not led Soviet people to cease differentiating among ethnic groups. Preferences and prejudices appear to be very much alive.

## Conclusion

Obviously, ethnicity matters in the Soviet Union, both to the state and to the society. Neither a classless society nor one without ethnic tensions has yet been achieved. Moreover, the ethnic harmony described by Soviet commentators is more wish than reality. That there is a gap between ideologically colored assertions by Soviet spokesmen and the grayer realities of Soviet life is not surprising. More important is the trend: if the Soviet Union is not a society in which ethnic differences and tensions have disappeared, is it becoming so? Is it only a matter of time before the vision of Marx and his followers will be realized? Unfortunately, we lack the time-series data that could provide us with answers. Those inter-ethnic frictions and prejudices which Soviet spokesmen care to acknowledge are said to be "survivals of capitalism." Yet, like religion, these are proving to be hardy survivals indeed. If they have survived for so long after capitalist circumstances have been removed, might there not be something in Soviet socialist conditions that allows for their continuation, and perhaps even regeneration or creation? Or are these transient phenomena whose passage is very slow but whose eventual demise is clearly indicated? There are no "hard" data to support one or another hypothesis, though each observer will, no doubt, have his own convictions. But surely it is clear that Soviet society is not a social phenomenon sui generis, and that the "Soviet people" *(narod)* resembles other multiethnic societies, though its blemishes may be less visible.

Certain ethnic problems seem to be highly salient to Soviet people, even to those who had little personal contact with them. Baltic-Russian and Armenian-Georgian relations are widely perceived as tense and

[46] Ibid., p. 245



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hostile even by those who lived far from those nationalities. There obviously exists a folklore about nationality relations that is different from official myths and that differentiates quite finely the relationships among the many Soviet nationalities.

We do not know from the interviews about the *intensity* of ethnic attitudes. Nor, of course, can we tell whether, indeed, there are nationality tensions so severe as to pose any kind of long-range threat to the stability of the system. All that can be concluded is that there are easily recognized ethnic tensions and that Soviet claims to having achieved a new type of ethnic order, with unparalleled harmony among peoples, are, at the very least, premature.

One of the most intriguing findings is the relationship between education and the willingness to "rate" national groups. If the stated position—that one cannot judge ethnic groups as a whole and that ethnicity is irrelevant in forming personal relations—reflects true convictions, then we could assume that the path toward the ideal society without ethnic tension lies through education. However, we are not sure whether the attitudes reported are due to the specific content of education—teaching national tolerance and mutual respect as well as conditioning people to disregard nationality in making personal assessments—or whether even Soviet education, with its narrow ideological bounds and intentional biases, nevertheless molds an outlook that is more tolerant, more liberal. This is an area which calls for more investigation.

Finally, a few remarks about the nationalities directly involved in our sample are in order. The Germans in the Soviet Union are somewhat like the Jews in Germany in the early 1930's. They are a group apart, looked down upon by many, and even resented for the admirable traits they are said to possess: conscientiousness, efficiency, and capacity for hard work (and considerable suffering). Most likely in reaction to the hostile environment, the Germans prefer to stick to their own. They wish to be as distant as possible from those Asian peoples among whom they were exiled, but they are drawn to the Baltic nationalities who are most similar to them in culture and religious background. They are not reticent about expressing their ethnic preferences, perhaps because the proportion of educated people among them is quite low.

Jews, who have also been targets of official and social hostility, but who have seized on every opportunity for upward mobility through education (and through political activism in an earlier period), are less insistent on sticking to their own. In fact, were Soviet conditions to permit it, it is likely that the majority would not only acculturate to Russian culture, as they have already done, but would assimilate themselves into the Russian people, and, to a lesser extent, to other peoples. The weakening of religious loyalties has eroded the ties among Jewish groups. Though the Georgian Jews still feel a close kinship with European Jews, the latter, who have little in common with Georgian Jews other than the religious factor, do not share this feeling for the most part. In this case, culture seems to be thicker than blood.

In many ways émigré research is not a satisfactory substitute for research in the field. But since the prospects for field research in the USSR are close to nil, Western scholars should try to extract whatever utility they can from émigré research, with all its limitations. Even though the ethnic feelings and attitudes of émigrés may not replicate the situation in the USSR, it is very likely that the *direction* and *distribution*, if not the exact range, of these feelings and attitudes are very similar in the USSR, at least among the same groups from which the émigrés have come. Moreover, the differences *within* the émigré sample are likely to be parallel to those within a Soviet population group. These differences certainly alert us to the nature of the effects that education, nationality, and other variables may have on attitudes and feelings in the USSR. This kind of research, then, may yield partial reflections of Soviet realities, as useful as those that Western scholars have extracted out of aggregate data for many years. But it also gives us new angles of vision and presents us with new opportunities that could bring us several steps closer to understanding the complexities of ethnic relations in the Soviet Union.



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# Party and Military in China: Professionalism in Command?

by Ellis Joffe

Of crucial concern to Deng Xiaoping in ascending to and maintaining his paramount position in China's power structure has been his relationship with the People's Liberation Army (PLA).[1] This concern is well founded. Although the Chinese military, firmly committed to civilian supremacy, has never moved into the political arena on its own initiative, past experience has shown that in times of severely disruptive leadership conflict the military can be drawn into that arena as the arbiter between competing forces.[2] However, even far short of such extreme action, there is good reason for Deng to seek the support of the military. Lacking Mao's charisma and political capital, Deng has had to rely to a greater degree on coalitions, and the military is a central element in any coalition. And lacking Mao's standing among the generals, Deng cannot assume, as Mao could, that their support will be forthcoming, whatever their differences over specific policies. Maintaining control of the military, therefore, has clearly been one of Deng's primary and ongoing political objectives.

How successful has Deng been in the pursuit of this objective, and what is the state of civil-military relations under his leadership? The dominant fact in considering these questions is that China's military establishment is not monolithic, and its attitude toward Deng and the party leadership has not been uniform. Although some of Deng's policies have aroused opposition within the military, this opposition has stemmed from different segments of the armed forces for different reasons, and has been uneven in scope and intensity. In general, Deng's critics in the military can be classified into two broad and amorphous groups. One group consists of professional officers, whose main concern is the modernization of the PLA, and whose differences with Deng revolve primarily around the issue of resource allocation for weapons renewal. The second group consists of "political" military leaders, whose concerns extend beyond military issues, encompassing criticisms of the national policies of the party leadership. Because of conflicting interests, however, these groups have not coalesced against Deng. On the contrary, the differences between the professional officers and Deng Xiaoping seem to have been reduced sufficiently to give Deng their support against his critics in the army, as well as in the party.

While civil-military relations under Deng have been diverse and complex, the party and the PLA have faced each other not as distinct entities, but in issue-oriented coalitions that have transcended institutional boundaries. An assessment of civil-military relations, therefore, requires an effort, speculative in part, to sort out the main issues shaping these relations and the power alignments behind the issues.

[1] For an overall survey of civil-military relations in China since 1949, see my chapter in Gerald Segal and William Tow, Eds., *Chinese Defense Policy*, London, Macmillan, forthcoming. The present article is an expansion and elaboration of some of the material contained in this chapter.

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[2] The most notable examples of the military being pressed into action as arbiter between competing forces within the leadership are the PLA's intervention in the Cultural Revolution and later in the succession struggle with the "gang of four." See Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army in the Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Intervention," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Dec. 7, 1970, pp. 1–25; and Ellis Joffe and Gerald Segal, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1978, pp. 1–19.



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## Modernization of Defense

The most important, and potentially the most divisive, issue in post-Mao civil-military relations is military modernization. It involves the vital interests of the entire professional officer corps and is the one issue on which military elites can be expected to present a united front to the party, whatever their internal differences over specific policies and priorities.[3] This unity, however, stems not only from the universal and inherent desire of professional military men for more and better weapons. It draws special strength from the particular circumstances of the PLA's development under the aegis of Mao Zedong: the dominance of a military doctrine based on "people's war" (with its emphasis on "men" rather than "weapons"); the priority accorded to the development of nuclear weapons; and the heavy involvement of PLA troops in political and economic tasks. As a result, China's conventional forces, with the exception of a few select sectors, suffered from neglect for almost two decades. Thus, by the late 1970's, in terms of military technology and combat effectiveness, they were estimated to be 15 to 20 years behind the most modern armies.[4] This lag was most apparent in weapons systems, but all facets of the PLA's military operations were affected by the obsolescent technology and by the subordination of professional interests to political and ideological considerations.

Despite this state of affairs, military leaders refrained from speaking out, especially during the last decade of Mao's rule. In the highly charged atmosphere of anti-professionalism created by the radical Left during the Cultural Revolution, it was neither prudent nor practical to question the Maoist doctrine of "people's war" and its implications for the armed forces. To the extent that doubts were cast, this was done not in forthright pronouncements by military leaders, but in murky, esoteric articles, usually written by unknown authors, as, for example, during the "anti-Lin anti-Confucius" campaign of 1974–1975.[5] Also contributing to the military officers' inattention to professional concerns during this period were the varied demands thrust upon them after the PLA became deeply involved in the Cultural Revolution and in the political conflicts, inside and outside the military establishment, that resulted from this intervention. Consequently, basic problems of military preparedness were not addressed until the end of the Maoist period.[6]

*Deng Xiaoping (seated) with regional military leader Hu Shiyou at the 1980 National People's Congress in Beijing; Hu was ousted from the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo in 1982.*

**—Camera Press.**

Since the downfall of the radical Left shortly after Mao's death—which removed the chief barrier to the articulation of the military's interests—China's military professionals have put forth their long-suppressed views and demands with unprecedented force and frankness. The pivotal role the military elite played in propping up Hua Guofeng's leadership of the party during the transition period[7] and the importance of their support for Deng Xiaoping have lent special weight to these interests. The pragmatic approach of the post-Mao party leadership to national development has enabled the military professionals to discuss their problems in practical terms. The return of the

[3] Rivalry presumably exists between the services, but there are no data to document it. One possible source of rivalry is the inordinate attention, in resources and publicity, devoted to the navy. The publicity probably stems from the leadership's desire to highlight China's ability to show its flag on the high seas, but it is not likely to go down well with other services. Interservice rivalry will doubtless sharpen as technological modernization becomes more complex and expensive, and budgetary battles become more intense.

[4] The backwardness of Chinese military technology is widely acknowledged, both by the Chinese leaders themselves and by Western analysts. In a recent article in *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), for example, Defense Minister Zhang Aiping noted that "China's weapons and equipment are very far from being able to meet the demands of modern war." See Zhang's article in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Aug. 22, 1983, pp. K/1-2. For a brief overview of Chinese weapons production from 1975 to 1981, see US Congress, Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1981*, Hearings, Part 7, Executive Sessions, July 8 and Oct. 15, 1981, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 153–55.

[5] See the discussion in Harry Harding, "The Domestic Politics of China's Global Posture, 1973–1978," in Thomas Fingar, Ed., *China's Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970's*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980, pp. 112–13.

[6] See, e.g., Joffe and Segal, loc. cit., esp. pp. 9–11.

[7] Ibid., pp. 5–9.



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troops to the barracks has allowed these officers to focus on professional pursuits, and has highlighted the disrepair into which the armed forces had slid.

The state of civil-military relations in the People's Republic of China (PRC) thus depends decisively on the extent to which Deng and these military professionals can agree on a series of issues relating to military modernization. Foremost among these is the updating of conventional weapons and equipment. At first glance, the party leadership and the PLA high command seem far apart in their basic positions on this point. PLA officers want to modernize their weapons quickly in order to make up for lost time. Party leaders, while not questioning the need to modernize the military, maintain that economic modernization must precede weapons procurement, and that only after a solid industrial and technological infrastructure has been created can there be significant improvements in weapons. For this reason, the party leadership has rejected the military's demand for a bigger share of the national budget. This demand, and the party's rejection of it, were both reflected, for example, in the words of PLA Chief-of-Staff Yang Dezhi, in his address to the 3rd Session of the 5th National People's Congress in September 1980:

*The broad masses of commanders and soldiers ... are longing for rapidly changing our economic backwardness and the backwardness of our military techniques and equipment.... However, ... it is not yet possible to bring about very speedy development of our national economy. Therefore, it will also not be possible to achieve very great progress in the modernization of our national defense. Comrades in the armed services must ... correctly handle the relations between national defense construction and economic construction. Should our demands exceed the capacity of our economy, they will badly affect the speed of our economic construction.... At the same time, it is also hoped that the state can increase national defense expenditure in an appropriate way to step up the process of national defense modernization....*[8]

But defense expenditure has not been increased. After reaching a high point of 22.3 billion yuan (approximately US$14.3 billion) in 1979 (as a result of China's Vietnam war), the announced military budget was reduced in 1980 and again in 1981; it was raised only slightly in 1982. The same is true of military expenditures as a percentage of the national budget (see Table 1).

## The Professionals' Consent

The low priority accorded weapons renewal has understandably led some observers to conclude that military leaders are disgruntled and that civil-military relations are strained. According to one analyst, "the military opposition can be expected to blame Deng, both for reneging on his promise to modernize defense and for the policies that led to the forced economic retreat."[9] From the pivotal perspective of resource allocation, relations between the party and the professional military thus seem destined to be dominated by an inherent, almost insolvable conflict.

A broader perspective, however, strongly suggests that these relations are smoother and more harmonious than they initially appear. Surely, professional officers must realize, however grudgingly or reluctantly, that the rapid and comprehensive reequipment of China's conventional forces is simply not possible unless and until modernization in other sectors is given reasonable chance for success. Military elites must also be aware that the costs of quickly overcoming the PLA's technological deficiencies would be awesome, especially since the only way to modernize rapidly would be to purchase massive amounts of modern weapons from abroad. Just how awesome such an undertaking would be was indicated by a US Department of Defense study in 1979, which estimated that the purchase by China of American weapons and services needed to give the PRC a "confident capability" against a Soviet conventional attack would cost US$41 to $63 billion (at 1977 prices).[10]

Even if possible, massive imports of military technology involve risks that cannot be taken lightly by party and PLA leaders alike. One shortcoming is that China probably will not get the latest weapons systems—a problem that is compounded because such weapons will become outdated by the time Chinese technicians are able to assimilate them. Another is that such purchases will make the PRC dependent on the suppliers for know-how and spare parts, making it vulnerable to political pressure or sudden cutoffs, as occurred in 1960 when the Soviet Union abruptly terminated its military assistance. Also,

[8] *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Sept. 8, 1980, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 12, 1980, p. K/14.

[9] Richard D. Nethercut, "Deng and the Gun: Party-Military Relations in the People's Republic of China," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), August 1982, p. 699. See also Dorothy Grouse Fontana, "Background to the Fall of Hua Guofeng," ibid., March 1982, p. 241.

[10] Drew Middleton, "Pentagon Studies Prospects of Military Links," *The New York Times*, Jan. 4, 1980.



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**Table 1: Announced Military Expenditures in the PRC, 1977–1981**

| Year | Budget, billions of yuan | Percentage of national budget |
|---|---|---|
| 1977 | 14.9 | 17.7 |
| 1978 | 16.9 | 15.2 |
| 1979 | 22.3 | 17.5 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 16.9 |
| 1981 | 17.5 | 14.5 |
| 1982 | 17.9 | 15.7 |

SOURCE: US Congress, Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1981*, Hearings, Part 7, Executive Sessions, July 8 and Oct. 15, 1981, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 158.

imported weapons systems may not meet China's varied and specific needs. An additional problem is that the Chinese will find it difficult to absorb rapidly large quantities of sophisticated technology because of the low educational level of their troops.[11]

Perhaps of even greater significance is the critical question of the Chinese leaders' perception of external threat, since it is this perception that ultimately shapes the leadership's approach to military preparedness. There can be little doubt that had the leadership under Deng perceived a dire and direct threat to the nation's security, it would have immediately taken the necessary steps to bolster the nation's defenses regardless of the costs involved and the arguments against importing weapons. One should point out, of course, that the Chinese leadership under Mao did not take such steps, despite considerable pressure from the military, after the escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1964 or after the border clashes with Soviet troops along the Ussuri River in 1969. But circumstances were different then. In the aftermath of the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam there was no one the Chinese could turn to for "quick fixes" for their defense except the Soviet Union, but the political price for such a move was unacceptable to the Maoist leadership. In the aftermath of the Ussuri border clashes, the PRC had become isolated from both superpowers—an isolation that was especially damaging, since China's relations with potential West European arms suppliers suffered as a result of the chaos and instability of the Cultural Revolution. More important, at the time of both these crises, dominant forces in the Chinese leadership considered the Maoist doctrine of "people's war" adequate to meet the threat of an attack on China, since it relied on the country's vast human and natural resources to offset China's technological inferiority.[12]

No such confidence motivates the current leadership. Indeed, Deng and his colleagues clearly have little faith in the military effectiveness of the "people's war" doctrine, although they have retained some of its elements for pragmatic reasons. Thus, the leadership's refusal to divert vast funds to rapid weapons procurement derives not from its belief in a countervailing doctrine against an immediate threat, but in its perception that no such threat exists.

This perception, paradoxically, began to take root in the wake of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, as the Chinese worked to improve their relations with the United States and other countries in order to counterbalance their strategic vulnerability. It was given high-level blessing in Zhou Enlai's speech to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973 when he said that Europe was the main target of the Soviets, who were "making a feint to the east while attacking in the west."[13] Thereafter, Chinese leaders portrayed the Soviets as striving to "seize Europe by strategem," the "strategem" being both direct pressure on Western Europe (the "strategic center"), and indirect pressure through Europe's "extended backdoor" (the Middle East and Africa) and "the soft underbelly" (the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean).[14] In this view of global Soviet strategy, against which the Chinese tirelessly issued shrill warnings, China was depicted as an object of Soviet encirclement and containment, but not as an object of an immediate military threat. As relations between China and the United States cooled in 1981 and 1982, moreover, the Chinese further toned down

[11] Numerous articles in the Chinese press have stressed the importance of improving the level of education and technical competence of PLA personnel to meet the needs of a modern armed force. See, e.g., Shao Huaze, "A Reliable Guarantee for Socialist Construction," *Hongqi* (Beijing), Nov. 1, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 19, 1982, pp. K/23-24; and Zhang Aiping, "Several Questions Concerning Modernization of National Defense," *Hongqi*, Mar. 1, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 17, 1983, esp. pp. K/6-7. And Chairman of the Military Commission Deng Xiaoping noted recently that the "key problem" of the PLA's effort to modernize "is to increase the number of younger and better educated officers and soldiers." See New China News Agency (Beijing—hereafter Xinhua), June 11, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 13, 1983, pp. K/30-31.

[12] According to this doctrine, China's industrial sectors can be devastated by nuclear strikes, but the nation cannot be subjugated except by a massive invasion on the ground. Against such an invasion the Chinese claim to have advantages that make them virtually unconquerable. These advantages derive from their topographic and demographic assets. In the event of an invasion, the Chinese will conduct a defense in depth, drawing the enemy deep into Chinese territory, and forcing it to move in unfamiliar and hostile terrain, to extend its lines of supply and communications, and to divide its forces. In the meantime, the Chinese will mobilize their population to fight alongside the regular army in an effort to wear the enemy down by guerrilla warfare. After the enemy's strength has been eroded, the Chinese will counterattack in full force.

[13] In Harold Hinton, Ed., *The People's Republic of China: A Documentary Survey*, vol. 5, *1971-1979*, Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1980, p. 2466.

[14] See, e.g., "Expansionist Soviet Global Strategy," *Beijing Review*, June 22, 1981, pp. 22-25.



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*A photo reputedly taken at a test launch of a CSS-X-4 missile, reported to have a range of 11,000 kilometers, in the People's Republic of China in the spring of 1979.*

—Alain Nogues/SYGMA.

their view of surging Soviet power and adopted a more sanguine outlook on the threat of encirclement.

This view is echoed in statements of Chinese military leaders. Although some of their pronouncements early in the post-Mao period invoked the Soviet threat to justify rapid military modernization, this rationale has now been dropped, and the need for modernization is either assumed to be self-evident or is linked to vague challenges facing China and to the nature of modern warfare.[15] In any case, military professionals do not claim that an imminent danger to China's security requires the urgent reordering of priorities.

Given the whole range of considerations militating against rapid reequipment, it is inconceivable that even the most extreme officers extended their demands to the overall updating of China's conventional forces. Statements to that effect, which were particularly notable shortly after the downfall of the "gang of four,"[16] should therefore be attributed to rhetoric and posturing rather than to realistic demands. What precisely these demands have been is difficult to determine, but they obviously revolve around two pivotal and interrelated issues: the pace of weapons modernization, and the scope of military technology imports. The military, while conceding the need for linking weapons modernization to economic development, has pressed for accelerating the upgrading of strategic arms and equipment as the economy advances.[17] The party leadership, on the other hand, while

[15] See, e.g., Zhang, "Several Questions Concerning Modernization of National Defense," loc. cit., p. K/2.

[16] See, e.g., excerpts from *Jiefangjun Bao* editorial of Sept. 24, 1977, Xinhua Domestic Service, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1977, pp. E/12–15; and article by the theoretical group of the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission, Peking Domestic Service, Jan. 20, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 23, 1978, pp. E/1–6. See also Japanese TV interview of Oct. 22, 1978, with Wu Xiuquan, deputy chief of staff of the PLA General Staff, in BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part 3, *Far East* (London), FE/5951/i.

[17] See, e.g., *Jiefangjun Bao* report of Oct. 18, 1982, of interview with Zhang Aiping, Xinhua Domestic Service, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 19, 1982, p. K/1.



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conceding the need for weapons renewal, has stressed that the pace of modernization should be gradual lest it affect adversely the speed of economic construction.[18] The military has also advocated selective but apparently substantial imports of weapons technology to undergird domestic weapons production.[19] The party leadership, while in principle not averse to this demand, has put much more emphasis on indigenous production and on making do with available weapons and equipment until the domestic effort begins to bear fruit.[20] In short, the differences between the Deng leadership and the professional military have been a matter of degree rather than of kind, and have been contained by an understanding based on a mutual recognition of objective constraints and possibilities.

Nowhere is this understanding better reflected than in a recent article by Zhang Aiping in *Hongqi*, the party's ideological organ, in his first important pronouncement as defense minister. Coming after prolonged debates, the article is a major statement of military policy for the 1980's based on the consensus worked out by military and party leaders. It goes a long way toward meeting the demands of the professional military while upholding the basic position of the party leadership. "Our party," Zhang states, "has always attached great importance to the role of weapons in wars. . . . In order to achieve modernization of our national defense, our first task is to develop and produce sophisticated military equipment."[21] However, this cannot be achieved by buying weapons systems abroad. To be sure, "at the outset it is necessary to obtain some technology that can be imported and model some weaponry on that of others. However, if we are content with copying, we will only be crawling behind others.... The fundamental way is to rely on ourselves."[22]

Zhang then comes to the crux of the problem. "Modernization of our national defense," he emphasizes, "must be based on our national economic construction." In allocating resources, the government has to give priority to other sectors, and this is "an entirely correct policy decision." The military has to take the needs of other sectors into account and to "carry out... strict budgeting within the scope allowed by the limited amount of funds allocated by the state, practice thrift, and organize development of the most important and most urgently needed military equipment."[23] However, Zhang holds out the prospect of better days in the future:

*From now on, with the development of the country's economic construction and the flourishing of science and education, more favorable conditions will be created in turn for national defense modernization. This means not only that funds for building national defense will be increased, but that more fine scientific and technological results will also be shifted to ... promote ... national defense modernization.*[24]

*Zhang Aiping, Chinese Minister of Defense since November 1982 and a member of the State Council.*

—Camera Press.

Underlying the understanding between the party and the PLA is not only the prospect of a brighter future for the military, but also the development of modern weapons systems in the present. Despite the eco-

[18]See, e.g., Shao, loc. cit., p. K/22.

[19]See, e.g., article by former defense minister Xu Xiangqian, "Strive to Achieve Modernization in National Defense," *Hongqi*, October 1979, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 18, 1979, p. L/14.

[20]See, e.g., Shao, loc. cit.

[21]Zhang, "Several Questions Concerning Modernization of National Defense," loc. cit., pp. K/2–3.

[22]Ibid., p. K/3.

[23]Ibid., p. K/5.

[24]Ibid., p. K/6.



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nomic limitations, procurement of weapons has been far from frozen. Since 1975, China has maintained a "relatively low, yet constant level of military production," manufacturing almost 100 different types of equipment, ranging from rifles to ICBM's.[25] There are other indicators that the level of China's production of military equipment in recent years has hardly been low. For example, the PRC has concluded arms deals with several Middle Eastern countries, sending an estimated US$4 billion in military equipment to Iraq since 1980, and supplying Egypt with submarines and aircraft reportedly worth close to US$1 billion.[26] These, and presumably other, arms deals not only have given a tremendous boost to China's defense industries and provided foreign exchange, but they have also given the PRC, in return for its supplies, important access to relatively advanced Soviet and, probably, Western military technology.[27]

The arms deals indicate also that the Chinese have made considerable advances in both the mass production and the technological sophistication of military equipment. Some of the weapons sold by the Chinese are said to be quite sophisticated—the Type-69 tanks are reportedly equipped with infrared devices and laser range finders[28]—and are reputed to be sturdy and simple to handle. Thus, if one assumes that the PLA's most urgent needs are met before weapons are exported, and that at least part of the earnings from these exports are earmarked for the military sector, then the current party leadership has done much to satisfy the military in weapons improvement.

## Upgrading Standards

In its attempts to modernize certain areas of military operations less subject to economic constraints—simplifying the command structure, intensifying troop training, mastering tactical skills—the party leadership has made considerable progress. As a result, since Mao's death in 1976, and especially since 1980, the PLA has undergone a quiet revolution, as far-reaching and fundamental reforms have been introduced in all of its activities. The rationale for these changes is a newfound recognition, made public by Chinese leaders, of the complexities of modern warfare and of the concomitant need for the armed forces to cope with these complexities. As an article in *Hongqi* put it:

*New conditions ... have appeared in contemporary warfare. The most salient feature is three-dimensional warfare. It means that warfare will be simultaneously carried out in the air, on land, and at sea, and it will be difficult to differentiate between the front line and the rear areas. To adapt to the demands of this kind of warfare, we must further build the PLA into a powerful composite army able to operate in concert with various branches of the services under modern conditions. The organization system, weaponry, strategy and tactics as well as cadre training ... must be oriented in this direction.*[29]

The point of departure for this new orientation should have been the complete abandonment of the Maoist "people's war" doctrine, but here the Chinese leadership is in a quandary. On the one hand, the doctrine is unsuitable to the type of warfare a modernized Chinese military is likely to wage in the future; on the other hand, it remains the ultimate counterweight to the current state of backwardness of the PLA's weapons and equipment, and the ultimate deterrent against a large-scale invasion of China.

As a way out of this quandary, the Chinese have devised the formula "people's war under modern conditions," which is a transitional doctrine designed to guide the PLA as it moves along the long road to modernization. Although the Chinese have not provided a systematic exposition of the doctrine, their references to it—or the absence thereof—leave no doubt that its two parts do not carry equal weight. While restating their general commitment to "people's war," the Chinese have in effect emptied it of much of its operational content.[30] Thus, on the doctrinal plane, old and new elements continue to coexist, but the trend is unmistakably in favor of the new.

In practice this trend has been much more pronounced, as Chinese military leaders, unfettered by doctrinal constraints, have revamped the maxims and methods that had dominated the PLA's activities since the late 1950's. Training has been given top priority and has been increased in scale and complexity, with emphasis on imparting specialized military skills to the troops and on combined operations among the various services, including exercises predicated on an adversary's use of tactical nuclear weapons. At the

[25] Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics, op. cit., pp. 153 ff.

[26] These figures, which are somewhat speculative, are from the *The Economist* (London), May 14–20, 1983, pp. 55–56.

[27] See *ibid.* for a brief explanation of this point.

[28] *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), Feb. 3, 1983.

[29] Shao, loc. cit., p. K/23.

[30] See, e.g., the article by Song Shilun, commandant of the Academy of Military Science, "Mao Zedong's Military Thinking Is the Guide to Our Army's Victories," *Hongqi*, August 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 17, 1981, pp. K/10–23, esp. K/22.



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same time, efforts have been made to raise the educational and technical level of the troops, with the express purpose of enabling them to handle complex, sophisticated equipment.[31]

Special stress has been put on the training of officers. Military academies, many of which had been closed for some 10 years, have been reopened, and the new entrance qualifications require that candidates be middle-school graduates. The curriculum has been reformed and now focuses on modern military science and technology. The advanced academies have highlighted the study of combat tactics and the direction of military campaigns. Classes in military science and general education have also been extended to various fighting units throughout the army. Field exercises have concentrated on training officers in commanding joint air, sea, and land operations under conditions of modern warfare.[32]

On a broader level, the organization of the armed forces has been streamlined in an effort to make them leaner and more efficient.[33] The logistics system has been improved and geared to the demands of modern warfare.[34] Military discipline has been tightened, and special attention has been given to the appearance and behavior of the troops.[35] As part of the campaign to raise military standards, the system of drawing basic-level officers from the ranks has been abolished; from now on only graduates of military academies will be assigned to these posts.[36] Promotion

[31]See, e.g., the article by Yang Shangkun, permanent vice-chairman of the Military Commission, written on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the founding of the PLA, "Build a Strong Modern Revolutionary Army," *Hongqi*, Aug. 1, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 25, 1982, pp. K/20–27; and Xinhua Domestic Service, Jan. 31, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 7, 1983, pp. K/11–12. See also, *Jiefangjun Huabao* (Beijing), No. 11, 1980, in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 76928, Dec. 4, 1980, p. 20.

[32]See, e.g., Xinhua Domestic Service, Apr. 26, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 28, 1981, pp. K/6–7; and Beijing Domestic Service, Aug. 26, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 31, 1982, p. K/6. See also Xinhua Domestic Service, July 26, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 29, 1982, pp. K/5–6.

[33]See, e.g., interview with Yang Shangkun, Xinhua Domestic Service, Feb. 9, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 10, 1983, p. K/6.

[34]Ibid.

[35]See, e.g., Yu Qiuli's report to the 11th Communist Youth League Congress on Dec. 25, 1982, in *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (Beijing), Dec. 30, 1982, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 82806, Feb. 14, 1983, pp. 6–7.

[36]Interview with Chief-of-Staff Yang Dezhi in *China Daily* (Beijing), June 11, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 13, 1983, pp. K/29–30.

*Various branches of the Chinese People's Liberation Army participating in an exercise in the autumn of 1981.*

—Camera Press.



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policies have generally favored officers who are younger, better educated, and more competent professionally, especially in the technical fields, though according to recent reports there still is no sign of a return to insignia of rank within the military.[37]

Although lip service is still paid to the role of the PLA in society, in effect its nonmilitary duties have been curtailed, as a result both of the PLA's disengagement from the political arena and of the leadership's desire to let the soldiers concentrate on military activities. At the same time, the military role of the people's militia, of which the professional military has always taken a dim view, has been downgraded, and only a small and select number of its members are being trained for combat operations.[38]

It is clear that the current leadership's primary consideration in implementing these reforms has been to enhance the professional standards of the Chinese military, in particular as concerns the combat capability of the armed forces. As a senior Chinese commander bluntly put it: "What is referred to as reform is to do away with all rules, regulations, and work style that do not conform to the needs of modernization; study new situations; solve new problems; sum up new experiences; and establish new rules and regulations."[39] Political work has been explicitly subordinated to the attainment of military objectives, and the role of political commissars has been implicitly downgraded.[40] In sum, not since the mid–1950's, and in many ways even more than at that time, have professional officers carried so much weight in molding the character of the Chinese armed forces.

In view of this, professional military leaders seem to have little ground for serious disaffection from the Deng leadership. Although the current party leadership has not given them their desired share of national resources for technological updating, it has been far from indifferent to the military's needs in armaments and has compensated them generously in other areas of military modernization. To the extent that remaining differences have been aired publicly, this has been done in a low-key and reserved fashion since Deng formally assumed the chairmanship of the Military Commission following Hua Guofeng's resignation from that post at the 6th Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in June 1981.[41] Such reserve cannot be attributed solely to discipline and reticence, since in the recent past military professionals have not refrained from speaking out vigorously when defending their vital interests. A more likely explanation is that they regard Deng's policies as acceptable, if not fully satisfactory, and have found it possible to work out their differences without intensifying disputes.

## Party Policies and Political Dissent

If the professional officers have been able to reach an accord with the Deng leadership, the same cannot be said for the other group of critics among the leaders of the military. Although the latter share the professionals' institutional interests, they have not confined themselves just to promoting these interests. Unlike the military professionals who have limited their advocacy to military issues, these leaders have intruded into the political arena and have publicly spoken out against the national policies of the party. Consequently, this second group of officers has crossed institutional lines in voicing its broader differences with the party, criticizing party policies that lie outside the corporate concerns of the military and drawing support from among that segment of the military that has opposed Deng's leadership.

Centered in the PLA's General Political Department (GPD) and its subordinate organs, this second group of officers has apparently coalesced around the old marshal Ye Jianying. To be sure, Ye undoubtedly views himself (and is viewed by others in China) not solely as a representative of the military, but as a national leader whose concerns are not restricted by institutional boundaries. Although in the past Ye had been identified as a leader of the professional military, and for that reason was a prime target of the "gang of four,"[42] he has apparently, for personal and political reasons, become the focus of opposition to the policies of Deng Xiaoping. The personal reasons presumably stem from the fact that, despite radical attacks against him during the Cultural Revolution, Ye's stat-

[37] Ibid.; see also *FEER*, Aug. 11, 1983, p. 18.

[38] June Teufel Dreyer, "The Chinese Militia: Citizen-Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations in the People's Republic of China," *Armed Forces and Society* (Chicago, IL), Fall 1982, p. 76.

[39] Li Desheng, "Continue to Eliminate 'Leftist' Ideological Influence, Strive to Create a New Phase of Armed Forces Building," reprinted from *Lilun Yu Shijian* (Lioaning), No. 4, 1983, in *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 13, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 14, 1983, p. K/4.

[40] The downgrading of political commissars is most striking in that their role is almost completely ignored in military pronouncements, especially in statements by Yu Qiuli, head of the PLA's Political Department. See, e.g., interview with Yu in *Beijing Review*, Aug. 1, 1983, pp. 13–16.

[41] Hua is reputed to have relinquished his post as chairman of the Military Commission in late 1980, but did not formally resign until the 6th plenum in June 1981. For a cogent account of the important personnel changes at the plenum, see David S. G. Goodman, "The 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP: Look Back in Anger?" *China Quarterly* (London), September 1981, pp. 518–19.

[42] See, e.g., Hsieh Cheng, "Ferreting Out 'the Bourgeoisie in the Army'—Another 'Gang of Four' Scheme," in *Peking Review*, Mar. 4, 1977, p. 9.



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*Marshal Ye Jianying, octogenarian member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, around whom the political opposition in the military to Deng Xiaoping's policies has coalesced.*

—Camera Press.

ure is linked to Mao's legacy. Furthermore, Ye's role as the central pillar in the coalition led by Hua Guofeng during the transition period after Mao's death reinforced this link, as Hua's tenure symbolized continuity with the Maoist era. Thus, an unrestrained repudiation of the Chairman's legacy cannot but have an adverse effect on Ye's position within the party. Ye's political motives presumably derive from his abiding belief in the central facets of the Maoist ideology, and his concern for the future of the Chinese revolution, which he sees as stagnating because of Deng's diluting, if not discarding, of this ideology.

It is not surprising, therefore, that a key issue in dispute between this group of officers and the Deng leadership has been the evaluation of Mao's role in the history of the Chinese revolution. The party's pronouncement on this important issue—known officially as the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," adopted after debates and delays at the 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee on June 27, 1981—is generally considered by observers to have been watered down when compared with statements reportedly made by Deng,[43] and this modification is attributed to pressure from the military. Even if true, there is no doubt that the Resolution's verdict is much harsher than that given by Ye Jianying in his important statement marking the 30th anniversary of the regime in October 1979. The difference is particularly glaring with regard to the most sensitive and divisive question—Mao's responsibility for the Cultural Revolution. Whereas Ye simply glosses over this period and attributes its calamitous consequences to Lin Biao and the "gang of four,"[44] the Resolution deals with the Cultural Revolution in detail and lays the blame for its excesses squarely on Mao.[45]

Related to the treatment of Mao's legacy has been this group's discontent with the consequences of what it perceives as the drift away from Maoist values in Chinese society. Many articles reflecting such discontent have been published in the PLA press organ, *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation Army Daily). One article, for example, praised the revolutionary Yan'an spirit and lamented its passing: "What kind of fine social values and attitudes we had at that time, and how much we yearn for such fine social values and attitudes."[46] It then implicitly criticized party policies for abandoning such values.

*To turn China into a powerful, modern socialist country, we should demonstrate high material civilization as well as high spiritual civilization. This kind of spiritual civilization should not be represented by high developments in the fields of science and culture alone. First of all and most important, this spiritual civilization must manifest itself in Communist ideals and beliefs, Communist ethics and values, fine social practices, comradely relations among the people, and so on.*[47]

A more specific indication of the kinds of developments that irritated the critics of party policies was given by Li Desheng, commander of the Shenyang Military Region, when he refuted their criticism:

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[43]See Nethercut, loc. cit., p. 696.

[44]For the full text of Ye's Sept. 29, 1979, speech, see *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 1, 1979, pp. L/8–34.

[45]See, e.g., Article 22 of the full text of the Resolution, Xinhua, June 30, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 1, 1981, p. K/18.

[46]Beijing Domestic Service, Jan. 2, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 6, 1981, p. L/25.

[47]Ibid.



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*For example, in early 1979 after the emergence of Xidan democratic wall, some comrades doubted whether the discussion on the criterion of truth and the slogan of emancipating the mind were correct; in early 1980 when the phenomena of indulging in social dancing, wearing flared trousers and singing hit songs appeared, some comrades favored the slogan "promoting what is proletarian and liquidating what is bourgeois"; in 1981 when [the film script] "Unrequited Love" was criticized, some comrades held that it was necessary to exercise dictatorship in the ideological and cultural spheres; in 1982 when serious crimes in the economic spheres were cracked down on, some comrades held that this was a result of the policy of opening to the outside world and adopting flexible economic policies at home and that the policy of taking class struggle as the key link should not be done away with.*[48]

The dissidents in the military blamed the party's policies for the appearance of such phenomena. According to a report outlining PLA efforts in Guangzhou Province to combat leftism, "some comrades ... regarded certain erroneous trends of thought and unhealthy tendencies that arose in society as the results of carrying out the policies [that had been established at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress]. They wondered whether the Party's principles and policies had deviated and become rightist."[49] One political commissar did not wonder at all, mincing no words in linking party policies with the emergence of pernicious trends in society: "At present, under the new historical conditions in which our country is implementing an open-door policy and the policy of enlivening the economy, and owing to the corrosive influence of decadent bourgeois ideas abroad and the adverse influence of the remnant forces of the exploiting classes in the country, anarchism, extreme individualism, and bourgeois liberalization trends of thought have appeared in society."[50]

A particularly galling manifestation of this trend, from the military dissidents' viewpoint, was the film script "Unrequited Love" by Bai Hua, an intellectual in a PLA unit in the Wuhan Military Region. The script gives a bitter portrayal of a patriotic artist who is hounded to death by radical leftists. Although published in 1979, the script was not attacked in *Jiefangjun Bao* until the spring of 1981, when the debates over the evaluation of Mao's role in the Cultural Revolution were approaching a climax. In denouncing "Unrequited Love" for "negating patriotism," and in depicting it as "not an isolated phenomenon" but as a reflection of "anarchism, ultra-individualism, [and] bourgeois liberalism,"[51] the dissidents in the military may have used the script to highlight the potential consequences of extreme de-Maoization, and thereby to influence the outcome of the debate over Mao's role in the history of the party. Nonetheless, the party press did not immediately take up the attack on Bai Hua, joining in only after the "verdict" on Mao had been reached and after the army paper continued to press its campaign.

A much more blatant instance of military meddling in high politics occurred on the eve of the landmark 12th Party Congress, which was held September 1–11, 1982. The cause of the flare-up of the simmering strains between the Deng leadership and dissident elements in the military was an article by Zhao Yiya, an army propagandist, which was published in the Shanghai *Jiefang Ribao* (Liberation Daily) on August 28, 1982, and which, as it later turned out, was reprinted from the previous day's *Jiefangjun Bao*.[52] Taking up the time-honored theme of "red" versus "expert" under the new slogan of "socialist spiritual civilization" versus "capitalist civilization," Zhao strongly criticized the party's overemphasis on material progress at the expense of Communist ideology. "We want to learn the advanced scientific and technological achievements of the capitalist world," Zhao said, but "we must also adopt an analytical attitude, and cannot copy them blindly and mechanically, still less praise them in extravagant terms."[53] This, however, was exactly what "some comrades" did. They "one-sidedly emphasized 'civilization' while neglecting 'spirit' and, worse still, socialism. As a result, the difference between the two types of civilization was easily confused."[54]

Had Zhao left matters there, the publication of his article would probably not have become a cause célèbre. After all, the army paper had published many articles warning about the effects of neglecting ideology. However, two features made Zhao's piece stand out. First, Zhao did not confine himself to criticizing party policies, but in no uncertain terms also accused the party leadership of dereliction of duty:

[48]Li, "Continue to Eliminate 'Leftist' Ideological Influence," loc. cit., p. K/2.

[49]Guangzhou Guangdong Provincial Service, Mar. 26, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 30, 1981, p. P/1.

[50]Shijiazhuang Hebei Provincial Service, Apr. 14, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 28, 1982, p. R/1.

[51]Shanghai City Service, Apr. 20, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 22, 1981, p. K/1.

[52]*Jiefang Ribao* (Shanghai), Aug. 28, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 29, 1982, pp. K/4–6.

[53]Ibid., p. K/4.

[54]Ibid.



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*In the past few years, unhealthy ideas have really emerged inside and outside our party. . . . However, what is more important is our lax and weak leadership on the ideological front. It was some of our comrades in the theoretical, literary and art, and journalistic circles who first took the lead in supporting and publicizing the erroneous viewpoint of bourgeois liberalism. . . . Moreover, this erroneous viewpoint was not promptly checked and corrected. As a result, it inevitably spread and grew.*[55]

A second distinguishing feature of Zhao's article was the timing of its publication. As the army paper itself later emphasized, the article, which was "in conflict with certain important points in [General Secretary Hu Yaobang's] report to the 12th party congress," appeared after the report had been "basically finalized."[56] The publication of Zhao's admonition to "use Communist ideology to guide the building of socialist spiritual civilization" may have represented a last-ditch effort by Deng's opponents to pressure the leadership into altering the report in line with their own views. More likely, the article may have been intended to provide the dissidents with ammunition against Deng so as to strengthen their hand in the tough bargaining over personnel appointments that apparently went on behind the scenes before and during the congress. In any case, publication of the article at that time, the army paper admitted, was "not only a case of serious carelessness, but ... a grave political and organizational mistake on our part."[57]

[55]Ibid., p. K/6.

[56]The *Jiefangjun Bao* critique of Zhao's article was reprinted in *Jiefang Ribao*, Sept. 28, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 4, 1982, p. K/1.

[57]Ibid.

*In December 1979, municipal workers remove posters from Beijing's short-lived "Democracy Wall"—a forum for public expression of opinion that the party leadership initially tolerated and perhaps even encouraged despite criticism from elements in the Chinese military.*

—Gamma-Pekin/Liaison.



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This mistake did not pass without retribution from the party leadership. On September 27, the army paper published a long and abject self-criticism for printing the piece in the first place and refuted each of Zhao's arguments point by point. It concluded:

*The fact that Comrade Zhao Yiya's article was published in this paper (and also simultaneously in the Shanghai* Jiefang Ribao*) shows that among a very small number of comrades in the party and the army there indeed remains the pernicious influence of "left" ideas, which constitutes an obstruction to the party's line, principles, and policies. . . . Organizationally and as a disciplinary matter, it is impermissible to propagate these erroneous viewpoints. It is precisely on this point that this paper has for a period of time in the past lacked understanding and must strive to correct from now on.*[58]

As part of this effort, on the same day as the publication of the army paper's self-criticism, Wei Guoqing, the director of the PLA's General Political Department, which is responsible for publishing the paper, was dismissed.

PLA dissidents also criticized the party's economic policies, which they viewed as yet another manifestation of the current leadership's departure from socialist values. One target of attack was the party's pragmatic policy of decentralizing agricultural production down to the family level: "When some comrades saw that some places were permitted to fix production quotas for each household, they wondered how on earth that could happen and opined that this was taking the old [capitalist] road again."[59] Others objected on more practical grounds, expressing their fears that the new responsibility system would disrupt PLA recruitment and troop morale.[60] Indeed, according to some accounts, a career in the military was becoming less attractive to peasant youths, as the "income of army men's families was less than before, as a result of implementing the system of production responsibility."[61] More generally, the party's economic policies came under fire because they were seen as leading to moral laxity and corruption:

*For example, we have given enterprises greater decision-making power, have instituted the bonus system, and have opened up a number of channels for the circulation of commodities in order to . . . accelerate the development of the national economy. However, due to the influence of various nonproletarian ideas, some persons have abused their decision-making power, have wantonly issued bonuses, or have benefited themselves at the expense of the public interest. . . . Others have engaged in speculation and profiteering, have put profits first, and have considered everything in terms of money.*[62]

*Wei Guoqing, dismissed from the directorship of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army.*

—Camera Press.

## Impact of Dissent

What then has been the significance of this dissent and how has it affected civil-military relations in general and Deng's position in particular? To answer

[58]Ibid., p. K/8.

[59]Hainan Island Regional Service, Feb. 13, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 18, 1981, p. P/1.

[60]For an overview of the responsibility system in China, see Frederick Crook's review-essay in this issue of *Problems of Communism*. See also the article by David Zweig on reform in the countryside in Robert A. Morse, Ed., *The Limits of Reform in China*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

[61]Xinhua Domestic Service, Apr. 5, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 9, 1981, p. P/1.

[62]Beijing Domestic Service, Mar. 27, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 1, 1981, p. K/6.



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these questions it is necessary to examine several critical factors, which can only be assessed in a partly speculative manner.

The first factor is the extent of dissent. Unfortunately, because of the lack of data, it is difficult to identify with certainty the dissidents at the highest level of the military hierarchy. What is known generally is that the main source of opposition to Deng's policies at this level has been the General Political Department. The GPD's former director, Wei Guoqing, was dismissed from his post recently either because he was considered a dissident or, more likely, because he had to take responsibility for deviations in his domain. Other high-level supporters of the dissident group may have included Xu Shiyou, former commander of the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions, who lost his Politburo post at the 12th Party Congress;[63] Ye Fei, former commander of the navy;[64] and lesser figures such as Xiao Hua, until the mid-1960's director of the General Political Department and later political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region.[65]

How strong has been the support of the officer corps for dissident military leaders? This question is extremely difficult to answer. Judging by the efforts of the leadership to refute criticism and to indoctrinate officers, dissatisfaction with party policies has been widespread. For example, in April 1981 it was reported that "over the past two years, some 70 percent of cadres at and above the regimental level have attended various forms of study classes" in which the correctness of party policies was explained.[66]

This does not mean, however, that all the officers participating in such classes had disagreed with the policies of the party. When criticism of party policies began to well up in the PLA, the party leadership launched a major educational drive to counter it, and it hardly distinguished between officers who had voiced criticism and those who had not. More important, it is unlikely that many professional commanders were among the critics, given their preoccupation with improving the combat capabilities of the PLA and their desire for material development, even at the expense of revolutionary values, as the basis for military modernization. At any rate, no high-ranking officer associated with the professional military, perhaps with the exception of the dismissed Ye Fei, has publicly spoken out against the leadership's economic or ideological policies.

The significance of the dissent also depends on how and where it manifests itself. At the national level, the most obvious voice of the dissident leaders had been *Jiefangjun Bao,* but critics doubtless made their views known in inner party circles as well. At the middle and lower levels of the armed forces, dissent from party policies was presumably expressed in discussion sessions and speeches. Whatever the form of dissent, there is not the slightest indication that the military dissidents made any move to press their views by direct action of some kind. In meeting their responsibility to effect the party's *military* policies, officers have the risky option, to which they have resorted in the past, of sidestepping or sabotaging distasteful directives in the course of implementation. However, in the case of *national* policies, such an option is hardly available to officers, since they generally have no control over the implementation of such policies. Short of direct action, therefore, the military can influence national policies only by making public statements, which they have done, and by working behind the scenes in whatever ways are customary in China's mysterious policymaking process, which they have also presumably done.

Another factor that has to be taken into account in assessing the significance of dissent in the military is the reaction of the party leadership. This reaction has taken several forms. One has obviously been personnel changes, but information linking such changes directly with criticism of party policies is unavailable, and only the dismissal of Wei Guoqing falls into this category. Almost all the members of the Military Commission's Standing Committee and Secretariat have been appointed under Deng's aegis, as have the directors of the subdepartments of the General Staff Department and some of their deputy directors and political commissars, 9 of the 11 Military Region commanders, and well over half the Military District commanders. While there are no data to connect these changes to disaffection with party policies, such a connection is probable in at least some cases. At any rate, the new appointees have doubtless been approved by Deng and their support for his policies must have been taken into consideration. The sweeping changes of Military Region commanders—far more drastic than the reshuffling in 1974—suggest several observations. For one thing, it is obvious that Deng is

[63] It is interesting to note that according to some accounts Wei and Xu were strong supporters of Deng and fought to have him reinstated after his second ouster from power. See Parris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," *Problems of Communism,* January–February 1981, p. 3; and Fontana, loc. cit., pp. 241–42.

[64] My assumption with regard to Ye Fei is speculative and is based on the somewhat flimsy evidence of his speech to a naval congress in which he seemed to take the line of the dissidents. *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), Aug. 25, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Aug. 25, 1982, pp. K/17–18.

[65] My assumption with regard to Xiao Hua is based on his emphasis on the importance of political work during modernization. See *Hongqi,* June 1979, trans. in *JPRS,* No. 73956, Aug. 3, 1979, pp. 54–66.

[66] Xinhua Domestic Service, Apr. 24, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Apr. 28, 1981, p. K/19.



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*Li Desheng, commander of Shenyang Military Region.*

—Camera Press.

in very firm control of the PLA; otherwise, such extensive changes could not have been carried out. It also appears that Deng has succeeded in breaking up the political power of the regional commanders, a major source of which had been their lengthy service in the same post. (As of 1983, only two commanders—Yang Chengwu and Li Desheng—have served in their areas since the 1970's.) Finally, all nine commanders appointed during Deng's tenure as China's top leader have had professional rather than political backgrounds.[67]

The party leadership also reacted by cracking down on the critics of its policies. Party committees in various PLA units and institutes convened criticism and self-criticism meetings at which the influence of "leftist" ideology was analyzed and condemned.[68] At the same time, study classes for officers were held throughout the PLA in order to convince them of the correctness of party policies.[69] At the beginning of 1983, the Military Commission looked back on its efforts with satisfaction:

*The all-army party organizations at various levels and the vast number of party members have shown further improvement in supporting the political views of the central authorities. Through education and a series of measures to set things right, ... marked ... results have been achieved. ... The overwhelming majority of cadres and party members firmly believe that the leadership of the Central Committee is absolutely correct.*[70]

Nonetheless, "some comrades are not yet quite determined to eliminate the influence of 'leftist' ideas and have not taken effective measures. Consequently, 'left' ideas still find support in some units."[71] The authority for this statement is no less a figure than Li Desheng, Politburo member, commander of the sensitive Shenyang Military Region, and director of the General Political Department in the early 1970's. In an article published in a Liaoning journal and reprinted in the *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) in April 1983, Li launched a hard-hitting attack on "leftist" trends in the PLA and called for their elimination. Although at first glance Li's article might be taken as an indication of the persisting strength of "leftist" elements in the military, its real significance lies in demonstrating exactly the opposite. As a prominent survivor of the Cultural Revolution and as a leading military figure in the twilight years of the Maoist era, Li, like Ye Jianying, has a personal and political stake in maintaining strong links with the Maoist past. Although Li had made several routine pronouncements since Deng's rise to power, he had not taken a firm stand on this issue until the publication of this article. Smacking of self-criticism and generous in its praise for party policies, the article constitutes an unequivocal declaration

[67] There were two waves of appointments. In 1980, six officers who had never held the post of Military Region commander were appointed: You Taizhong to Chengdu, Rao Shoukun to Jinan, Zhang Zhixiu to Kunming, Du Yide to Lanzhou, Zhang Caiqian to Wuhan, and Xiao Quanfu to Urumqi. At the same time, Wu Kehua was transferred from Urumqi to Guangzhou, and Qin Jiwei, who had not been a Military Region commander for several years, was sent to Beijing. Only three commanders—Nie Fengzhi in Nanjing, Yang Chengwu in Fuzhou, and Li Desheng in Shenyang—remained in their posts.

In 1982, three deputy commanders were appointed to the position of commander in their regions: Wang Chenghan in Chengdu, Xiang Shouzhi in Nanjing, and Zhou Shizhong in Wuhan. At the same time, You Taizhong was transferred from Chengdu to Guangzhou. Zheng Weishan, who had been commander of the Beijing Military Region in 1968–70, was appointed to Lanzhou in 1983.

[68] See, e.g., Guangzhou Guangdong Provincial Service, Mar. 26, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 27, 1981, p. P/1; and Xian Shaanxi Provincial Service, Mar. 26, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 27, 1981 p. T/2.

[69] See, e.g., note 66.

[70] Xinhua Domestic Service, Jan. 20, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 27, 1983, p. K/21.

[71] Li, "Continue to Eliminate 'Leftist' Ideological Influence," loc. cit., p. K/3.



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

*A Chinese military delegation examines heavy artillery in June 1983 at the biannual exhibition of French weapons for export, in Satory, near Versailles.*

—Jean-Claude Francolon/Gamma-Liaison.

of support for Deng. Such a declaration not only strengthens Deng's hand; it also presumably demonstrates that Deng's position as head of the party is extremely solid, since Li would not have given such support unless he had decided that it was futile to resist the policies of the Deng leadership.

The last and most important factor to consider in evaluating the weight of dissent in the military is its impact on party policies and on Deng's position. In both cases, the impact has been marginal. Although changes have been made in party policies, there is no way of determining whether they were due to pressure from the military or to other factors. Regarding the verdict on Mao's role in history, it is quite likely that Deng toned down the criticism of Mao in deference to Ye and his supporters; but there must also have been other considerations for this move, in particular those pertaining to the legitimacy of the post-Mao leadership. Regarding policy toward freedom of expression, Deng cracked down hard on the outspoken advocates of political rights, but this move can be attributed as much to his fear that liberalization was getting out of hand as to pressure from the military. Most important, the current leadership's policies of national development, which are based on a pragmatic approach that discards Maoist values as the need arises, have not only remained unchanged, but have been extended and consolidated. This has been particularly true with respect to economic policy and policy toward intellectuals, two areas that the military has criticized most harshly. The reaction of the Deng leadership, in short, has been not to give in to criticism, but to "give it" to the critics.

This Deng has done, as already shown, by means of personnel changes and indoctrination campaigns. And he has been able to do this because disaffection in the military has obviously not weakened his position to a significant degree. If it had, Deng would have been compelled to make more than minor compromises with his critics. In fact, he has not been swayed from the course he has set for himself.

In sum, Deng has been able to overcome dissent in the military primarily because this dissent has been limited to a segment of the PLA that has not included the professional officers. These officers support Deng because they have reached an understanding with him on vital military matters. One key element in this understanding is evidently Deng's promise to gradually meet their demands for technological modernization. His future relations with the professional military will, therefore, decisively depend on his ability to deliver on this promise.



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# Books

# Motivating China's Farmers

**by Frederick W. Crook**

RANDOLPH BARKER and RADHA SINHA, Eds., with BETH ROSE. *The Chinese Agricultural Economy*. Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 1982.

LAURENCE J. C. MA and ALLEN G. NOBLE, Eds. *The Environment: Chinese and American Views*. New York, NY, and London, Methuen, 1981.

JAMES E. NICKUM, Ed. *Water Management Organization in the People's Republic of China*. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1981.

CLIFTON W. PANNELL and CHRISTOPHER L. SALTER, Eds. *China Geographer, Number 11: Agriculture*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

CHINA'S POST-MAO leadership in 1978 initiated a major shift in policies for motivating and managing the country's vast rural labor force.* Instead of trying to control the economic behavior of peasants and limit their ability to make important economic decisions independently, the current reforms aim to restore certain prerogatives to the peasants and to unleash entrepreneurial and innovative behavior.

*The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the US government.

To understand this shift and to venture some thoughts about its prospects it is useful to summarize the contrasting situations of the Chinese peasant in the pre-reform period and today. The books under review are helpful in understanding the peasant's earlier situation, incidentally providing a great deal of information on a much wider range of topics relating to Chinese agriculture, including environmental issues and foreign trade. However, it was after most of the authors reviewed here had written their articles or books (to meet publication deadlines in 1981 and 1982) that the current agricultural reforms began to take concrete shape. As a consequence, these studies must be supplemented with more recent information if one is to comprehend the contemporary institutional framework of agriculture in China.

FOR THE PRE-REFORM period, I have chosen to describe the situation facing the peasants in 1975, i.e., in the last full year of Chairman Mao Zedong's life. At that juncture, the commune system—first introduced in the summer of 1958—was the prime rural organizational arrangement in China. Its status was perhaps typified by the September 1975 First National Conference on Learning from Dazhai (the name of a model commune production brigade in Shanxi). This system comprised four parts: (1) the commune itself; (2) production brigades under the commune; (3) production teams assigned to production brigades; and (4) peasant households. Benedict Stavis's article "Rural Institutions in China" in the volume edited by Randolph Barker and Radha Sinha provides a detailed account of the development and growth of the commune system.

As of 1975, the commune was the basic unit of local government, commune headquarters often being situated in the former township (*xiang*) center. Articles in the volume edited by Laurence Ma and Allen Noble provide useful explanations of relations among the communes, the towns, and the cities of China. Commune departments exercised police powers and settled disputes; registered births, marriages, and deaths; authorized movement of people into or out of the commune; and managed the training of the militia and recruitment of inductees into the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Party committees at the commune level were to ensure that central policies were properly implemented and that the various parts



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of the commune system worked together smoothly. The commune party committee also supervised party branches and cells at lower levels.

In economic terms, the communes provided leadership for large-scale water-control projects and directly managed small rural industrial enterprises. They also played a key role in formulating and executing agricultural production plans.

The commune also had responsibility for various important social functions. Primary-school-aged children attended commune schools funded in part by team and brigade revenues. First-aid was available from paramedical technicians at brigade clinics, and more advanced medical care was provided at commune-run hospitals. The commune welfare system, funded by production-team earnings, provided welfare assistance to the aged, infirm, and widowed; built homes for the elderly; and assisted survivors from military families. The commune system also provided cultural facilities such as libraries, movie theaters, and sports arenas.[1]

Under the communes were the brigades, the last link in the long chain of the government and party control systems. Branch organizations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were located at this level, serving to bring party discipline to rural areas. Below the brigades were the production teams, essentially small collective farms. These were the most important formally organized units in the commune system. They made final decisions regarding the production of goods and the distribution of income. At the bottom were the households, which collectively owned the means of production in the teams. The households had responsibility for disciplining and motivating family members to work on commune projects.

In the late 1950's and early 1960's the CCP leaders believed that peasants could be motivated to work in the commune system, even while clinging to and operating small private plots. Commitment to commune labor was to result both from socialist education—designed to overcome the "narrow-minded, backward, conservative, selfish" profit-seeking mentality of the small producer—and from operation of the labor-day work payment system.

As of 1975, farm households received about 40 percent of their income from the labor-day work payment system. Household members accumulated work points according to the quality and quantity of work performed in the collective fields. Ten work points equaled one labor day. At year's end, a team's revenues (net of production costs, taxes, capital accumulation, and welfare expenditures) were divided by the total number of labor days credited to all team members to calculate the value of a single labor day. Team net income was then distributed to farm families according to the number of labor days earned by family members as recorded in account books.

Over the years, various methods had been employed by teams in measuring labor days. These oscillated between egalitarian schemes (in which everyone showing up for work on a given day received an equal number of work points) and various forms of piece-rate and labor-production contracts (which introduced substantial material incentives to farmers, but which were also severely criticized).[2] By 1975, teams were using the Dazhai work-point method, in which the level of a worker's "political consciousness" as well as ability to work figured into the awarding of work points.

[1] See John Dixon, *The Chinese Welfare System, 1949-1979*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1981.

[2] For a detailed account of how these methods functioned, see F. W. Crook, "An Analysis of Work Payment System Used in Chinese Mainland Agriculture, 1956 to 1970," Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School, Tufts University, 1971, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI, 1972.

## Reviewers in This Issue

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The incentive potential of the labor-day work payment system was further undermined by egalitarian tendencies in the distribution of food grain rations—which tended to be based on the number of persons in a household, need, and the type of work performed. The monetary value of these rations—distributed throughout the year and amounting to about 40 percent of peasant income—was deducted from the household's share of team income at year's end, and the cash residual was distributed to the household on the basis of labor days earned.[3]

As noted, private households also generated income from private plots, from household subsidiary production such as manufacture of straw and bamboo articles, and from rural trades such as bricklaying and carpentry. In the mid-1970's these activities—tolerated as a necessary evil and regularly criticized as vestiges of capitalism—generated an estimated 20 percent of total household income.[4]

Of the three forms of private activity the private plots generated the largest share of income. These plots averaged about 275 square meters, but varied widely in size, tending to be larger in North China and smaller in South China. Some areas in 1975 abolished the private plots altogether. Plots were intensively cultivated and produced grain, vegetables, tobacco, and fruit, much of it for consumption by household members. There was doubtless also barter trade between neighboring households, but open trading in rural markets in most areas was discouraged. The private output was far more important than its monetary value, the vegetables and fruits adding much-needed vitamins and minerals to an otherwise starchy diet of cereals.[5]

Household subsidiary production included such activities as raising chickens and pigs, collecting wild medicinal plants, manufacturing small farm implements and grass mats, and spinning and weaving cloth.[6] Output from these activities was again consumed by the producing household or bartered for goods produced by neighboring households.

Finally, part-time carpenters, bricklayers, and other skilled laborers earned income for their families by working for neighbors or other production units.

PARTY COMMITTEES of the commune dominated all political, social, and economic activities. Party members also often served as commune, brigade, and team officers who worked actively to implement party and government policies formulated in Beijing. The committees certified the political reliability of (1) young students nominated for further training, (2) recruits for the CCP, (3) PLA recruits, (4) candidates for administrative positions in the commune system (e.g., brigade or team leader), and (5) team laborers assigned to work in industrial enterprises operating at the team, brigade, or commune level (these last described in considerable detail in Christine Wong's article on rural industrialization, in Barker and Sinha). This power of certification gave the party substantial control over the lives of farmers. The CCP also employed coercion or the threat of coercion—the identification of families as bourgeois elements to be persecuted, the dispatching of family members to western border areas, and the sending of persons to labor reform camps.

Economic control of peasant production teams in 1975 was provided through a host of government and commune entities, programs, and policies. Government planning procedures called for teams, brigades, and communes to participate in formulating agricultural production plans. It was an important event for the team when the final plan targets arrived from the commune via the brigade, specifying what kinds of crops should be sown, how much area should be planted, and what output was expected. The emphasis was on grain production and self-sufficiency in food grains and oilseeds. Counsel of veteran farmers was not always sought, and crops were sometimes planted in fields ill-suited for their cultivation.[7]

The agricultural extension system of the commune supported production teams by providing improved seed varieties and advice on how to apply chemical fertilizer and to combat insects and disease. These services could be denied to teams not implementing the prescribed production plans. Decisions to use new techniques were made by administrative cadres. Although team leaders followed the advice of local technical stations, the farmers in general were not deeply committed to or involved in learning science or improved

[3]See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Aug. 8, 1978, p. E/10.

[4]State Statistical Bureau, Ed., *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian: 1981* (China Statistical Yearbook, 1981), Beijing, Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, August 1982, pp. 431–34.

[5]Information on the private plots was gleaned from an unpublished data set containing some 7,000 reports on communes from 1958 to 1983, assembled by the author.

[6]*Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian: 1981*, pp. 431–34.

[7]Zhang Zhoulai, "Some Opinions on Strengthening Agricultural Planning Work," *Jingji Guanli* (Beijing), No. 3, Mar. 20, 1981, pp. 36–40, trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 73,385, June 26, 1981, pp. 12–19.



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methods. The marginal return to a farmer for time invested in the study of science and technology was low. Even if a farmer did make a contribution raising output for the team, his personal benefit—when worked through the labor-day payment system—would be only a few handfuls of grain.

Tractor stations and electric power grids in communes also supported teams' attempts to meet production targets. Teams were required to pay service fees to have their land plowed or to have agricultural products or supplies of seed and fertilizer transported. Electrical power was supplied to 70 percent of the communes in 1975.[8] Some communes constructed their own small hydroelectric stations, while others were tied into larger power grids. Electricity was important for teams primarily to operate drainage pumps and irrigation systems. The ability to allocate or withhold vital services and resources gave commune leaders considerable control over team economic behavior.

From 1958 through 1975, communes had mobilized farmers to perform billions of man-days of labor in the building of extensive water-control systems. James Nickum's study provides useful information on the organization and management of these systems. The overall impact of these massive expenditures was to increase agricultural output, but commune control over the life-giving irrigation water also gave important leverage over team operations.

Peasants in 1975 interacted with the commune financial system in three ways. Households with excess cash could open savings accounts, and those in desperate financial straits could obtain consumer loans from the commune credit cooperative. Second, teams kept their funds in banks or credit cooperatives, which had to approve loans for purchases of major items such as farm machinery; terms of repayment and the interest rate were set by the government. Third, credit cooperatives and agricultural banks in rural areas also monitored teams' financial exchanges to insure that such transactions met government requirements.[9]

The system controlling the marketing of farm, industrial, and handicraft products, and of agricultural inputs and consumer goods, was one of the most important support-and-control mechanisms affecting farm households. The government classified all products into three categories. The first comprised goods that were considered vital to the welfare of the nation such as grain and cotton. The government laid down strict guidelines governing the purchase, transport, and processing of these goods. For raw cotton, the government was the sole purchaser. Stores owned and operated by the government made contracts to purchase grains and oilseed crops from production teams. Category II products such as eggs, hemp, and fruit were sold by contract to supply and marketing cooperatives, which had originally been founded by farmers but were now under government management.[10] Category III items included products of local interest such as medicinal herbs, poultry, and vegetables.

Because the government managed retail trade, it was in an excellent position to control the movement of rural inhabitants. Commune cadres issued coupons to qualified families permitting individuals to enter grain stores and cooperatives for the purchase of rationed commodities such as grain, edible oil, and cotton. Since these coupons were usually only valid in the local area, there was considerable pressure on farm families to stay in their villages rather than migrate to urban areas. The rationing system did provide a safety net for the populace and also made it possible to set off some areas to raise only specialty crops such as peppermint oil or rubber. Nicholas Lardy's article "Food Consumption in the People's Republic of China" in the Barker and Sinha volume provides a good review of the food distribution system in this period.

The government-owned stores and government-managed supply and marketing cooperatives controlled the supply of inputs. In purchasing a tractor or scarce chemical fertilizer, the farmers had to worry not only about their supply of cash or credit but also about how the managers of the supply outlets evaluated team compliance with production plans. As for rural free markets, government and party policy required cadres to choke off the rise of capitalist tendencies; hence in most areas, markets were closed altogether, while in others, they were severely limited in hours open and in goods that could be traded. There were also limits imposed on places where skilled tradespeople could work.

The commune system yielded at best modest gains for the peasant. Per capita income for farmers from the commune system rose only slowly, from 41.4 yuan in 1958 to 63.2 yuan in 1975—i.e., an average of 1.2 yuan per year.[11] This

[8] *Survey of the People's Republic of China Press* (Hong Kong), No. 5940, Sept. 23, 1975, p. 27.

[9] *JPRS*, No. 75,942, Jan. 26, 1980, p. 73.

[10] *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao* (Beijing), Feb. 8, 1981, p. 5.

[11] He Kang, Editor and Chairman of the Agricultural Yearbook Committee, *Zhongguo Nongye Nianjian: 1980* (China Agricultural Yearbook, 1980), Beijing, Nongye Chubanshe, November 1981, p. 41.



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finding is reinforced in Tom Wien's outline of the main features of agricultural growth from 1957 through 1978, which is the centerpiece of Clifton Pannell and Christopher Salter's *China Geographer, Number 11: Agriculture*. Wien notes that in spite of increased supplies of chemical fertilizer, better seeds, and expanded irrigation area, the growth in grain production for the period barely managed to keep pace with population growth. After 20 years of hard labor, farm families found per capita grain rations virtually unchanged. The slow pace of growth in the agricultural sector is also documented in considerable detail in the Barker/Sinha volume. In particular, Thomas Rawski's article "Agricultural Employment and Technology" highlights the difficulties the commune system had in providing the incentives and flexibility needed to increase farm output (pp. 121–36).

The shortcomings in agriculture also retarded growth of other sectors of the Chinese economy. Matters grew so serious that after Mao's death in 1976, CCP leaders reviewed the situation and determined that dramatic policy changes were required.

THE PIVOTAL DECISIONS regarding reform of China's agricultural system were made public at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, in December 1978.[12] Instead of viewing peasant tendencies toward the profit motive as the ultimate horror in a socialist society, the party now decided to try relying on this very motive as a means of increasing agricultural output and household income. At the same time, party leaders decided to reorganize rural structures and loosen control mechanisms so that teams and households would have sufficient freedom to respond to the profit motive.

Starting from this basic reorientation, the government has drastically changed the work payment system, opened rural free markets, lifted restrictions on goods entering markets, encouraged private production activity, and fostered an open debate in the press regarding the merits of the commune system and proposals to revamp its structure radically.

One of the most significant developments has been the implementation of production-responsibility systems (*shengchan zerenzhi*), which link peasant remuneration directly with either work effort or output. One of these systems, *baogan daohu* (signifying production contracts with full responsibility to households), builds a tenant-type relationship between production teams and farm households to replace the prevailing egalitarian and labor-day work payment systems. Under *baogan daohu*, production teams assign specific plots of land to a household to farm for a designated time period (from a single season to 3 years). For each piece of land, teams specify the quantity of output that must be delivered to procurement stations. Through these deliveries by households, the team fulfills the agricultural-tax and marketing quotas assigned by the government. The land continues to be collectively owned, and households may not rent out, transfer, or sell the assigned parcels of land.[13] The system has two advantages: (1) it permits households to decide when it is most productive and convenient to work on the assigned plots or on the private plots and subsidiary production activities, and (2) households producing more than contracted amounts are permitted to retain the surplus for consumption or to sell it in village markets.

By the end of 1982 more than three-fourths of all teams were using some form of *baogan daohu*, the labor-day system being retained primarily for farmers working in factories or performing tasks difficult to contract out.[14] However, rural cadres have used differing methods to implement the *baogan daohu* system. In some cases, it has been loosely applied, with little control by the team. In other cases, teams set severe restrictions on what households can and cannot do. Some teams even specify that plots assigned to a given household will be plowed and planted by the team, which also sees that irrigation water and chemical fertilizer is applied in a uniform way and organizes insect control on a unified basis.

Official government and party attitudes toward private production activities have also changed dramatically since 1975. Farmers are now openly encouraged to increase their income through such activities. For example, in 1981 the government proposed expanding the size of private plots to 15 percent of a team's total arable land.[15] Some areas actually began to expand private plots, but those implementing the *baogan daohu* system saw no need to thus expand the area of private plots. House-

[12]Chinese Communist Party, Central Committee, "Decisions on Some Problems in Accelerating Agricultural Development, Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, December 22, 1978," trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 31, 1979, pp. L/22–37.

[13]Du Rensheng, "A Good Beginning for Reform of the Rural Economic System," *Beijing Review*, Nov. 30, 1981, pp. 15–20. See also Wang Guichen and Wei Daonan, Agricultural Economic Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "Fixing Output Quotas for Individual Households," *Jingji Guanli*, Jan. 20, 1981, pp. 64–67, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 77,665, Mar. 25, 1981, pp. 21–30.

[14]*Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Feb. 9, 1983, p. 1.

[15]Circular of State Agricultural Commission, CCP Central Committee, and State Council, "Report on the Active Development of a Diversified Economy," trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 9, 1981, pp. K/8–11.



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hold subsidiary production was encouraged by reducing restrictions and opening markets, and families were also afforded easier access to credit to finance production activities and the purchase of supplies. Barriers restricting rural handicraft and skilled workers from plying their trades were also reduced. Many such workers have participated in a housing-construction boom.

THE COMMUNE SYSTEM still existed at the end of 1982, but government and party leaders were telling commune members that the system would be drastically reformed and in some cases even eliminated. It was openly admitted that the previous fusion of party and government entities into one body had overly concentrated power in the hands of a few administrators, which served to retard the growth of output.[16] Already, there have been substantial changes in the way in which support-and-control mechanisms are being used to affect the economic behavior of farm households.

Central planning continues to be an important force in rural areas, with government planners still formulating agricultural production plans and output targets. These are eventually sent through the commune system to production teams, which in turn most often use the *baogan daohu* system to parcel out portions of production targets to individual households.[17] In some teams, the households are told specifically what kind of grain or cash crop is to be sown; in others, households can grow whatever *kind* of grain they want, the important thing being delivery of a specified *quantity* of grain. Moreover, farm households are now encouraged to use their own energy and skills to solve the economic questions of how (with what techniques) products should be produced.

Indeed, with the introduction of the production-responsibility systems, households have become vitally interested in agricultural science and technology as a means of boosting yields and overfulfilling production quotas. By 1982, commune agricultural technicians were being hounded by farmers wanting advice.[18] In some cases, commune extension people actually make contracts with teams and households to provide consulting services, with part of the technicians' pay being based on a percentage of the increased yields. By the end of 1982, over 15,000 science and technology "popularization societies" had been formed to introduce technology to farmers.[19]

Commune tractor stations still exist, but have lost their monopoly position. While some production teams still hire tractors from the stations, others have their own tractors to plow land for use by farm households under *boagan daohu*. Moreover, whereas before 1978, private ownership of tractors was forbidden, households can now purchase draft animals and hand-guided tractors (tillers) for their own use. Almost all new tractors sold in 1981–82 were purchased by peasant households.[20]

By contrast, supplies of electricity presumably remain under more centralized control. Likewise, the administrative systems controlling irrigation and water drainage have changed very little. Moreover, the many new companies being formed in the fields of technical services, seed production, plant protection, and marketing all link the large state-owned industries with farm households and tend to retain some measure of government guidance over the economy and insure that economic activity is brought effectively into the orbit of state planning.[21]

On the financial front, farm households have seen a loosening of restrictions on personal accounts. They can even open up business accounts and get production loans.[22] To monitor the exploding volume of rural financial transactions involving some 175 million farm households is clearly beyond the capability of the government.

In terms of marketing, the government retains the critical prerogative of deciding what and how much should be produced, even if farmers may now decide what techniques and combinations of inputs to use in meeting the planned quotas. Procurement contracts still require farmers to sell a given quantity of a specified commodity, such as grain, cotton, or oilseeds, but since 1975 there have been substantial increases in procurement prices for grain, cotton, oilseeds, and tobacco.[23] Moreover, since the quantity of goods delivered under quotas has not been raised, the farmers have an added incentive to produce above-quota goods.

There have been other dramatic changes in the rural marketing system. Rural free markets have been

[16] Wan Li, "Further Develop the New Phase of Agriculture Which Has Already Been Opened Up," trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Jan. 4, 1983, pp. K/2–20.

[17] *Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 18, 1982, p. 3.

[18] Wang Songpei, "Investigative Report on Mechanization in Agriculture," *Jingji Yanjiu* (Beijing), No. 2, February 1983, pp. 62–67.

[19] *Jingji Ribao* (Beijing), Jan. 8, 1983, p. 1.

[20] *FBIS–CHI*, August 29, 1983, p. T/3; and *Renmin Ribao*, May 9, 1983, p. 5.

[21] *FBIS–CHI*, Apr. 15, 1983, p. K/10; and *Renmin Ribao*, May 12, 1983, p. 5.

[22] *FBIS–CHI.*, Jan. 20, 1983, p. K/20.

[23] US Department of Agriculture, Economics, Statistics, and Cooperative Service, *People's Republic of China: Agricultural Situation, Review of 1979 and Outlook for 1980*, Washington, DC, June 1980, Appendix, Table 14. Between 1966 and 1975 there had been few such increases.



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reopened and now number some 45,000.[24] Farmers may now freely sell commodities produced on private plots plus output retained from the *baogan daohu* system after meeting output targets.[25] Category I goods formerly prohibited from entering rural markets—e.g., grain and oilseeds—can now be traded if households first fill their contract obligations. Moreover, agricultural commodities have been reclassified. Some goods in the tightly controlled Category I (e.g., sugar) have been explicitly shifted to Category II.[26]

Then, too, the production-responsibility system and expanding rural per capita income have modified and expanded demand for production and consumer goods. Farmers on the *baogan daohu* system now seek hand-guided tractors and hand tools instead of large tractors and combine harvesters.[27] Farmers are also seeking a greater variety of consumer goods which are of a higher quality. Poor-quality, lackluster, high-priced goods have begun to gather dust on merchandise counters and in warehouses, and the government and party have undertaken to invest substantially more capital into the productive capacity of light industry to meet the increasingly sophisticated demand.

Implementation of the *baogan daohu* system has probably weakened many of the social services rendered by the commune system. Production teams are beginning to find it difficult to squeeze public welfare funds from households. The latter—with their new-found autonomy—are reluctant to give up grain. The value of funds transferred to teams and brigades to finance operations of schools, health facilities, and welfare systems has declined.[28]

On balance, the changes wrought in Chinese agriculture seem to have had a positive effect on production. Gross value of output in agricultural production rose in 1978–82 at an average annual rate of 6.95 percent compared to 2.95 percent for the period 1957–78. Grain output rose from 305 million metric tons to 353 million. Cotton, oilseed, and sugar output rose at even faster rates. Average per capita income from communes rose substantially, from 63.2 yuan in 1975 to 101.32 in 1981. Although some of the increases can be attributed to generally favorable weather and increased supplies of such inputs as fertilizer and tractors, a significant portion certainly resulted from the reforms.[29]

WHAT DOES all this bode for the future? The positive results of the reforms seem to be encouraging the government to proceed further. At the beginning of 1983, farm households were told that the government and economic functions formerly combined in the commune system would be separated. The *xiang* (township) governments displaced by the communes in 1958 would be restored, with communes performing only economic functions.[30] Like the commune it replaces, the township unit will be subordinate to the county in the administrative hierarchy. The restoration is to take place gradually, with changes undertaken first in 69 selected counties in order to learn best how to accomplish the task.[31] While no national timetable has been published, some provinces such as Jiangsu have reported that the changes will be completed by mid-1984.[32]

The new township governments are to implement party and government decisions, policies, and laws, including decisions made by the elected township congress. They will collect taxes, manage markets, and ensure fulfillment of contracts. They will handle matters of public security, defense, justice, and civil administration, and will develop programs for education, culture, science and technology, and health care. Finally, they will be responsible for water-control construction projects and for formulating and implementing production plans.[33]

Committees of the CCP will be formed at the township level as the key party decision-making body in the countryside. These committees are to ensure implementation of party policies, publicize the party line, expand ideological work, and strengthen the building of the party in rural areas.[34]

The new commune unit will be restricted to economic responsibilities. As noted above, already in 1983, former commune entities such as agricultural extension stations, poultry farms, supply and

[24] *Renmin Ribao*, Mar. 24, 1983.

[25] "State Council Circular on Firmly Stabilizing Market Commodity Prices," trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Jan. 11, 1982, p. K/1.

[26] *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 5, 1981, p. S/1.

[27] Ibid., Apr. 18, 1983, pp. K/10–11.

[28] Lillian Liu, "Mandatory Retirement and Other Reforms Pose New Challenges for China's Government," *Aging and Work* (Washington, DC), No. 2, 1982, pp. 119–33. Also see Wu Xiang, "The Production Contract Responsibility System and Agricultural Plan Management," *Nongye Jingji Wenti* (Beijing), Feb. 23, 1983, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 84,182, Aug. 24, 1983, pp. 33–47.

[29] US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, *China: Review of Agriculture in 1982 and Outlook for 1983*, Washington, DC, June 1983.

[30] Specified in the new constitution, adopted on December 4, 1982. For a text, see *FBIS–CHI*, Dec. 7, 1982, pp. K/1–29.

[31] *Jingji Ribao*, Jan. 8, 1983, p. 1.

[32] *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 23, 1983, p. O/1.

[33] *Banyue Tan* (Beijing), Feb. 25, 1983, pp. 19–20.

[34] "The State and Commune Separation's First Township Government in Guangzhou Prefecture; Yonghe Township Government Established Yesterday in Zengcheng County," *Guangzhou Ribao* (Guangzhou), Mar. 22, 1983, p. 1, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 83,787, June 29, 1983, p. 115.



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marketing cooperatives, and rice mills are being converted into commune profit-or-loss companies known as "agricultural special service companies" (*nongye zhuanye fuwu gongsi*).

The future of the brigades is uncertain. Some of the model reformed communes have disbanded them altogether. Others have reformed brigades by reestablishing village governments, by separating party branches from economic and administrative functions, and by forming branches of commune companies at brigade level.[35]

In the new system, production teams will continue to have important economic responsibilities. According to one account, these will include:

- to ensure unified organization of mechanized planting, irrigation, disease protection, and use of machines;
- to continue to operate team-owned enterprises such as forests and sideline industries (the labor-day work payment system will continue to be used to distribute income generated by such enterprises);
- to be responsible for delivering commodities produced by sideline industries to the state;
- to organize team labor force units in a unified way to build projects such as dams and canals, roads, and school buildings;
- to collect and distribute subsidies for schooling and the cooperative medical system;
- to collect welfare funds and to distribute goods and services to those in need;
- to manage debt and creditor situations involving the state and team members.[36]

Rural households are doubtless enthusiastic about the prospects for increased income offered by the reforms. At the same time, they must fear that the current policies may not last. Great changes in policies have occurred many times in the past, and one could have lost one's life a decade ago for promoting *baogan daohu*. If farmers support the reforms too strongly only to see policy revert to the 1975 status, might not powerful local cadres seek revenge? Finally, although the stated purpose of the reforms is to shake up the commune structure so that teams and households will have the freedom to become efficient producers, many of the commune organizations retain their control function despite name changes.

China's leaders from top to bottom have struggled for years with the problem of how tight a rein to keep on profit-oriented farmers. Too tight a rein chokes off production increases, but with too loose a rein the farmers might damage or destroy the socialist system. China's farmers have seen many weather shifts on the agricultural policy front. They are prudent enough to keep a sharp eye out for the next storm.

In all, introduction of production-responsibility systems in the Chinese countryside is a major undertaking, a risky gamble by the Chinese Communist Party. Leaving aside the considerable opposition to the project among rural cadres—on grounds of ideology and of political and economic self-interest—it is an open question whether the party and state apparatuses can muster sufficient administrative skills to carry it off. Should it fail to bring lasting improvements in efficiency and increases of output, the reform could leave the party in the ideologically disreputable role of landlord, controlling the fortunes of a sullen and discontented peasantry.

[35] *FBIS–CHI*, Feb. 15, 1983, p. R/2.

[36] Ibid., May 13, 1983, p. Q/3.



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# Images of the Turkish Left

by Jacob M. Landau

ABDI IPEKÇI. *Barış, Demokrasi, Özgürlük* (Peace, Democracy, Liberty). Istanbul, Adam Yayincilik, 1982.

ISMAIL CEM. *Türkiye'de geri kalmişliğin tarihi* (The History of Turkey's Backwardness). Istanbul, Cem Yayinevi, 1970.

ISMAIL CEM. *Siyaset yazilari: 1975–1980 Türkiyesi* (Writings on Politics: The Turkey of 1975–1980). Istanbul, Cem Yayinevi, 1980.

DOĞAN AVCIOĞLU. *Devrim üzerine* (On Revolution). Ankara, Bilgin Yayinevi, 1971.

DOĞAN AVCIOĞLU. *Türkiye'nin düzeni: dün—bugün—yarin* (Turkey's Regime: Yesterday—Today— Tomorrow). New edition, 2 vols. Istanbul, Cem Yayinevi, 1973.

THE SIGNIFICANCE of the Turkish Left, small and fragmented as it is, lies not in its numbers but rather in its impact upon public opinion. George Harris has already drawn our attention to the scope of its appeal to Turkish intellectuals.[1] Students and other educated youth have been particularly attracted by the socioeconomic message of various leftist spokesmen.

With little prospect of effecting change from within, partisans of the Left became increasingly active, after the late 1960's, outside the system they criticized. For the more extreme and impatient, violence was a logical sequel, soon bolstered by detailed theoretical justifications. The resulting climate of insecurity and fear led the armed forces to intervene in March 1971 and severely curb leftist activities. These resumed, however, in the mid-1970's, with old and new leftist groups physically attacking each other as well as the extreme rightist "commandos" of the Nationalist Action Party, who responded in kind. The security situation deteriorated, approaching anarchy. By September 1980, when the military intervened again, an average of 25 political murders a day meant that daily life was dangerous not only for those involved but also for innocent bystanders.

The September 12, 1980, military intervention was intended to restore law and order through the arrest of extremists from both Left and Right.[2] In addition, the two houses of the parliament were prorogued, and all political parties were closed down. A Constituent Assembly prepared the draft of a new constitution, approved by popular referendum on November 7, 1982. This constitution was more restrictive than that of 1961, in an effort to prevent a recurrence of political violence after the envisaged return to civilian government.[3] Various provisions attempt to preclude the future political participation of parties and personalities actively involved in public life before the 1980 intervention.

These restrictions have hampered the Left no less than other groups; indeed, during the three years that have elapsed since the last military intervention, Turkish leftists have been fairly circumspect about what they publish. Still, rash though it may be to predict Turkey's future, recent history suggests that the Left will try to make itself heard once again soon, after the restoration of full civilian government scheduled for November 1983. As a result, this may well be a suitable moment to pause and look back at some of the main points of the Turkish Left's philosophy, as expressed in their own words.

Not all of the numerous publications identified with the Turkish Left are equally relevant. We have selected several of the more significant ones, regardless of their age, and attempted to grasp their perceptions of Turkey more clearly. This will enable us to better under-

[1] George S. Harris, "The Left in Turkey," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1980, pp. 26–41.

[2] Jacob M. Landau, "The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey," *Journal of Contemporary History* (London), October 1982, pp. 587–606.

[3] The newest Turkish constitution has been translated into English as *The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982*, and published by the Prime Ministry-Directorate General of Press and Information, Ankara, 1982.



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stand the broad framework within which the Left has operated. Our selections are representative, although they obviously cannot cover the entire range of leftist opinion.

THAT RANGE is quite large, from moderate social democrats to an avowedly Communist or radical Left terrorist underground. Differences among these groups concern issues of tactics and timing as much as of ultimate goals. Consequently, some have argued, the moderate camp has unwittingly prepared the ground for the extremists by bestowing intellectual respectability upon the Left. This essay will survey that familiar ideological progression in the Turkish context, beginning with one leftist spokesman who was so influential that he was gunned down (by unknown assailants) at the height of Turkey's troubles three years ago.

Abdi Ipekçi, chief editor of the Istanbul daily *Milliyet* until his assassination, offers an "authoritative" indication of moderate leftist views in a recently published collection of articles. On the whole sympathetic to the left-of-center leadership of the Republican People's Party, his articles between 1965 and 1979 covered a wide spectrum of life in Turkey. Their importance lies not just in being representative of a certain trend of thought, but also in molding Turkish public opinion—chiefly that of the better-educated segment that reads *Milliyet*. The articles' deceptively simple style should not fool anyone: Turkey is and always has been a land of complexities, as is evident from the disparate topics Ipekçi discusses.

Ipekçi's image is one of a society increasingly involved in public affairs, due perhaps to the rise in literacy and education. Unfortunately, it is also one in which various Turkish governments, opposition groups, and extremists alike all increasingly resort to pressure or even to brute force in attempting to persuade others of the justice and feasibility of their divergent approaches. For the bulk of Turkey's population, however, what probably mattered most was the order of priorities for spending the country's meager resources in the ill-defined area of "social justice." Wise spending might have improved the quality of social and economic life, while diminishing the polarization that Ipekçi considered so dangerous. Instead, everything pointed toward growing polarization in Turkey, in the political, cultural, and socioeconomic arenas. Ipekçi would have liked to see more moderation and a "softening" of these cleavages. Thus, he called for a "multigroup" parliament, to alleviate the deep bitterness inherent in the rivalries of Turkey's two-party system.

BUT A COMMON weakness of the moderate Left—and not just in Turkey—is an overambitious attempt to tackle all evils simultaneously. Ipekçi, a good journalist rather than a practical reformer, likewise attempted to take on the entire gamut of Turkey's many ills. More radical leftist thinkers, while referring generally to a wide spectrum of topics, have tended to concentrate on fewer issues, but with a stronger punch. For example, Turkey's parliamentary affairs appear to have been of little concern to them, compared to their immersion in the country's socioeconomic problems.

A case in point is Ismail Cem (Abdi Ipekçi's brother), an active left-wing journalist and former director of Turkey's official Radio and Television Services. Two of his books are especially significant in this respect. *The History of Turkey's Backwardness* (as its title implies) deals with the country's underdevelopment, chiefly in the socioeconomic area, but in the cultural and administrative domains as well. The bulk of this work analyzes the decline of the Ottoman Empire, with its peculiar system of land tenure and "modes of production"—arguments familiar to students of Marx and of his disciples. Today's Republic of Turkey is presented as the direct heir of those outdated systems, unable to shake off its backwardness thanks to a cumbersome bureaucracy and a middle class that still rules the country so as to perpetuate its "class interests" in a context of appalling economic inequality.

While there may be more than a grain of truth in this picture, it is much too pat; sweeping generalizations—not always supported by facts—abound, and the overall picture is far too pessimistic, ignoring Turkey's achievements in many fields. This is typical, of course, of much of the Left's writing in Turkey. Less typically, there is no systematic, detailed plan for development in this early effort by Cem.

The picture is updated, to some extent, in another of Cem's books, *Writings on Politics*, a collection of articles covering the tumultuous five years preceding the military intervention of 1980. Read together, these essays supply a rich panorama of the ever-present political intrigues of that period. This state of affairs, to be sure, is not peculiar to Turkey. But it appears (at least according to Cem) that the Turkish case was characterized by an especially implacable struggle of all against all, with continual formation and dissolution of political coalitions, switching of allegiances, and vicious backbiting. Verbal assaults were accompanied, more and more, by armed terrorism. Here, characteristically, the brunt



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of Cem's accusations is directed against the extreme Right, while armed leftists are exonerated, at least by implication.

A MUCH MORE systematic analysis of Turkey's predicament, probably one of the most persuasive ever produced by leftist writers in that country, is that of Doğan Avcioğlu. An active journalist with political ambitions, Avcioğlu had in 1969–71 published a weekly called *Devrim*—a term that once meant "reform" but, in the publications of Avcioğlu and others, increasingly signified "revolution." When the weekly was closed down by the authorities, Avcioğlu managed to publish a slim book openly entitled *On Revolution*. Here he argued forcefully that the revolution inherent in Atatürk's "War of National Liberation" had only partially achieved its goal, and that Turkey now needed a socialist revolution to complete the job. Once again, Turkey is viewed as an underdeveloped country burdened by blatant poverty and growing unemployment, and endangered by evil external plotting. The author presents several features of a socialist "solution," of which the two most important appear to be "scientific" central planning and "courageous" nationalization of Turkey's resources.

Avcioğlu developed this analysis much further in a larger, two-volume work, reprinted (with minor revisions) four times in its first year of publication and several more times since. The set, entitled *Turkey's Regime,* elaborates a theme popular with Turkish leftists at the time (and also expressed by Ismail Cem): 20th-century Turkey is accused of perpetuating, in many respects, the socioeconomic conditions of the Ottoman Empire. Here too, Turkey is perceived as a state governed by a coalition of businessmen interested only in preserving the economic and political status quo, and with it their own luxurious, profiteering way of life. The main ally of these circles is said to be the United States, which grants them credits and military support. This "capitalist coalition," according to Avcioğlu, thrives at the expense of Turkey's masses of peasants, artisans, and workers of the lower class, who can barely make ends meet. Thus, in Leninist fashion, Avcioğlu argues for a noncapitalist mode of development for Turkey. He hopes that a united front of all "progressive" forces, led by true revolutionaries, could achieve this goal within 15 to 20 years.

Avcioğlu's message, though obviously more radical than that of Ipekçi or Cem, was nevertheless tempered by caution, possibly induced by the strict censorship of the time. This was not the case with avowedly Communist publications, however. Their authors, unlike Avcioğlu, refused to wait 15 years or more for the revolution they aspired to and considered imminent. Numerous inexpensive Communist pamphlets and magazines described the political and economic plight of Turkey in the darkest colors and advocated immediate change by direct action—violent if necessary.[4]

DESPITE SUCH differences of nuance, the Turkish Left (i.e., those to the left of the Republican People's Party) is as one in assailing the status quo on a *total* basis: while the emphasis is on politics and socioeconomic issues, culture in all its aspects is also not overlooked. Moreover, spokesmen for all factions of the Turkish Left seem profoundly convinced of the utterly evil character of their opponents, who are said to prefer "deals to ideals." Conversely, the various leftists remain absolutely certain of their own righteousness, never admitting any error and always suffused with a strong sense of their mission to save Turkey in spite of itself.

None of these leftist splinters appears today to have a solid institutional base or widespread popular support. Even so, their appeal to certain Turkish intellectuals, and their ability to arouse the country's extremist fringe, suggest that Turkey may be in for renewed bouts of radical leftist activism within a year or two of its return to civilian rule.

[4] For a relatively balanced analysis of some of these, see Metin Toker, *Solda ve sağda vurusanlar* (Struggles of Left and Right), Ankara, n. p., 1971.



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# USSR Regional Issues: Growth vs. Equality

**by Elizabeth Clayton**

I. S. KOROPECKYJ and GERTRUDE SCHROEDER, Eds. *Economics of Soviet Regions.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1981.

JAN AKE DELLENBRANT. *Soviet Regional Policy.* Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1981.

PETER J. GRANDSTAFF. *Interregional Migration in the USSR: Economic Aspects, 1959–1970.* Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1980.

PAUL M. WHITE. *Soviet Urban and Regional Planning: A Bibliography with Abstracts.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1980.

THE SOVIET UNION is a conglomerate of disparate regions that exert a centrifugal force against national unity. In this respect, the Soviet Union does not differ appreciably from, say, Canada with its Quebec or Italy with its Mezzogiorno, but the sheer size of the USSR and the considerable diversity of its peoples give a unique weight to the country's regional problems. Ordinarily, the study of the parts is forgone for surveys of the Soviet Union as a whole, but each of the books reviewed here, by looking into various aspects of regionalism, adds considerably to our understanding of the sum of the Soviet parts.

Soviet central planners share with their counterparts in other planned societies the dilemma of whether to implement nationwide egalitarian policies that reduce regional and economic disparities, or to allow the continued existence of distinctive socioeconomic communities lying at sharply different points along the national economic scale. The dilemma is complicated because the goal of interregional equalization must coexist with the goal of economic growth. The latter goal generates policies that work to modify occupational structures, the family, and even individuals, and thereby weaken tradition, separate children from grandparents and wives from husbands, and break down small-community bonds. To offset the resulting grievances, the effort is made to equalize individual opportunity and mobility. In a word, the Soviet Union—like other countries—has vacillated uneasily between policies of growth and social fracture, on the one hand, and policies of equalization in the name of national harmony, on the other.

Elimination of regional differences is least objectionable to the population when it relates to the economic sphere, for a common and comfortable standard of living and working is a goal seemingly shared by all Soviet citizens. The Soviet Union in the last decades has scored some remarkable achievements in raising the national standard of living; but despite its considerable administrative powers, it has not leveled the economic differences between republics (and recently may even have diminished its efforts in that direction). In the volume coedited with I. S. Koropeckyj, Gertrude Schroeder estimates that between 1965 and 1978, Soviet per capita income increased by 3.2 percent annually, with regional rates ranging from 2.6 percent in Azerbaydzhan to 4.9 percent in Moldavia. In the process, the existing regional hierarchy of consumption per capita remained relatively stable.[1] Moreover, as James Gillula points out in his contribution to the Korpeckyj-Schroeder volume, a similar trend occurred in the structure of fixed capital—i.e., an overall increase that has nonetheless preserved the regional hierarchy of capital per person. For the first indicator, per capita income, the spread between the highest and lowest figures has increased since 1960 (see Table 1 on page 76).[2]

Soviet regional differences are enhanced and complicated by differences in the rate of population

[1]The only significant shifts involved the improvement in the positions of Byelorussia and Moldavia.

[2]Alfred Evans, Jr. reaches the same conclusion in his article "Interrepublic Inequality in Agricultural Development in the USSR," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), Winter 1981, pp. 570–84. Evans based his work on agricultural data, but also made reference to more general published speeches and documents.



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**Table 1: Rankings of Soviet Republics Over Time by Real Consumption and Fixed Capital Per Capita**

**(in each column, USSR = 100)**

| Real consumption per capita | | | | Fixed capital per capita | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1960 | | 1978 | | 1960 | | 1975 | |
| Estonia | 130.2 | Estonia | 130.3 | Estonia | 151 | Estonia | 137 |
| Latvia | 127.3 | Latvia | 117.2 | Latvia | 138 | Latvia | 117 |
| Lithuania | 109.9 | Lithuania | 114.7 | RSFSR | 110 | RSFSR | 115 |
| RSFSR | 106.6 | RSFSR | 109.8 | Azerbaydzhan | 101 | Kazakhstan | 102 |
| | | | | | | Lithuania | 101 |
| Kazakhstan | 95.6 | Byelorussia | 98.5 | Georgia | 97 | | |
| Georgia | 95.4 | Moldavia | 97.2 | Ukraine | 96 | Ukraine | 90 |
| Ukraine | 94.3 | Ukraine | 94.1 | Kazakhstan | 93 | Byelorussia | 80 |
| Armenia | 87.0 | Kazakhstan | 90.3 | Lithuania | 88 | Georgia | 75 |
| Byelorussia | 84.4 | Georgia | 90.1 | Armenia | 81 | Armenia | 73 |
| Turkmenistan | 82.4 | Armenia | 84.0 | Turkmenistan | 80 | Turkmenistan | 73 |
| Uzbekistan | 80.4 | Turkmenistan | 80.6 | Byelorussia | 71 | Moldavia | 69 |
| Kirgiziya | 74.7 | Uzbekistan | 78.0 | Kirgiziya | 57 | Azerbaydzhan | 64 |
| Azerbaydzhan | 74.4 | Kirgiziya | 74.2 | Moldavia | 57 | Kirgiziya | 60 |
| Moldavia | 72.5 | Azerbaydzhan | 66.9 | Tadzhikistan | 56 | Uzbekistan | 54 |
| Tadzhikistan | 70.5 | Tadzhikistan | 64.1 | Uzbekistan | 53 | Tadzhikistan | 51 |

SOURCE: I. S. Koropeckyj and Gertrude Schroeder, *Economics of Soviet Regions*, New York NY, Praeger, 1981, pp. 129, 160.

growth.[3] Briefly put, population has grown rapidly in the Soviet south but stagnated in the north and west. One result is that increasing investments in the south have been needed merely to keep the figure for capital per capita from losing ground vis-à-vis the national level. This policy has had the effect of increasing the south's share of total capital.

In turn, differing labor force participation rates for women affect figures on per capita income, and hence per capita consumption. The dominance of northern regions at the top of the latter hierarchy reflects a greater number of earners in the average family in those regions rather than innate differences in policy regarding wages or other conditions of work.

POLICIES of the 1960's aimed at equalizing regional disparities between north and south in *economic* terms actually made the south more attractive overall, because of other, *noneconomic* advantages. This effect is shown by an unexpected finding of Peter Grandstaff— that Soviet population has tended to migrate, not to, but from the high-income areas.[4] In the 1960's, people moved from the high-income Russian republic (the RSFSR) into the southern republics, which had and continue to have a labor surplus, but also have a better climate and an easier "sunbelt" style of living.

Soviet regional planners were not necessarily pleased by the population migration to the Soviet sunbelt. They preferred that migrants choose the developing regions of the Soviet Far East and Siberia. But, as Grandstaff shows in painstaking detail drawn from the 1959 and 1970 censuses, Soviet workers followed the same incentives as Western workers. They were attracted not only by higher wages, but also by intangibles such as climate and the fact that large numbers of their ethnic colleagues had already settled in the southern regions. Primarily young, the migrating Russians fanned out into more attractive new regions, and were supported by the influx of capital into the Soviet southwest. In effect, they were responding to the opportunities afforded by a national labor market. Those Russians who did migrate to the north and east did not usually remain in place, but instead migrated further east, with East Siberia pulling them from West Siberia and Kazakhstan and in turn losing them to the Soviet Far East.[5]

EXCEPT in the Baltic republics, the Communist Party and Komsomol seem to have benefited from eco-

[3] See, e.g., Murray Feshbach, "Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census, *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–February 1982, pp. 27–37; Basile Kerblay, "Inequality in the Soviet Union," ibid., pp. 56–60; and Jeffrey Hahn, "Soviet Demographic Dilemma," ibid., September–October 1981, pp. 56–61.

[4] Grandstaff, pp. 124–25.

[5] Ibid., p. 55. This particular result sheds some light on the relationship between ethnicity and migration. Population movements have been important for the Russians, but not for other ethnic groups, which have mostly stayed within the confines of their "national" republics and not mingled with the larger nation (ibid., p. 54).



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nomic growth, expanding their membership in proportion to improvements in economic well-being. This finding emerges from the study by Jan Ake Dellenbrant, who combined the regional disparities in economic growth and in social development into a single index of well-being which he found to have a positive correlation with successful party recruitment between 1956 and 1973.

Unfortunately, Dellenbrant's analysis is not sufficiently robust to determine the direction of causality—it cannot distinguish, say, between one republic's citizen who joins the party to become well-off and another's who joins it because he and his neighbors are already well-off. Moreover, recruitment data for the Baltic republics, whose populations are at the high end of the socioeconomic scale, do not fit his general hypothesis and hence leave it suspect, without further refinement of his measure.

THE QUESTION of whether Soviet policy can redress regional disparities and at the same time promote economic and social development receives only incomplete answers from the reviewed books. While these studies on a national scale do not lack data—they are great sources of numbers and quantitative analysis—the scale of these investigations is too large to discern or predict changes *within* regions. After all, many Soviet regions in themselves are the size of small nations and have their own regional differentiation.

All these studies do seem to agree on one point: despite steady national economic growth since 1960, regional economic disparities in the USSR have remained more or less unchanged, or have worsened. Moreover, it is not even certain whether administrative and centralized planning has even meaningfully addressed the disparity question at all. For example, Grandstaff concludes that the Soviet Union has operated an open labor market and has not pursued equalization through administrative means with any resolve or success (p. 126). Dellenbrant concludes that the two goals are probably so incompatible in any case that backward areas tend unavoidably to lag behind during periods of growth (p. 136). Koropeckyj suggests that priorities other than equalization have dominated public policies (p. 112).

The Koropeckyj-Schroeder volume, which includes detailed studies of seven regions—Central Asia, the Baltic republics plus Byelorussia, the Transcaucasus, and the like—gives evidence of continuing Soviet experimentation in the 1970's and 1980's with regional specialization, rather than equalization. For example, Gillula detects such a focus in capital-investment policy. If these tentative findings regarding regional specialization based on factor endowments and natural advantage are confirmed,[6] then the Soviet Union finds itself in a situation where regional equalization of per capita indicators can occur only through much more extensive and more directed migration than at present. This approach, of course, would be expensive not only for the economy, but also for the families who transplant themselves.

PERHAPS the greatest evidence of attempts to achieve regional "equalization" in the USSR is found in the documentation on Soviet urban and regional planning provided in Paul White's useful bibliography. Here we find great uniformity in the norms, scientific standards, and master plans generated by Soviet planners. Though White's list suffers from being limited to works in English, the titles included do cover a wide range of topics—from general philosophical-historical treatises to discussions on specific norms for the planning of new towns or recreational facilities.

White's book suggests, to this reviewer, that even in this narrow dimension of planning norms, egalitarianism is an ideal of only limited or no pragmatic value—difficult to realize, easy to evade, and romantic in expectations. A reading of the other books suggests that the Soviets quietly agree that continued economic growth is more important than equalization.

[6]On the continuing or expanding Soviet emphasis on investment in Siberia, see, e.g., Boris Rumer, "Soviet Investment Policy: Unresolved Problems," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1982, p. 60.



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# Resistance: A Polish Tradition

**by Anna M. Cienciala**

JAN NOWAK. *Courier from Warsaw*. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI, 1982.

STEFAN KORBONSKI. *The Polish Underground State. A Guide to the Underground 1939–1945*. Hippocrene Books, New York, NY, 1981.

JOANNA K. H. HANSON. *The Civilian Population and the Warsaw Rising of 1944*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.

CZESLAW MILOSZ. *The Seizure of Power*. Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, NY, 1982.

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IN THE FOREWORD to Jan Nowak's *Courier from Warsaw*, Zbigniew Brzezinski notes that the book, although it deals with Poland in World War II, is particularly timely because "the roots of Solidarity spring from the unity of the Polish people forged during the uprising and from a history of struggle and resistance to foreign oppression" (p. 14). Indeed, both Nowak's memoirs and Stefan Korbonski's *The Polish Underground State* were published in Poland by the Polish underground press in the late 1970's. They served to instruct the young generation of Poles both in the history that they were not taught in school and in conspiratorial techniques. Now available in English, they provide well-written accounts of Polish resistance to German occupation during World War II. Nowak's book is more autobiographical than Korbonski's historical study, although Korbonski also played an active role in the resistance as director of its civilian component. The book by Joanna Hanson, a young British scholar, is especially valuable for those interested in the Warsaw Rising from a sociological point of view. She details the strong support given to the Home Army fighters by the civilian population, despite the hardships of constant shelling, the lack of food, water, power, and medical supplies. Indeed, without this civilian support the rising would not have lasted as long as it did—63 days. Finally, the political novel, *The Seizure of Power*, by Nobel laureate Czesław Miłosz deals with the Warsaw Rising, the Soviet and Polish Communist "liberation" of Poland, and the personal drama of a young officer in the Soviet-controlled Polish army. The love-hate complex toward communism of the protagonist, Peter Kwinto, and his ultimate escape to a diplomatic post in Paris are a reflection of Miłosz's own drama.[1]

It is indeed true that the greatest and most united resistance effort by the Poles to foreign oppression took place during World War II. Yet we should note that this resistance was the linear descendant of an old tradition. We need only to think of the Polish revolts against Russian and Prussian rule in 1830–31 and against Russia in 1863–64. Between 1890 and 1914, the Poles in Russian Poland developed the so-called "flying universities"—secret seminars held in private homes to study Polish history and literature, which were banned from the schools. Similar seminars were established after 1976 in Communist Poland. In the period 1907–14, Józef Piłsudski trained the future cadres of the Polish army in Austrian Poland; for this purpose, he established the conspiratorial Polish Military Organization (POW). Former members of this organization were among the first to organize resistance to German occupation in 1939. Finally, we should note that as far back as the 16th century, when Poland was a great European power, the French political theorist Jean Bodin observed that Poles belonged to those nations whose attachment to freedom and unrestrained abhorrence of servility and slavery were especially strong.[2] While the Polish "nation" meant only the nobility in the 16th century, this noble tradition has been inherited by the whole Polish people. The old challenge that the nobles flung at their kings—*nic o nas bez nas* (nothing

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[1] Miłosz's intellectual autobiography is given in another work, *Rodzinna Europa* (trans. as Native Realm in English), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1959.

[2] Jean Bodin, *Les six livres de la République* (Six Volumes on the Republic), 1576.



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about us without us)—was taken up by Solidarity in 1980–81.

OF THE BOOKS under review, the most fascinating account of Polish resistance in World War II is Jan Nowak's *Courier from Warsaw,* which will serve as the connecting thread in this review. It is the story not only of an incredibly brave man but also of the struggle against the Germans and of Allied policy toward Poland. As breathtaking as the best of John le Carré's thrillers, it has the added virtue of being verifiably true. It is an excellent example of the adage that truth is stranger than fiction.

Nowak first worked in the underground for the so-called Section "N," whose task was diversionary propaganda against the Germans. This comprised printing newspapers, books, and pamphlets for German soldiers and officials. Official orders also were faked to disrupt the German administration. Some material was distributed at great personal risk, while some was actually delivered as "printed matter" by the German postal service.[3]

Nowak's first expedition to Sweden was undertaken to establish cooperation with the British propaganda effort directed at Germany. Nowak was smuggled aboard a Swedish ship and hidden under a pile of coal. By the time he reached the Polish legation in Stockholm, however, British policy had begun to tilt toward Moscow at the expense of Polish interests, and the Soviet government had severed relations with the Polish government-in-exile in London (in late April 1943). The pretext for this action was the Polish government's request for an investigation by the International Red Cross into the Katyn massacre—the Germans had discovered the bodies of some 4,000 Polish officers at Katyn, near Smolensk. They had been taken prisoner by the Soviets in September 1939, and all contact with them had been lost in the spring of 1940.[4] The reaction of the British press to Katyn and to the break in Polish-Soviet relations was to blame the Germans for the crime and the Polish government for slandering the USSR. To Nowak this was "the greatest blow since the beginning of the war" (p. 131). But, as a Polish official in Stockholm explained to Nowak, the primary aim of the Anglo-Saxon powers was to win the war. This, plus their "guilt" feelings vis-à-vis the Soviets because they had not yet opened a second front in Europe, made backing the Poles against the Soviets seem to be politically suicidal (p. 132). However, as Nowak notes, none of this was reflected in the Polish-language broadcasts of the BBC and of the Polish radio in Britain. Thus, the Polish people continued to live in a world of "make believe," certain that the Allies would not abandon them to the Soviets. With this same tragedy in mind, Miłosz has a priest active in the Warsaw Rising speak bitterly of the Western allies:

*They will cling frantically to life. They will call in the barbarians from the steppes to help. And the barbarians know the price of their blood. They must be repaid in towns, countries, the extermination of the innocent. But the Roman Empire of cowards will fall.* (pp. 67–68)

During Nowak's stay in Sweden, the Warsaw Ghetto Rising took place. The Polish underground had reported the extermination of the Jews and appealed to the Allies for counteraction in late 1942. But Jan Karski, the first emissary to report this, was not believed.[5] The policy of the Polish underground was to help the Jews; this was done despite the fact that Poland was the only country under German occupation where such help was punishable by death (see Korbonski, ch. 18). Then, in late spring 1943, Nowak wrote a report on the genocide of the Jews for General Władysław Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief in London (p. 133).

Nowak returned from Sweden aboard a Swedish ship and made his way by train to Warsaw. There he was told that he would be sent to London. First, however, he had to memorize an enormous amount of information to deliver to Polish and British authorities there. At this time he adopted the alias which is his name today (his real name is Jezioranski). He set out for Gdańsk in mid-October 1943, was again smuggled to Sweden aboard a Swedish ship, and then flew on to Britain in the bomb bay of a Mosquito fighter plane.

NOWAK'S ACCOUNT of his talks in London is as fascinating as his tales of "derring do" in the underground. He stayed in the British capital from late fall 1943 until early July 1944. The policy differences between the Commander-in-Chief, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski (who had succeeded General Sikorski as Commander-in-Chief after the latter's death in a plane crash at Gibraltar on July 4, 1943) and the Prime Minister, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, are sharply

[3]For a brief summary on Section "N," see Korbonski, ch. 11, p. 3.

[4]See ibid., ch. 20, and J. K. Zawodny, *Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre,* Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1962.

[5]See J. Karski, *The Story of a Secret State,* Boston, MA, Houghton-Mifflin, 1944.



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delineated. Sosnkowski was very pessimistic about Poland's fate, foreseeing a division of Europe between the Western allies and the Soviets. He therefore did not want the Home Army to come out of the underground when the Soviets came in, and he opposed territorial concessions to the USSR on the grounds that these would spell the end of Polish independence (pp. 217–20). It should be noted that Sosnkowski's views resembled the attitude of the Polish prewar government toward Hitler's demands in 1939.

Prime Minister Mikołajczyk took a different line. He told Nowak that the British supported Soviet territorial demands, that is, that the Soviet Union receive eastern Poland up to the Curzon Line of 1920. This was confirmed by Foreign Minister Tadeusz Romer, by Polish ambassador to England Edward Raczyński, and by the records of official Anglo-Polish conversations which Nowak was allowed to read—while the V–1 and V–2 rockets were falling on London. In view of the British attitude, Mikołajczyk believed that the Polish government should concede eastern Poland to the USSR, except for the predominantly Polish city of Lwów (Lviv, Lvov) and the adjoining oil fields. He thought that in return for such concessions, the British and Americans would defend Polish independence against the USSR.

But Mikołajczyk was in an impossible position. On the one hand, the British wanted the Polish government to agree to the proposed frontier with the Soviets at once, as the Soviet price for resuming relations with the Polish government in London. The question of Poland's future border with Germany, on the other hand, was to be postponed until the end of the war (pp. 225–26), supposedly in order to avoid prolonging German resistance. Furthermore, Britain only offered to guarantee Polish independence *jointly with the USSR*, while the US government refused such a guarantee on the grounds that this was prohibited by the US Constitution. Finally, Polish opinion both at home and in Britain, as well as in the army then fighting in Italy (1943), was adamantly opposed to cessions of territory. No wonder Mikołajczyk felt he was between a rock and a hard place.

Nowak's conversations with prominent Britons underscored Poland's tragic isolation. Most of those whom Nowak met saw Polish demands for territorial integrity as an effort to split the Allies (e.g., Hugh Dalton's opinion, cited in Nowak, p. 239). Most of the British press appeared pro-Soviet. Winston Churchill's special adviser, Major Desmond Morton, wrote a tendentious report on his conversation with Nowak, and sabotaged the latter's attempts to meet with the Prime Minister (ch. 24), although Nowak did eventually meet Churchill for a few minutes. Nowak was present when, on February 22, 1944, Churchill publicly came out in support of Soviet territorial demands on Poland in the House of Commons. Nowak also realized that the Polish underground effort was peripheral to the Allied invasion plans for western Europe.

NOWAK ARRIVED back in Poland—this time by plane from southern Italy—and reached Warsaw on July 30, 1944, the eve of the Rising, by which time his report on Western attitudes was largely academic. Soviet guns could be heard across the Vistula River; the population was seething, while masses of German soldiers and civilians were streaming through Warsaw in what seemed to be full retreat. The Home Army leadership assumed that the Soviets would take Warsaw, since it was the most important road and rail center on the way to Berlin. The Communist-dominated "Polish Committee of National Liberation" had come into existence and issued a manifesto in Chelm on July 22, 1944—although as we now know, it was agreed upon only that day in Moscow. Polish-language radio stations behind Soviet lines appealed to the population to rise against the Germans. Prime Minister Mikołajczyk was on his way to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin.

However, of all the factors that led to the uprising, the most important one was local. The people of Warsaw had suffered five years of brutal occupation and were itching to fight. One alert had already been given and canceled. There was sporadic shooting in the streets, and the German presence seemed to be fading. Even if the Home Army command had not given the order to begin the uprising on August 1, it is more than likely that there would have been a spontaneous rising.

Certainly, there was also a political aspect to the Rising. Indeed, Polish Communists were already proclaiming that the Home Army command had left Warsaw and, when the Rising began, that it was being led by armed units of the (Communist) Polish Workers' Party. By fighting the Germans, the Home Army wished to document the rights of the vast non-Communist majority of Poles to have a say in a new Polish government. But the decision to rise was taken under the tremendous pressure of the moment, not after a leisurely weighing of the pros and cons.

The tragic saga of the Warsaw Rising is told autobiographically by Nowak—who cooperated with Korbonski in broadcasting reports about it to England. Nowak made



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one more hair-raising trip, through Germany to Switzerland—this time with his wife, whom he had married during the Rising. He was the first eyewitness to the Rising to arrive in England. The tragic story of the Warsaw Rising is summarized by Korbonski (ch. 23) and told from the civilian point of view by Joanna Hanson. It also forms a large part of Miłosz's *Seizure of Power*. As we know, despite the fact that Mikołajczyk had told Stalin there would be a rising in Warsaw, the Soviet armies advanced to the northwest and southwest of the city into East Prussia, toward Silesia, and into the Balkans. Marshal Konstantin Rokossovskiy's army took the eastern suburb of Praga in mid-September; it allowed an isolated Polish unit to cross the Vistula and be shattered by the Germans. German guns and planes devastated the city at will. Stalin allowed one US mission to land behind Soviet lines after it had dropped supplies to the Poles. Other supplies were dropped by planes that had to fly from Italy to Warsaw and back without landing. The Rising ended after 63 days. Warsaw, already partially destroyed, was razed by the Germans. Some 250,000 people were killed. Thus, the Germans were allowed to destroy the Home Army, ridding Stalin and the Polish Communists of uncomfortable rivals for power in Poland.

The tragic end of Polish resistance and the imposition of a Communist-led regime on Poland are recounted by Korbonski (chs. 24-26) and rendered in literary form by Miłosz. In the latter's book, Kwinto, an officer in the Soviet-controlled Polish army, is tormented by a recurring dream. Despite his hatred of communism, he dreams of sitting on Stalin's knees, drawn to the strength that he hates (pp. 203-4). His sweetheart Teresa gives him a Freudian explanation: "They killed your father, so they seem all-powerful to you" (p. 206).

This might also apply, in a highly simplified form, to General Jaruzelski today. The Russians killed his father in 1939, when he was 13 years old, and deported him to the USSR with his mother and sister. There he joined the Polish, Soviet-led army in 1943. However, reactions to brute power are highly individual. Most Poles have never forgiven the Russians for denying them help during the Warsaw Rising, and for imposing the Soviet model of communism on their country.

SOLIDARITY was a national movement to gain more internal freedom, to give the people some influence over their own lives, and to evolve a model of socialism more in keeping with Polish traditions. Such efforts will continue either until the Soviet leaders allow the Polish government to grant these demands, or until the Soviet Union is too weak to oppose them. Miłosz foresaw the Solidarity movement in *The Seizure of Power*, first published in 1953. Speaking of the Polish workers' protests against communism and of their stubborn faith, only half-expressed in their shouts of "unfair," Miłosz has a character say:

*It was they—one day, in the distant future, when they had become the real owners of the smelting works, of mines, and of the factories—who would protect with their hands the uncertain light, and without any illusions that they were discovering the absolute truth.* (p. 242)



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# Eastern Europe: The Challenge From Within

**by A. Ross Johnson**

MORRIS BORNSTEIN, ZVI GITELMAN, and WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN, Eds. *East-West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe.* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

KAREN DAWISHA and PHILIP HANSON, Eds. *Soviet–East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition, and Consent.* New York, NY, Holmes and Meier, 1981.

ROBERT W. CLAWSON and LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, Eds. *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means.* Wilmington, DE, SR Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1982.

CHRISTOPHER D. JONES. *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact.* New York, NY, Praeger Special Studies, 1981.

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ONE CONSEQUENCE of the crisis in Poland has been to refocus the attention of Western scholars and policymakers on Eastern Europe. The volume of writings on the region has increased, and a number of new research projects dealing with Soviet–East European relations are in progress. These research efforts, and all interested observers of developments in Eastern Europe, will benefit from the four books reviewed here. The first three books are compilations of conference papers, the fourth a monograph. All were completed in 1980–81 as the Polish crisis unfolded. All offer valuable information or insights on the patterns of socioeconomic and political change inside the countries of Eastern Europe and in Soviet–East European relations.

Most useful is the volume edited by Morris Bornstein, Zvi Gitelman, and William Zimmerman, which contains papers prepared for a 1979 international conference and revised in fall 1980. The editors, and other political scientists and economists from West and East, profitably address how world economic developments and East-West relations have affected Eastern Europe; what have been the internal political determinants and domestic consequences of East European foreign economic and political relations; and how world economic changes and domestic politics in Eastern Europe have affected the region's relations with the Soviet Union.

*Soviet–East European Dilemmas,* edited by Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson, covers much of the same ground, but also includes two chapters on East European military affairs. The essays in this volume, which were originally presented to a Chatham House study group in 1979–1980, are not as well-researched and well-documented as the contributions to the Bornstein/Gitelman/Zimmerman book. Rather they are intended as "think pieces" and indeed provide much food for thought.

READ TOGETHER, the two volumes illuminate the main issues of the current dilemma of Eastern Europe. As a consequence of Soviet regional military hegemony, on the one hand, and the Ostpolitik of West Germany and the West as a whole since the late 1960's, on the other, Eastern Europe's position—militarily, territorially, and politically—within the Soviet sphere of domination is nowhere fundamentally and actively contested in the West. Yet in the early 1980's, Eastern Europe's status as a stable and viable element of the Soviet imperial system has come under increasing challenge, not from without but from within. The East European governments are simply, as George Schöpflin puts it in the Dawisha/Hanson book, running out of steam. Over the years, the Communist leaderships of the region became less dependent on day-to-day repression and came to rely more on "consumerism" to maintain their rule and enhance their legitimacy. In the process, and despite the looming Soviet military presence, the party leaderships in Eastern Europe became hostage to economic progress, especially an increase in the stand-



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ard of living. They became dependent on what Alex Pravda terms an economic, welfare-based "social compact."[1]

The demonstrated capabilities of centrally planned "socialist" economies to carry through forced industrialization and extensive growth are becoming irrelevant precisely because of their initial economic success. As contributors to both books argue, further economic progress requires a transition from the extensive to the intensive phase of economic development, which involves economic specialization (whereby each country concentrates on producing what its resource, labor, and capital base best suit it for), greater labor productivity, faster technological adaptation, more decentralized and flexible economic management, and curtailment of political controls over the economy. Western and East European contributors to the Bornstein/Gitelman/Zimmerman book argue persuasively that greater involvement in the world economy is a precondition for the East European countries to make the transition. That process does not preclude—indeed, Bornstein, Zimmerman, and Hanson all argue, it probably entails—closer economic cooperation among the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) member-states in the energy and other sectors. They and other contributors argue that this increased interstate cooperation portends something quite different from the nearly-dead idea of supranational "integration" within CMEA (involving greater Soviet control of the East European economies) that Nikita Khrushchev once promoted. What intensive growth and minimal satisfaction of consumer expectations do exclude is economic autarky.

A vital precondition for continued economic development in Eastern Europe is structural reform of the centralized national economic systems. As Philip Windsor argues in *Soviet–East European Dilemmas*, the functioning of a complex modern economy assumes a rapid flow of effective information, devolution of decision-making to a level where decisions can benefit from that information, and flexible mediation among competing groups in both resource allocation and consumer goods production. Yet such attributes of modern economic management are incompatible with the Soviet-Leninist interpretation of the "leading role of the party." Significant adaptation of the economic management system (as opposed to tinkering with the present system, which many Western observers are too quick to call "reform") thus, inevitably, entails reform of the political system. But political reform is rejected by the East European leaderships, because it would undermine their own institutional and personal power and because (should they try to emulate former Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubček) Moscow would forbid it.

SEVERAL AUTHORS in the two books trace the blossoming of Eastern Europe's economic ties with the West after the mid-1960's. The Western political calculation (as compared to calculations based on economic interests), to the extent it mattered, was that, within the limits imposed by Soviet power, commerce could foster a more Westward orientation and internal "liberalization" in Eastern Europe. The political calculation of the East European leaderships was, by and large, quite different. The Polish, East German, and Romanian leaderships, especially, sought to develop an economic connection with the West as a way of sustaining economic growth and satisfying consumer expectations, thereby securing a modicum of legitimacy in the absence of—indeed, in order to avoid—fundamental economic and political reform. The calculations of the individual East European leaderships, of course, varied. Nicolae Ceauşescu sought to use the Western economic connection to expand Romania's special independent position within the Soviet bloc. János Kádár sought with considerable success to advance intensive growth in Hungary after introducing the New Economic Mechanism in the late 1960's. The Czechoslovak and Bulgarian leaderships placed less emphasis on Western economic ties. But throughout the region, as Alex Pravda points out in the Bornstein/Gitelman/Zimmerman book, the blossoming of East-West economic ties coincided with the emasculation of structural reform of the economy and East European leaders' failure to adapt domestic political systems.

East-West economic ties in the period of "high détente" of the early 1970's did bring with them, as Western political calculation had intended, a greater influx of Western ideas and influences. East European leaders, particularly Edward Gierek in Poland, were willing (within differing limits, and with Soviet support or acquiescence) to tolerate this import of "subversive" Western influences as the price of commerce with the West, calculating that the ensuing economic gains and resultant increase in consumer satisfaction would neutralize or minimize the negative features of Western cultural and other influences. It seemed a low-risk strategy, and it

[1] "East–West Independence and the Social Compact in Eastern Europe," in the Bornstein/Gitelman/Zimmerman volume, pp. 162–87.



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worked—at first. By the late 1970's, however, the Western economic connection became the channel by which Eastern Europe "imported" high energy prices, fixed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and world economic recession that it might have largely been protected against in earlier, more autarkic times. The result was economic slowdown, which in turn brought about an absolute decline in living standards in several countries.

Economic downturns had occurred earlier in Eastern Europe, of course, but the adverse sociopolitical consequences were limited and the economy subsequently revived. The downturn of the late 1970's, however, came at a time when Eastern Europe as a whole was attempting to shift from extensive to intensive economic development; thus, some of the time-tested instruments for reviving economic performance in centrally planned economies (such as boosting investment) had become less relevant. More important was the altered sociopolitical situation. The downturn of the late 1970's coincided with the emergence of the first "mature socialist" industrial work force. This group, symbolized by the Gdańsk worker-activists but with counterparts elsewhere, was (in the words of a Polish journalist) "aware of their place in society and determined to draw all the necessary conclusions from the fact that, according to the ideological premises of the system, their class has been accorded the leading role in society."[2] In 1980, Polish workers mounted the first massive active opposition to the Communist system since the consolidation of Communist power in the late 1940's. Ironically, what the Western economic connection had been intended by local regimes to help avoid—namely, economic dissatisfaction of such proportions that it unleashed latent political opposition—in fact occurred in part because of that connection.

WHAT OF the future? The countries of Eastern Europe—Poland and Romania above all—have reached a stage where socioeconomic and political change is as "necessary" as it is "impossible." But East European "reformers" and Western "liberalizers" both maintain that the circle can be squared. This viewpoint is well stated by Polish scholar Stanislaw Gebethner in *East-West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe:* a modern "socialist" economy requires a more flexible and decentralized system of economic management, and this will entail some changes in the form of the "leading role" of the Communist party—which, however, will continue to monopolize political life and retain the confidence of the Soviet Union (pp. 277–80).

That scenario may still play itself out in one country or another. Hungary, as several contributors to the two books discuss, has started down that road. But the evolution of Hungary's economy and political system is partial and fragile. Nonetheless, in many respects, the reformist scenario seems to be the "best" course of future developments in Eastern Europe, and even halting steps down that road should not be overlooked.

But we must also accept the possibility—more likely, in my view, and too little discussed in both books—that the derivative East European Communist systems are fundamentally unreformable. The conditions under which reform was introduced in Hungary in the late 1960's—in the aftermath of the bloody trauma of 1956, by a unified and self-confident party leadership, in favorable domestic and world economic circumstances—are unlikely to obtain elsewhere. Wlodzimierz Brus, in *Soviet–East European Dilemmas,* draws on his own considerable experience as an advocate of economic reform in Poland to argue that opposition to economic reform in Eastern Europe arises first of all from within, that is, from among the domestic Communist elites, not from Moscow. The chapters by Gitelman and Zimmerman in their edited volume and by Schöpflin and Windsor in the Dawisha/Hanson book help us understand the domestic political obstacles to such reform.

The most serious fault line of the system is, as Gitelman notes, the absence of intermediate institutions that could represent and channel worker interests. Bodies representing those interests (workers' councils, unions) have periodically emerged, but they have always been emasculated or destroyed by the ruling parties. Schöpflin concurs with this diagnosis, but he points more generally to a lack of intermediate institutions able to represent particular social interests and mitigate social tensions as the chief failing, and potential flash point, of the East European Communist systems. Barring the evolution of such institutions and an ensuing dilution of the "leading role of the party"—one version of which was the Polish "historic compromise" portended by the Gdańsk Agreement of August 31, 1980—stagnation, instability, and violence are likely to characterize Eastern Europe, and thus influence Soviet–East European ties and Eastern Europe's relations with the West, over the next decade.

[2] Ryszard Kapuscinski, "Notes from the Seacoast," *Kultura* (Warsaw), Sept. 14, 1980.



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Whether or not this gloomy future occurs, the two books should serve to remind readers that an economic connection with the West is no panacea for Eastern Europe's fundamental political and economic ills and in many circumstances will compound rather than alleviate them.

THE INTERACTION of the social, economic, and political factors discussed above will crucially affect Eastern Europe's future contribution to Soviet military power. Various aspects of this issue are discussed by Malcolm Mackintosh and John Erickson (in the Dawisha/Hanson book), by some of the contributors to *The Warsaw Pact* edited by Robert Clawson and Lawrence Kaplan, and by Christopher Jones in his study of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

Since the early 1960's, the USSR has sought to develop East European military forces capable of supplementing those Soviet military units that would be employed in a conflict with NATO. East European armed forces (with the exception of those of Romania) have been modernized and trained to carry out secondary but important missions under Soviet command within the Soviet-defined operational doctrine of Warsaw Pact "coalition warfare"—a strategy designed to give East European military elites a sense of participation in bloc military affairs, while reserving for the Soviets all key commands and decision-making prerogatives. The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) has served as the multinational organization through which the USSR has pursued these aims. The organization has also served the Soviet Union as a major instrument for ensuring political/military control of Eastern Europe in the post-Stalinist period.

The books under review help us understand how these processes work. Boleslaw Boczek and Thomas O. Cason (in the Clawson/Kaplan book) review the capabilities of the East European military forces, individually and collectively. Mackintosh reaffirms his earlier analysis—to which all scholars in the field are indebted—that military-operational control of the Warsaw Pact remains firmly anchored in the Soviet General Staff.[3] Erickson, in *Soviet–East European Dilemmas,* explains potential uses of selected East European forces according to Soviet operational doctrine. However, in exploring Soviet alternatives to mobilizing all Warsaw Pact units—thereby reaping the advantages of surprise—he overstates the possibilities for multinational integration at lower-level echelons of even elite national military units. And in his chapter in the Clawson/Kaplan book, Erickson grapples with the thorny issue of the East European defense burden. He traces the process of military modernization within the WTO, noting that while modernization enhances potential military capabilities, it may also increase strains within the organization:

*Modernization, meant to ease the transition of the Pact into the 1980's, may only contribute to exacerbating attitudes of antagonism and deeply felt subservience on the part of the frustrated professionals within all the military-economic establishments in East Europe.* (p. 226)

Jones's study of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe would have benefited from more attention to the strains between the Soviet and East European military establishments. Like Andrzej Korbonski and Jörg Hoensch in *The Warsaw Pact,* Jones is concerned primarily with the utility of the WTO as an instument of control within the Soviet bloc. He usefully reviews the sometimes neglected military dimension of East European aspirations for greater independence from Moscow. The countries that have avoided or escaped (in varying degrees) from Soviet domination—Finland, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania—all developed nationally-based defense systems that could credibly threaten to make Soviet military subjugation difficult, costly, and complicated internationally. Similarly, efforts in Poland in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1966–1968 to achieve greater national autonomy included a "national" military dimension.

Jones also marshals much useful evidence on the Soviet approach to standardizing doctrine, command, training, military education, and political activity within the Warsaw Pact. But on this score the book must be read with caution. At times, Jones equates Soviet words (which may or may not reveal Soviet policies, as distinct from preferences) with Warsaw Pact deeds. Thus, he understates Soviet–East European tensions and minimizes areas of actual or potential friction between the USSR and even the most loyal WTO members.

Jones interprets the Soviet imperative to dominate East European military institutions as an effort to prevent East European countries from adopting their own strategies of territorial defense. From the Soviet point of view, such a development must be avoided. But there are far less dramatic and more likely developments signifying greater national control over national armed forces (such as issues of operational military coordina-

[3]See Mackintosh's *The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact,* Adelphi Papers No. 58, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1969.



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tion) that require more immediate attention by Soviet military and political leaders. And while Moscow must be concerned with thwarting any developments that could enhance East European capabilities to fight the Soviet army, the USSR also must effectively develop and control East European forces so that those forces can serve Soviet purposes in a conflict with NATO. In reminding the reader of the intrabloc military control functions of the Warsaw Pact, Jones at times seems to question whether the Soviets impute any offensive mission to East European forces at all. That offensive mission demonstrably exists. If it did not, Moscow could most easily deal with potential military opposition in Eastern Europe by weakening the East European armies—which it has not.

THESE BOOKS help us understand the factors that affect Soviet calculations about military capabilities in Eastern Europe. The Soviet objective seems clear: to organize military forces in Eastern Europe in such a manner that—the widespread opposition in Eastern Europe to Soviet hegemony notwithstanding—those forces could be used reliably to enhance Soviet military capabilities vis-à-vis NATO, while avoiding tendencies toward "military deviation" that could foster political independence. The task of Western analysis is to understand better how the USSR has pursued this objective, and to estimate how successful it has been, avoiding the temptation either to overstate or dismiss the role of East European forces in Warsaw Pact "coalition warfare" strategy.

The four books under review remain relevant to the student of East European affairs today. They help illuminate not only the prospects for economic and political development in Eastern Europe but also the contribution of East European military forces to Soviet military power.



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# Notes & Views

# Correspondence

*NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors.* Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 400 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

## SOVIET OPTIONS

TO THE EDITORS: I have just finished reading General William Odom's most impressive survey, "Choice and Change in Soviet Politics" (*Problems of Communism*, May–June 1983). This is a sophisticated, all-embracing, almost encyclopedic treatment of conditions that Soviet General Secretary Yuriy Andropov faces at this time.

As is true for any such broad overview, however, there are points on which the reader may disagree with the author's treatment. For example, in assessing Leonid Brezhnev's legacy, Gen. Odom falls into what has become a fashionable trap, particularly in the present conservative political environment in Washington. He correctly points to Western legalization of the post–World War II frontiers in Europe as something that Nikita Khrushchev tried and failed to achieve, but he errs when he implies that "formal" Western recognition of these frontiers was accomplished by Brezhnev only at Helsinki. This Soviet goal was actually achieved in the quadripartite Berlin negotiations, which— somewhat ironically—had been imposed by the Western powers as a prerequisite to any meeting at Helsinki. If anything, Helsinki placed constraints on Soviet legitimacy because of the Helsinki Final Act's commitment to democratic reforms, open borders, and what President Jimmy Carter later came to call human-rights objectives.

Many Western assessments underrate the importance that the Soviets—with their inferiority complex—attached to such legitimization of their occupation of East Germany. Western resistance to this prime Soviet policy objective in Europe was lost, in my judgment, by none other than John Foster Dulles. It was Dulles who reacted to Khrushchev's 1958 ultimatum by offering to "assume" that East German VOPO's were acting on behalf of Soviet authority when they exercised control over access to and from Berlin. Subsequently, discouraged by continued US and British wavering on this subject, West German authorities themselves came to the conclusion that it was better to "cut a deal" with their East German cousins than hope to undermine Soviet hegemony. It seemed to those of us who served in Berlin at that time that the full psychological impact of first Dulles's and then the Kennedy Administration's failure to appreciate the historic significance of Berlin as a bone in the Soviet throat was not properly understood. Thus, by the time that—prior to agreeing to sit down and participate in the Helsinki Conference—US Ambassador Ken Rush in Germany concluded an agreement with his Soviet counterpart to accept the division of Germany, he was no more than recognizing that one cannot be more Catholic than the pope.

This is a rather lengthy disquisition on a passing aspect of General Odom's excellent piece, but in the evolution of the Soviet Union's perceptions regarding Western determination, the recognition of the division of Germany must go down in history as an important watershed.

The second element in Gen. Odom's presentation that troubles me is his assertion that Brezhnev succeeded in reasserting Soviet influence—gaining important positions in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Angola—and the implication that these gains offset in importance the loss of Egypt and the further estrangement of China. He states: "Other than Egypt, the only major negative development from the Soviet viewpoint was the normalization of relations between the United States and China" (p. 6). The author's assertion troubles me in light of the view currently held by the extreme right in the United States that "the Soviet Union is on a roll," evidenced by its gains in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Angola. The Soviet leadership under Brezhnev and Khrushchev picked up a few clients here and there, but on the whole witnessed the inexorable march of history against them—a trend that continues to this day. There have been, and will continue to be, ups and downs in this process. Ghana was once a favorite Soviet protégé, one in which Moscow invested hundreds of millions in assets, only to be expelled after a coup a few years later. But we should recognize that the break with China dwarfs all other real estate acquisitions and losses and that the simultaneous or subsequent loss of investment and influence in Indonesia and Egypt far outweighs temporary gains or losses, whether in South Yemen or even Nicaragua.

Perhaps because of General Odom's very special expertise (including service as the US Army's attaché in Moscow), his comments on the military aspects of Andropov's policy options are the most compelling. All too seldom does anyone point out the fundamental advantages that Soviet military planners have over their Western counterparts by dint of the enormous control they exercise over the quality, design, and pricing of military production, as well as their ability to siphon off critical resources. At the same time, Gen. Odom's discussion of the potential incremental value to the Soviet leadership of switching some resources from the military sector to the civilian sector to deal with economic crises struck me as too telescoped. It is not so much the potential of converting portions of the productive capability of Soviet military industrial factories to civilian production that one might look to as a source of relief to the Soviet economy (pp.



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17–18). Rather, it is the tremendous reservoir of technically trained personnel currently tied up in the Soviet military industrial sector.

I do not give as much credence as General Odom seems to give to the hypothesis that younger Soviet policy analysts of Western affairs are much abler than their predecessors in exploiting Western political groups. No doubt greater numbers have had more exposure to the West and hence may be smoother in some respects than previous generations of Soviet officials. But then, who has had more exposure than Andrey Gromyko and the KGB, and one must not forget the first Soviet foreign minister, Georgiy Chicherin.

Gen. Odom seems insufficiently skeptical about the fundamental strengths of the Soviet social fabric. The USSR is a "third-world" economy with a "first-world" defense. In my judgment, there is little danger of the Soviet Union becoming a dedicated Sparta destined to "do in" a soft and fat Athens. An Athens the West may be, but a Sparta the Soviet Union is not. Seldom in the history of the world has a population been more bored, cynical, and turned off by its regime's ideology than the Soviet people. We need to recognize this in order to deal intelligently with what we are up against and not overestimate the capabilities, say, of Americanists within the Soviet regime.

As for religion, whether or not Moscow was involved in the attempt on the Pope's life—and there have been many people trying, without success so far, to prove that it was—I cannot believe that the Soviet leadership's understandable concern with John Paul II is stimulated to any significant degree by concern over Catholicism or religion in general in the Soviet Union, as Odom suggests (p. 14). The Pope is a historically unequaled political symbol in Central Europe, and Soviet reaction to him is, I believe, clearly motivated primarily by the political challenge of holding on to Poland.

General Odom's discussion of the considerable benefits accruing to the USSR from the Khrushchev/Brezhnev policy of peaceful coexistence ignores the losses and ferment that accompanied it—typified in the very problems we are witnessing in Poland today. A Western policy of engagement with the Soviet Union creates problems as well as benefits for the Kremlin. Acquiescence during the Ford Administration in a peaceful coexistence policy was a hard-nosed decision to fish in troubled Soviet waters and reflected confidence that face-to-face communication between our two societies inevitably has to benefit us and challenge them. I would cite the losses of China, Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia, the uprisings in Eastern Europe, and even the problems and pressures on the Soviet regime to devote more resources to the Soviet consumer.

I do, to be sure, agree with Odom in his assessment that the overriding Soviet policy objective is to split Europe from the United States. Undiscriminating pursuit by Washington of unilateral export controls and US efforts to punish our allies for disagreeing with us about what constitutes beneficial East-West trade could further this Soviet objective.

The author is also correct in assuming that the Soviets will fish with enthusiasm in the Iran-Iraq waters and in any other area or target of opportunity that may present itself. The prospects are indeed good that the current regime will continue for some time to rely on "sound and fury" in dealing with its domestic crises while competing aggressively with the West in the Third World. My only plea after reading Gen. Odom's thought-provoking tour d'horizon is that we engage in this competition with a strong sense of confidence in our fundamental superiority, rather than out of the alarmed misperception that the Soviet antagonist is somehow 10-feet tall.

KEMPTON B. JENKINS
Washington, DC

(Mr. Jenkins is a retired career diplomat with some 18 years' experience in Soviet affairs, including a tour as political officer in the US Embassy in Moscow. His latest government post was as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for East-West Trade. He is currently a Vice President of ARMCO Corporation.—Eds.)

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GEN. ODOM REPLIES: I am pleasantly surprised to find that Mr. Jenkins agrees with as much of my analysis of Soviet politics as he does. And one of his points of criticism is well taken. Indeed, the Quadripartite Agreement is more important than Helsinki as a legal basis for Soviet gains in Western acknowledgment of the postwar boundaries. Helsinki, nonetheless, is associated with the notion of greater acceptance of those unsettled borders. And I would also agree that the erosion of the US resistance to the Soviet political offensive in Europe began even earlier, in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

I do, however, have difficulty reconciling this line of Jenkins's criticism with his objection to the idea that the "Soviets are on a roll." The cliché is not mine, but it certainly does not abuse reality all that much. Who would make an argument that the overall East-West military balance is not worse (from the Western standpoint) today than in the 1950's and 1960's? That the US-Soviet balance of influence in the Persian Gulf is more favorable to the US today than it was a decade or two ago? That the balance has improved in the Caribbean region? Sino-Soviet enmity, to be sure, reduces US military requirements in East Asia, but what does it mean for our vital oil interests in the Persian Gulf? For the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe? For Soviet-Cuban adventures in Central America? These questions are analytically more important than comparing the value of Egypt and China in the East-West balance out of regional and global strategic contexts.

Two other points where Mr. Jenkins and I differ are, it seems to me, particularly important to highlight for public understanding and debate. First, I do not share his concern that we may overrate Soviet power and lose our self-confidence. I am struck by quite the contrary danger: that we greatly underrate the USSR, indulge in dangerous over-confidence, and tread close to the border of irresponsibility in failing to maintain adequate power to meet our foreign security obligations. The dangers of war are much greater from the later set of errors than from the former. I agree with Mr. Jenkins, however, that in debating this point we should avoid clichés and adhere to tough-minded analysis and solid evidence.

Second, it may be useful to analyze why the Soviets seem to hold influence with some states only briefly and then lose it (Ghana, Indonesia), while their influence in other countries seems virtually irreversible without outside military intervention (the states of Eastern Europe, Cuba, and probably Ethiopia and Afghanistan). I believe that the extent to which the Soviets are able to build a Soviet-type state/economic/party/police structure to replace the old regime in a client state is the best measure of the probable endurance of Soviet influence in that state. From this viewpoint, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are different from Ethiopia, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua (to all appearances of recent internal institutional change there). The latter set of states,



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by letting Soviet cadres design their domestic organization, simply cannot exercise the same autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow that the first set can. Egypt never allowed such an organizational transformation. Cuba did, and Ethiopia seems headed in that direction. In states where a Leninist institutional development occurs but where there is no extensive Soviet presence and involvement (Yugoslavia, China, Albania, and perhaps Vietnam), the governments may follow anti-Soviet policies in foreign affairs, but they remain oppressive dictatorships with political values quite incompatible with our own—not regimes that the US should take pride in supporting except to balance Soviet assertiveness, as the greater danger.

Mr. Jenkins's comments seem to me to raise these very important issues, and I encourage more informed discussion of them.

WILLIAM E. ODOM
Washington, DC

## THE ANDROPOV LINE?

TO THE EDITORS: The coverage of the Andropov accession in the January–February issue of *Problems of Communism* spurs me to some remarks. I was particularly struck by the exchange of correspondence between Albert Weeks and Jerry Hough concerning what can be learned from Yuriy Andropov's speeches.

From my studies of Soviet affairs, I remember that top party leaders hardly ever diverge from the official political line of the party, which is formulated by the plenums of the Central Committee and/or by party congresses. This "general line" is the basis for the activities of the major party and government apparatuses, gives direction to the mobilization of resources, imparts stability to the whole system, and last but not least, shapes public opinion. The general secretary is not able to formulate the political line on his own. Indeed, attempts to establish a personal dictatorship over the collective leadership, as Nikita Khrushchev tried, will be criticized as a violation of Leninist norms and punished by exclusion from the party leadership.

Rather, to get to the top of the party, an ambitious leader must make compromises and seek the support of the administrators of the principal apparatuses. He must make their interests his own. This effort is signaled and expressed, in more or less disguised form, through the candidate's speeches.

For instance, to enlist the support of party leaders concerned with the state of the civilian economy, Andropov said in his April 22, 1982, speech that shortages in consumer goods and agriculture would be overcome (*Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1982). In his speech to the November 12, 1982, CC plenum, he made a clear gesture toward the military when he pointed out: "We know very well that peace cannot be entreated of the imperialists. It can be maintained only by the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces" (*Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1982).

Indeed, in his move to the party general secretaryship Andropov received his strongest support from the military. The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov, gave critical momentum to Andropov's candidacy in the inner circle of the Politburo and did so on behalf of the Soviet marshals.

This circumstance was no chance occurrence. Rather, it was the logical result of the constellation of forces that had formed in the Soviet leadership in the preceding years. Brezhnev had promoted the military because of his policy of strength, especially as it pertained to rivalry with the United States. As a consequence, the military achieved a position of strength in the system and were privileged when it came to budget allocations. Moreover, under Brezhnev the Soviet military for the first time found itself integrated into the party decision-making process with full Politiburo membership. Andropov represented to the military some guarantee of continuity in a foreign policy of seeking international influence based, on the one hand, on military strength, and on the other, on disarming NATO's nuclear capability by pushing forward a campaign for nuclear disarmament in Europe. (Brezhnev had fired the opening shot in the latter campaign in his June 29 speech to the 1976 Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, in which he spoke of the need to defuse the nuclear powder keg that Europe had become.) Note that this happened a least half a year before the installation of the first Soviet SS–20 missiles in the European part of the USSR.

Obviously, former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko implied Andropov's involvement in this policy when he pointed out that the new general secretary had been engaged in foreign affairs as head of the KGB and had participated in planning primarily the KGB's foreign operations in conjunction with the International Department of the party Central Committee (see *Der Spiegel* [Hamburg], Feb. 14, 1983, p. 128).

Comparing the speeches of Konstantin Chernenko and Andropov at the November 13, 1982, Central Committee Plenum (where Andropov became general secretary), one can find that Chernenko had a different conception (see *New Times*, No. 47, November 1982, pp. 1–2, and *Pravda*, Nov. 14, 1982). He spoke for removal of "guaranteed security," i.e., what appeared to be a more defensive attitude. (Since he remains second man in the Politburo, his influence in this direction may continue.)

As for the military, an effective defense requires an effective and disciplined economy. In this domestic context, too, Andropov must have seemed the best man to the military. He seemed most capable of restoring discipline and centralism against growing domestic disorder observed in the late Brezhnev era. By contrast, Chernenko and his supporters seemed to favor a decentralization and more "democracy" (autonomous decision-making) in the plants (see Marc Zlotnik's item, "Chernenko's Platform," in the November–December 1982 *Problems of Communism*). The marshals had watched with suspicion the decreasing ability of the party to cope with such problems. Therefore, it is correct, as Mr. Weeks suggests, that Andropov begins to look like another General Wojciech Jaruzelski.

Meanwhile, we see that a new form of indoctrination will be one of the main tasks of the Andropov Politburo, albeit in a far subtler form than in past such efforts. He will also increase attempts to develop effective "counter propaganda" (a term Andropov expressly used; see Andropov's speech to the June 15, 1983, CC plenum, reported in the following day's issue of *Pravda*) against Western influence. In this context, it may well be that Western radio transmissions will be subjected to increased jamming in the future. There are already some indications of this in Politburo member Chernenko's speech to the same plenum a day earlier. It is unfortunate in this regard that at the Madrid follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe the West has dropped its opposition to jamming. In addition, in 1982, there were reductions in telephone connections between the USSR and the West and other measures to screen the Soviet people off from Western influence.

In foreign policy, the USSR will increase its "active meas-



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ures." Starting from the professed perception that the US is a threat to world peace and that the USSR is the real peacekeeper, Moscow seems determined to block Western arms modernization while preserving its own arms intact. In the long run, this policy is designed to give the world Communist movement new access to influence in the West. Andropov calls this process the battle for the minds and hearts of billions of people around the globe, and signals that it will become the main issue—relegating the "social question" to second place (see his speech to the June 1983 plenum).

The result is a worrisome new Soviet propaganda offensive designed to raise public anxieties in the West about the threat of a nuclear war in order to mobilize opinion against the defense policy of Western governments. So far it has been unsuccessful, but it is a serious challenge.

LOTHAR JUNG
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## THE "CHECKLIST"

TO THE EDITORS: Your note introducing the "Checklist of Communist Parties, 1982" (*Problems of Communism*, March–April 1983, pp. 94–102) invites "corrections, additions, or amendments," and I therefore submit the following suggestions.

I agree entirely with Professor Robert Wesson's initial statement that it is not easy to arrive at satisfactory criteria for the inclusion of the various manifestations of the diverse Communist movement in such a list. Some of the problems relating to the selection or exclusion process are discussed in the first chapter of my three-volume compendium *Marxist Governments: A World Survey* (London, Macmillan, and New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1981). Notwithstanding these difficulties, it would seem to me that the Communist movement which has evolved from a monolith to a polymorph can only be seen and satisfactorily analyzed in global terms on the basis of the principle of self-ascription of its various components. As I suggest in my *Establishment of Marxist Regimes* (London, Butterworths, 1982), using self-ascription as a multipurpose indicator in any comparative exercise is clearly more fruitful than basing such an exercise on models and categories that are shaped on the basis of an earlier situation and which, for that very reason, may not be capable of making sense of the new phenomena. By providing the framework in which a Marxist party *wishes* to be viewed, self-ascription offers the analyst a hypothesis regarding the reality of the party's orientation. In addition, common rhetoric is an important factor in politics—affecting, in particular, the legitimacy of a leadership that espouses that rhetoric.

Professor Wesson appears to have accepted part of this argument in his criteria for compiling the "Checklist" when he states: "Communist parties around the world continue to communicate in a common vocabulary and to employ roughly the same organizational structure" (p. 94). He presumably refers to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism which, in the case of a particular party being in power, extends the vanguard role of the vanguard party to other social structures.

It is therefore surprising that the "Checklist" does not include the following ruling vanguard-Communist parties: the MPLA-Party of Labor (Angola) and FRELIMO (Mozambique)— both of which have taken part as observers in recent meetings of the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; the Congolese Party of Labor; the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin; the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde; the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau; the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Principe; the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (Madagascar); the Zimbabwe African People's Union; and the New Jewel Movement (Grenada).

These omissions appear to me particularly unwarranted (in addition to ignoring the principle of self-ascription) since Professor Wesson has included in the Checklist the ruling parties of both South Yemen and Afghanistan, which are both "Leninist-style parties that maintain particularly close relations with Moscow" (p. 95). One could say the same of the parties listed above, although the closeness to Moscow might be evidenced more indirectly, for example, through East Berlin, Bucharest, Havana, or Sofia. The point here is that in recent years these ruling vanguard-Communist parties have been much in evidence in some, if not all, Communist capitals.

I would be glad to furnish the relevant information on the cases mentioned above, but I initially wanted only to stimulate discussion on what seems to me an important issue of principle.

One final nit to pick is the omission from the "Checklist" of the minuscule (500-member) Palestine Communist Party, although it is mentioned in the accompanying text.

BOGDAN SZAJKOWSKI
University College
Cardiff
Great Britain

TO THE EDITORS: I read the "Checklist of Communist Parties, 1982" by Robert Wesson in the March–April 1983 issue of *Problems of Communism* with particular interest as I myself prepare a similar set of data for the Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien.

It is to be expected that in the welter of incomplete and often contradictory evidence on the topic of party memberships there will be differences in analysts' figures, and I do not wish to second-guess Professor Wesson in his impressive compilation. However, I would suggest that it might be better if the "Checklist" provided the source and date of the information on membership, as this helps set a benchmark for comparison and updating.

This said, let me offer some brief comments and alternative figures regarding claimed membership totals for various Communist parties, proceeding in the order of mention in the "Checklist":

- The Communist Party of Bolivia claims 20,000 members (*horizont*, No. 11, 1982).
- The Communist Party of Colombia claims 25,000 members (*horizont*, No. 49, 1980).
- In Mexico, the PSUM claims 40,000 members (*Bulletin d'information* [Prague], No. 15, 1983).
- In Panama, the PPP claims 36,000 members (*Neues Deutschland*, May 5, 1982).
- The Communist Party of India claims 480,000 members (*Neues Deutschland*, Mar. 19, 1982).
- The December 1982 membership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was claimed to be 852,000 (Hungarian Telegraph Agency [MTI], July 13, 1983).
- The claimed membership of the Polish United Workers' Party is 2,488,000 in the "Checklist" proper and 2,388,000 in the accompanying text (p. 101). My lat-



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est figure is 2,370,000 (*Polityka*, Jan. 22, 1983).

• The newest claim for the membership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is 18,000,000 (*Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus*, No. 1, 1983).

• The Communist Party of Austria claims 16,000 members (*Probleme des Friedens...*, No. 6, 1981).

• In Cyprus, AKEL claims 14,000 members (*Probleme des Friedens...*, No. 10, 1982).

• In the case of Greece, it is not clear to which of the two distinct Communist parties the 73,000 membership total in the "Checklist" refers. (I have never succeeded in getting an official claim for either.)

• The Italian Communist Party now claims 1,670,000 members (*l'Unita*, Mar. 7, 1983).

• The Communist Party of Portugal claims 200,000 members (*horizont*, No. 42, 1982).

• The Communist Party of San Marino claims 1,040 members (*Neues Deutschland*, Dec. 8, 1980).

• The Communist Party of Spain claims 100,000 members (*l'Unita*, Dec. 18, 1982).

Finally, the last Moscow world Communist conclave was in 1969 (and not 1960, as suggested on page 94). Seventy-five party delegations took part, although the conference was held without representatives of the Communist parties of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, Yugoslavia, or Japan.

HEINZ TIMMERMANN
Köln

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MR. WESSON RESPONDS: The suggestion of Dr. Bogdan Szajkowski that our list of Communist parties should be expanded by the inclusion of nine African and one Caribbean (Grenada's New Jewel Movement) parties is apposite. We have, of course, wrestled with the question of which parties are to be considered Communist, and most of those listed by Dr. Szajkowski are mentioned in the preface of the *Yearbook*. There is no way to draw a clear-cut boundary: criteria include vocabulary and statements used by the party in question, its attendance at international or national Communist party gatherings, cooperation agreements and programs with Communist countries, trade patterns, and so forth. We have tended to broaden the definition of "Communist" in the past few years and include additional countries in the *Yearbook* (some additional parties may be added, I understand, in the 1984 edition currently being prepared by Richard F. Staar). In the 1982 "Checklist," it seemed to us that South Yemen was to be placed on the "Communist" side of the line and Angola on the other; this is a judgment subject to revision.

In regard to membership figures, it does not seem practical to cite sources in the "Checklist," although many sources are cited in the texts of the country profiles in the *Yearbook*. Moreover, many of the figures in the "Checklist" are only estimates, and hence have no formal "source."

Membership is not easily defined, and we have mostly tried to give our best estimates—or guesses—of the number of *reliable* followers, taking into account whatever we know about the party in question. It is reasonable to suspect that most claims, at least those of nonruling parties, are inflated—a suspicion supported by the fact that many "claims" are obviously rounded figures.

Heinz Timmermann's figures for claimed memberships are by and large very close to those given in the "Checklist." This is particularly true for countries in Eastern and Western Europe. The only exception I would note relates to the claimed membership of the Communist Party of San Marino, which is more than triple our estimate. The claimed figure of 1,040 amounts to 5 percent of the population of the ministate. Such a percentage is probable only for a Communist-ruled polity.

As for Latin America, the claimed membership figures for parties in Bolivia, Colombia, and Panama seem unrealistically high, and that for the PSUM in Mexico unrealistically low in view of our knowledge (admittedly limited) of the parties in question.

ROBERT WESSON
Santa Barbara, CA

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## RIGHT TO SECEDE FROM YUGOSLAVIA?

TO THE EDITORS: I read with particular interest Viktor Meier's article, "Yugoslavia's National Question," in the March–April 1983 issue of your most valuable periodical. I would like to correct an important inaccuracy in this generally excellent contribution.

The author states that "in Article 1 of the constitution of 1946, the member republics even received the formal right to secede from the federation" (p. 48). As a matter of fact, Article 1 provided that the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia "is a community of equal peoples which, on the basis of self-determination, including the right of secession, have expressed their will to live together in a federal state" (See "Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia," *Službeni list* [Belgrade], No. 22, 1949). This is rather different from a constitutionally recognized right to secede. At the time, Edvard Kardelj, Mosha Pijade, and other leaders of the Yugoslav Communist party explained that the peoples of Yugoslavia through the national-liberation war had *once and for all* decided "to live together in a federal state" and thus forever *exhausted* the right of self-determination, including the right to secede (see, e.g., the letter by Pijade published in *Vojno-politički glasnik* [Belgrade], No. 10, 1950).

The author also says that in the "basic principles" preceding the revised constitution of 1963, as well as in the present constitution of 1974, "the nations of Yugoslavia were granted the fictitious right to secede" (p. 51). In fact, they were not granted even the fictitious right to secede. The formula in both cases was essentially the same as in the 1946 constitution; these nations, while *proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed in the common struggle of all nations and nationalities in the National Liberation War and Socialist Revolution ... have ... united in a federal republic ...*

(See *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, Secretariat for Information of the Federal Executive Council, 1963; and *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Merrick, NY, Cross-Cultural Communications, 1976).

National tensions existing in Yugoslavia from 1918 up to the present are ultimately due precisely to the fact that the peoples of Yugoslavia have never decided in a free referendum, after an all-embracing discussion in freedom, whether they wish to form a federation and, if so, what kind of federation.

IVO LAPENNA
Professor Emeritus of Soviet and East European Law,
London School of Economics and Political Science



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MR. MEIER RESPONDS: Professor Lapenna is correct in stating that already in Article 1 of the Yugoslav constitution of 1946 the "people" of Yugoslavia, and not the republics, were named as constituent parts of the new federal state. Even usually reliable sources (see, for example, *Osteuropa-Handuch. Jugoslawien*, Köln-Graz, Böhlau Verlag, 1954, p. 126) did not distinguish between these two elements. In my opinion, however, Prof. Lapenna is not correct in the conclusions that he draws from this. The "right of separation" is clearly mentioned. In this context, it is not important how seriously it was meant.

The Yugoslav constitution of 1946 followed the Soviet pattern, but not quite: Article 72 of the Soviet constitution grants this fictitious "right of separation" to the republics, while the Yugoslav constitution grants it to the "peoples." Article 1 of the Yugoslav constitution of 1946 states: "The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state." In both the revised constitution of 1963 and the later constitution of 1974 (now in effect), the right of separation was repeated, albeit only in the preamble, called "Basic Principles." There, it is again reserved for the "peoples" of Yugoslavia (1963), and for the "nations and nationalities" (1974). At least to that extent, it remains a "constitutional right." Article 1 of the revised constitution of 1963, by the way, mentions again the "peoples" of Yugoslavia as constituent parts of the state, while the same article of the 1974 constitution mentions not only the "peoples" but also "their socialist republics and autonomous provinces." The change in the wording marks clearly a progress in legal and constitutional awareness.

VIKTOR MEIER
Vienna

## Corrections

In Norman M. Naimark's review-essay, "Writing the GDR's History" (*Problems of Communism*, July-August 1983), on page 52, the initials of the Social Democratic Party were rendered incorrectly; they should be SPD. Also, on page 56, the June 17 holiday was identified incorrectly. It should be "the day of German unity."



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